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The thesis argues that while academic capitalism or the "Enterprise University"
will offer good prospects for new ways to enable the public-funded universities to
meet their aspirations under growing globalisation, the private sector managerial
practices must not be implanted to the public sector without regard to the
characteristics of the public organizations. In their attempt to use performance
appraisal to motivate staff by linking appraisal results to extrinsic rewards,
universities must take into account the academics' desire for intrinsic rewards,
particularly in terms of autonomy and professional development, and their dislike
of managerial control.
The case study of the Performance Planning, Appraisal and Development Scheme
of the City University of Hong Kong indicates that the most effective motivation
in the work place for academics is intrinsic motivation. The managerialist
approach to motivate academic staff through external means ONLY is often
perceived by staff as a means of control. The consequence, as suggested in the
thesis, is the academics' resistance to the appraisal and reward scheme, and a
deterioration in their motivation which has a direct bearing on the quality of
education. It has been argued that academic work is not readily quantifiable,
measurable or predictable, and its assessment requires subjective judgment of
quality. Consequently, performance appraisal focusing on control through
external technical means will only work to deprofessionalize the academic
workforce, turning devoted people away from the profession.
On the other hand, it was found equally not practicable to rely ONLY on intrinsic
rewards to motivate work performance. Intrinsic motivation cannot last long
unless staffs efforts are recognized in some form of tangible results, so that the
staff can confirm within themselves that they are contributing to the organization's
success.
The thesis supports an appraisal scheme that has a developmental focus,
supplemented by a system of visible rewards to give recognition to autonomous
efforts made by staff to enhance performance that contributes towards the
organization's goals. The desire to obtain the rewards to prove their merit and
worth comes from within the academic staff. The controlling aspect is minimized,
as control is based on professional values and motivation; the feedback aspect is
intensified as individuals attain personal satisfaction by developing themselves,
and making their best contribution to the organization's success. If every staff
member marches forward, the University will march forward.
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Since the late 1970s, the public sector has experienced a major shift from public
administration to public management, in response to changes in the social,
economical and political contexts. To remain economically competitive in an
emerging global economy, the governments have to reduce costs and eliminate
inefficiency. Market principles based on economic rationality which have
dominated private sector practices were imported to the public sector. The move,
which is known as "new managerialism", has had a great impact on the ways in
which governments are structured. Public services are run under a new set of
assumptions. The change has also affected the people who work in the public
sector, as their routines have been transformed.
Following the general trend in the Civil Service, the new managerialist approach
has also been applied to the higher education sector, affecting the public's
expectation of the role and functions of the universities, the way the universities
operate or deliver their functions, and the way academics should perform. Such
expectation impacted on the ways academics carry out their functions. A new era
of "academic capitalism" has emerged where universities are encouraged to
become "capitalist" enterprises. As academic staff play a crucial role in education
and developing human capital, through educating the students and the pursuit of
scholarship, their motivation to work and their performance are vital to the
success of the education sector. It is therefore of interest and importance to
examine the effect of new managerialism or "academic capitalism" on the people
who serve in higher education, and ultimately on higher education itself
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Running a market-oriented organization assumes that there is an effective system
to monitor and measure adequately the performance of the decentralized bodies as
well as the front-line staff, as people at the top are responsible for the ultimate
result of the organization. Performance management is therefore a key
component of the managerialist approach. The most commonly adopted means is
the introduction of performance appraisal and in many cases, linking pay to
appraisal results. However, performance measurement and contingent pay
schemes were said to have led to demoralization among public servants.
Introduction of performance appraisal in academia has aroused great concern in
the profession. Questions were raised as to whether performance appraisal based
on the philosophy of economic rationality is the way to motivate academic staff
towards enhanced performance. In tasks requiring successive, unique qualitative
judgments, as in teaching and research, motivated persons perform much better in
the long run than do unmotivated ones (Bess 1997: x). It is therefore of value to
find out the motivators and demotivators in an academic's performance, and in
particular, what motivates academics to devote energy and attention to academic
work, what keeps them committed to it, and what will resurrect the commitment
of those who have lost their interest.
This thesis has attempted to explore some possible answers to these questions, by
using a case study of the Performance Planning, Appraisal and Development
Scheme introduced in I 995 to appraise academic staff of the City University of
Hong Kong, a public-funded university. The key research question was whether
performance appraisal should be conducted to motivate academic staff and if so,
under what conditions would the appraisal be successful. The investigation has
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also shed some light on the validity of many assumptions that underpin new
managerialism in the public sector.
The research is a qualitative one, using in-depth interviewing as the main data
collection method to facilitate a deeper investigation of the issues. 21 interviews
were conducted.	 The respondents included five members from senior
management (the President, two Vice-Presidents and two Deans), five heads of
academic departments, five appraisers (who are also appraisees of other
appraisers) and five (six including the pilot interview) appraisees from five (six
including the pilot interview) academic departments. A purposive sampling
approach was used to ensure a good mix of people from different disciplines and
with different experience in undergoing the appraisal scheme. In addition, the
views expressed by participants in nine discussion group meetings, which were
conducted to discuss the merits of a reward and sanction scheme being proposed,
were also collated as a means to triangulate the data collected during the
interviews. The participants, ranging from 15 to 30 in number in each meeting,
were staff members spanning various academic ranks.
The thesis has been constructed in the following order. Chapter One sets the
scene, describing the general trend towards new managerialism and performance
appraisal. The assumptions underlining these phenomena are explored. It
concludes with a structure for the thesis. Chapter Two gives a review on the
literature on relevant concepts of performance appraisal and staff motivation,
together with a suitable theoretical framework for examining the validity of the
assumptions underlining performance appraisal, and thus its effects on staff
motivation. The review focuses on finding answers to the question of whether
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performance appraisal should be conducted, structuring around the possible
effects of performance appraisal on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. The use of
punishment as a kind of negative incentive is also covered. Chapter Three further
reviews literature on some common rewards and their values as assigned by
people, particularly academic staff Chapter Four explains the methodology used
in conducting the research and the reasons for choosing a qualitative approach.
The introduction of the Performance Planning, Appraisal and Development
Scheme in the City University of Hong Kong is described in Chapter Five,
together with a brief account of appraisal schemes in other local institutions. It
begins with an account of increasing adoption of managerial practices in Hong
Kong's public sector. Data collected from academic staff of the City University
of Hong Kong about the University's Performance Planning, Appraisal and
Development Scheme are presented in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven; the former
focuses on rewards valued by the respondents; the latter on issues about
assessment and the University's role in it. Chapter Eight, the final chapter, puts
the findings together with an attempt to illuminate issues that may arise from the
adoption of a judgmental appraisal scheme which distributes extrinsic rewards
according to appraisal results, and particularly on its possible effects on
motivating staff towards continuous improvement and development. Some
general implications on the validity of the assumptions held by new mangerialism
have also been explored.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Rise of New Managerialism and Performance Appraisal
This chapter sets the scene, describing the general trend towards new
managerialism and performance appraisal. The assumptions underlining these
phenomena are explored. It concludes with a structure for the thesis.
Introduction
The rise of "new managerialism" (Pollitt 1990) or "new public management"
(NPM) (Hood 1991) is the most noticeable worldwide movement in public
administration since the late 1970s. Hood (1991) describes NPM as a loose term,
"a shorthand name for the set of broadly similar administrative doctrines which
dominated the bureaucratic reform agenda in many of the OECD group of
countries from the late 1970s" (j.3). With the main purpose of making
governments more cost effective and more accountable to the public, two trends
emerged under NPM (Hughes 1994). One was to roll back the frontier of the state
by reducing government's involvement in the provision of public services; the
other one was to emphasize competition and control, with adoption of measures
such as total quality management, quality assurance and staff performance
appraisal.
The traditional bureaucratic model of public administration was replaced by ideas
borrowed from public-choice theory and private sector managerial practices.
While most reforms were "imposed" by the changes in the social, economical and
political contexts, many were also the result of the internal desire of public
administrators to search for "innovative mechanisms for making government work
better and to serve society better" (Peters 1996: 2).
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Social-Economical Context
The significant shifts in the economy forced governments to respond (Peters
1996: 13). International systems of finance, transport and communications have
led to greater global convergence. To remain economically competitive in an
emerging global economy, the governments have to reduce costs and eliminate
inefficiency. Globalisation, as defined as "a material set of practices drawn from
the world of business, combined with a new-liberal market ideology" (Marginson
and Considine 2000: 45) is in essence new managerialism.
Queries were raised about the increasing role of the public sector (Friedman 1962;
Hayek 1968; Sawer 1982). In the United Kingdom and the United States, both the
Thatcher and Reagan administration held the view that the government was too
big and too expensive. After the Second World War the public supported a wider
role of the state in which greater intervention of the state in economic and social
matters was preferred. Education, health, housing, social security and welfare
were all provided by the state. However, as economic growth slowed down in the
1 970s, the public became dissatisfied with the state's ability to solve economic
and social problems.
The hierarchical rules of governance in public organizations resulted in the slow
response or insensitivity to clients' needs. Furthermore, many people perceived
that the bureaucrats, acting to maximize their own personal self-interest (Egeberg
1995), tended to expand at an unjustifiable rate (Peters 1996), or to undersupply
certain goods and services (Breton 1974). Some bureaucrats might also be too
committed to serving their narrow clientele but not the public interest. The
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market, based on public choice, was believed to be the most efficient mechanism
for allocating resources.
While attempts were made to roll back the government in terms of public
spending and staffing, and to move towards privatization and contracting out of
the more capital-intensive public functions, it was found difficult to privatize or to
cut labour-intensive public services, such as education and health care. Therefore,
governments were faced with declining tax revenue, and at the same time,
political demands to maintain or even increase the access and the level of such
services. Given that public expenditure had to be contained, the only choice was
to improve the cost-effectiveness of these services so that more and better services
were delivered with less. Management techniques borrowed from the private
sector presented a possible solution.
Political Context
The bureaucratic model requires the public servants to be apolitical with "neutral
competence" (Kaufman 1956) taking order from their political masters. However,
there is an increasing policy-making role of the public servants in most
contemporary governments (Peters 1992; Kato 1994; Terry 1995), leading to "a
struggle over competence and authority in making public policy" (Peters 1996: 6).
NPM, with its implicit return to the politics-administration dichotomy, satisfies
the wish of the political masters to seek or regain control, such that the public
servants remain fully accountable to them. It presents a partial solution to the
search for ways to structure governments that "recognize the reality, and even the
desirability, of the significant policy role for civil servants while simultaneously
preserving the requirements of democratic accountability" (Peters 1996: 6).
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At the same time, there is increasing pressure from the public to gain access to the
public policy-making process. Public organizations can no longer compel
acceptance of public policy by authoritative means. They now have to negotiate
acceptance of the policy the government has made. Becoming entrepreneurial
enhances the public servants' ability to do so.
Implications for the Public Sector
The apparent success of managers in the private sector gave rise to the speculation
that the public sector had lacked behind. In the 1968 Fulton Report in the United
Kingdom, concerns were expressed about the management capability of the public
sector; a modern, result-based view of management was suggested. It
recommended that "the systems be opened up, that outsiders be employed at all
levels and that the rigid hierarchical structure in which barriers were placed at
several points be removed" (Hughes 1994: 64). A series of Financial
Management Initiatives was started, with the attempt to give government
departments clear objectives and specifications of responsibilities. The aim was
to make the public sector more efficient by adapting some business values and
management concepts. The approach was result-oriented and customer-oriented.
Similar reforms also took place in the United States, New Zealand and Canada in
the late 1970s and the early 1980s. In the United States, the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978 gave the public sector managers greater responsibility for results, and
a contingent pay system was introduced for middle management. Prompted by
the concern over the capability of the public managers to meet future demands,
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser set up the Reid Inquiry in 1982.
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The aim of NPM is to improve the value-for-money, results, performance,
outcomes and the effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness of public
organizations. NPM stresses a "lean and mean" approach. The market-oriented
reforms have led to decentralized and disaggregated government departments.
Consequently, managers need to be given greater discretionary power. In order to
be responsive to the clients' needs, it is equally crucial to empower the street-level
bureaucrats who deal with the individual cases (Lipsky 1980) to enable them to
make instantaneous and autonomous decisions about the services. The move is
towards a relatively flat organizational structure. However, as people at the top
are responsible for the ultimate result of the organization, running a market-
oriented organization assumes that there is an effective system to monitor and
measure adequately the performance of the decentralized bodies as well as the
street-level bureaucrats. Paradoxically, decentralization necessitates certain degree
of centralization, and the locus of control now rests primarily at the top of the
public organizations.
As the public sector and the private sector are considered fundamentally alike in
all important aspects, the instruments used to motivate employees in the private
sector are considered equally applicable to the public servants (Linden 1994). In
the market model the basic belief is in the virtues of incentives (King 1987;
LeGrand 1989). Instead of lifetime employment and regular salaries irrespective
of performance, staff appraisal and contingent pay schemes become the principal
means of motivation for the public servants under NPM. Control is now exercised,
not by directives, but by means of clear, explicit and quantifiable performance
measurements which are linked to rewards to provide incentives.
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The private sector is a system based on profit motive and market forces (Bargh,
Scott and Smith 1996) with particular concern about results, performance and
outcomes. NPM emphasizes results and managerial accountability amidst a
climate of "doubt over the efficiency and appropriateness of public services"
(Pollitt 1990: 114). Performance measurement becomes critical to the success of
NPM. To measure the achievement of results, objectives in the form of
quantitative performance indicators are set to appraise performance systematically.
Paradoxically, performance management schemes introduced under the name of
enhancing "efficiency" have brought resulting evidence of declining morale in the
public service (Lee 1986; Pollitt 1990; Wildavsky 1988).
Implications for the Universities
The public-funded universities were not immune from the trend of globalisation,
as the public sector struggles to remain competitive in the emerging global
economy. Government policy in education is now economically rather than
educationally directed. The global university market dominates, as global free
trade in education is considered the preferred way forward. A new era of
"academic capitalism" (Slaughter and Leslie 1997) has emerged where
universities are encouraged to become "capitalist" enterprises.
Consequently, the public-funded universities are changing irreversibly under the
pressure of globalisation (Readings 1996; Currie and Newson 1998). They are
becoming transnational corporation whose mission is corporate rather than
cultural (Marginson and Considine 2000: 41). Universities now have to depend on
market sources of funding, as a result of cut in public funding. "An
entrepreneurial spirit is now sweeping the cloisters", at high speed and in great
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extent, of the "Enterprise University" (Marginson and Considine 2000: 2, 4). The
balance sheet is "the" indicator of preference and value. Teaching, research and
other forms of scholarship are now subject to new systems which require the
academics to compete by demonstrating performance in accordance with
managerial rules. For example, research which used to be under academic control
is now directed under university-industry partnerships dominated by profit-
seeking under the pressure of market imperatives.
Assumptions under New Managerialism
As Hood (1994) summarises, the "general themes (of NPM) are the idea of a shift
in emphasis from policy-making to management skills in the upper reaches of
public-sector organizations, from a stress on process to a stress on output, from
orderly hierarchies to an intentionally more competitive basis for providing
services, from fixed to ariable pay and from a uniform and inclusive public
service to a variant structure with more emphasis on contract provision" (p.129).
The two main theoretical bases for NPM are economics and private sector
management (Hughes 1994: 74-77). The former refers to economic rationality.
The latter includes ideas such as placing "focus on results" and controlling
performance through "assessment of success in achieving goals" (Hughes 1994:
257). These NPM perspectives are based on a number of assumptions, an account
of which follows.
Market Philosophy, Economic Efficiency and Competition
Market values underpin the need for the public sector reform. The market
philosophy questions public regulation in an all-out manner. Returning to the free
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market was considered the fundamental solution to all the problems faced by
public organizations. While the bureaucracy operates according to set rules, the
market adjusts services simply and quickly on the basis of supply and demand.
The market mechanism is regarded as superior and more efficient in resource
allocation, given that the market is more cost-conscious as it is basically
concerned with profit-making.
The emphasis on efficiency pre-supposes the operation of the market mechanism
with competition, which offers the best solutions in the economy (Lane 1994).
Competition is encouraged as it keeps costs down while pushing standards up. In
addition to promoting efficiency, it also enhances consumers' sovereignty, as the
winner will only be rewarded when the services or products are efficiently
delivered to the consumers' specification. Responsiveness to consumers is
considered important, as the main job of government is to give people what they
choose to "buy". The public service as a whole will achieve better results and
greater public accountability. Since individual decision-making is preferable to
collective decision-making, individuals and family rather than "society" should be
the "center of responsibility" (Flynn 1990).
It is the managerialists' belief that the main route to social advancement is
through continuing increases in economically defined efficiency, made possible
through the application of increasingly sophisticated technologies by a labour
force "disciplined in accordance with the productivity ideal" (Alvesson 1987:
158). The focus shall no longer be placed on input or the process. Achievement
of results becomes the main aim at both organizational and individual levels.
More emphasis is placed on output control under the guidance of an overall
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strategy with clear objectives set. The stress on measuring output is evident in the
Financial Management Initiative in the United Kingdom (UK Treasury and Civil
Service Committee 1982) which states that managers at all levels should have:
(a) a clear view of the organizational objectives; and means to assess, and
wherever possible, measure, output or performance in relation to those
objectives; and
(b) well-defined responsibility for making the best use of their resources,
including a critical scrutiny of output and value for money.
One major criticism against NPM is that fundamental values are taken as given
and unquestioned. While NPM insists on more efficient use of resources, it does
not deal with the questions of efficiency for whom, and accountability to whom.
It also does not examine whether efficiency and consumer responsiveness should
be the only values and goals in the public sector. It does not concern itself with
resource allocation and their distributional effects. The managerialist approach is
dominated by the market values, emphasizing economy, and efficiency, with
effectiveness a poor third; other values including fairness, justice, or
representation are either not on the agenda or are regarded as constraints on the
strive for higher productivity (Pollitt 1990). Many other important values, such as
impartiality, probity, equity and participation are neglected (Bayne 1989; Bryson
1986; Yeatman 1987). Doubts are also cast on guarantees of honesty and fair
dealing and of security and resilience (Hood, 1991). Generally speaking, market
justice over-rides political and social justice (Lane 1986).
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Output Control Rights Exercised by Managers
Increased managerial control over the workforce and efficiency in resource
allocation are the essential components of NPM. The return to the market
mechanism necessitates the devolution of decision-making to the local levels, in
order to be responsive to the market forces. To maintain control, managers must
be given greater discretionary power, so that their powers are no longer confined
by rules. Such a change has re-defined the balance of power between the
managers and the workforce in favour of the former. Public administrators are
now managers who have the right to manage. They wield great discretionary
power through shaping corporate cultures and setting and measuring output.
A model of management replaces the old model of administration. Management
evolved as a separate and distinct organizational function as a result of mass
production in industrial capitalism, where people believed that more efficiency
could be achieved if the functions of strategic planning, coordination and control
were separated from the routine operations. Specialist managers were created
who were supported by systems of surveillance to monitor the work performance
of the workers. Managers possess the right to decide resource allocation, and to
resolve conflict. While there may be variations in management styles, such as
between Fordist/Taylorist "scientific management" and post-Fordist human
relations, all managers assert the right to manage their subordinates, and to impose
ultimate authority by virtue of their position with delegated authority from owners
or shareholders. As they assume personal responsibility for results and
organizational success, naturally they must be granted reasonable discretionary
power in order to perform a critical role in planning, implementing and measuring
the required improvement in efficiency.
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Managerialism believes in this model of private sector style management (Hood
1990). "Managerialism is a set of beliefs and practices, at the core of which burns
the seldom-tested assumption that better management will prove an effective
solvent for a wide range of economic and social ills" (Pollitt 1990: 1). It is a
movement towards applying business type, scientific management skills in the
public sector (Hood 1991), assuming that better management can offer a more
logical, rational and orderly approach to improve performance in the public sector.
It also assumes that all problems can be solved merely by improved management
for efficiency. Since management skills are generic, applicable equally to both
public and private organizations, the practices of the private sector, particularly
those of leading companies, can be transplanted to the public sector. There is no
distinction between running a factory and running a hospital. Indeed Hughes
(1994) considers that the main functions of general management listed by Allison
(1982) are things "public managers now do in the course of their work" (p.63).
Public servants are now managers instead of administrators, and the work they do
is now managerial rather than administrative. Higher priority is given to the
"management of people, resources and programmes" compared to the
"administration of activities, procedures and regulations" (Aucoin 1988: 152).
With delegated authority, they are now answerable to the public for completing
agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of performance (Day and Klein 1987).
The managerialist approach sees politics as external to the public manager's job
(Alford 1993). It believes in the politics - administration dichotomy and assumes
that politicians rather than public servants make policy decisions. Critics of new
managerialism argue that in practice it is extremely difficult to separate politics
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from administration. Given the political dimension of the public services, there
are limitations to focusing on efficiency in managing the operations.
Predictability, Quantification and Calculability
Control is repeatedly emphasized under NPM (Hood 1991; Hughes 1994; Pollitt
1990). To maintain ultimate control at the central level, quantitative performance
measurement becomes important to ensure compliance (Scott 1994). Hood (1991)
highlights as key elements of the doctrine of NPM: explicit standards and
measures of performance by defining goals, targets, indicators of success,
preferably in quantitative terms. Performance measurement helps to exercise
output control by linking rewards to performance.
In order to measure efficiency and exercise control, it is assumed that all public
sector activities are products which are "definable precisely without ambiguity"
(Considine 1988: 11).
	 An emphasis is placed on "discipline, order,
systematization, formalisation, routine, consistency, and methodical operation"
(Ritzer 1993: 83) to ensure predictability which allows control. Quantification
and calculability constitute the second dimension of "McDonaldization", the term
coined by Ritzer (1993), in additional to efficiency, predictability and control.
Quantitative measurement is considered more acceptable than human judgment as
it is perceived to be more objective and scientific. Everything is measured and
costed. Quantity has become equivalent to quality. "Quantification allows for
comparability and, therefore, for competition, which rewards the winners and
shows up the losers" (Hartley 1995: 411).
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To ensure that efficiency is achieved, organizational and personal objectives are
set clearly to enable systematic measurement of achievement; and performance
indicators are used to denote explicit standards and measures of performance.
Successes of the managerialism depend on an initial process of defining a set of
clear, mutually compatible objectives (Pollitt 1990) which are translated into sets
of operational targets. Public services are now perceived as businesses with
mission statements defined as clear statements of goals and objectives which are
quantifiable and measurable.
Importance of Extrinsic Rewards
Given its focus on output and control, NPM emphasizes extrinsic rewards, almost
to the complete exclusion of intrinsic rewards. It is much easier for the managers
to control by passing out extrinsic rewards than to rely on the individuals to derive
intrinsic satisfaction from the jobs. For example, critics have argued that the Civil
Service Reform Act in the United States was based on a model of management
which has relied on manipulation of extrinsic incentives such as pay.
NPM believes that "individuals will not perform to their fullest unless an
appropriate system of incentives is in place" (Hughes 1994: 71). Therefore, in
addition to a change of focus to output there are also changes to input (people who
carry out the job) by improving incentives and thereby performance. "There is a
change in the (positive and negative) incentives to which public servants respond,
often with the introduction of material rewards" (OECD report, 1991: 11). Weak
linkages between performance and pay, promotion, and discipline are thought to
have weakened motivation in the public services (Rainey 1991: 120). To correct
the weak linkages, incentives used to improve performance. More flexibility in
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hiring and firing is adopted, with greater emphasis on appraising performance to
differentiate the higher achievers and the under-performers, so as to reward those
who are doing the work and to sanction those who fail to do it. Furthermore, the
change from life-time career employment to contract terms intensifies the impact
of performance appraisal on the public servants. The result is "greater managerial
control of staff, with appraisal as key element in achieving these goals" (Elliot
1987: 173).
Performance Appraisal Introduced under New Managerialism
It has been shown that performance management is a particularly important part
of NPM. "Performance management has at its heart the belief that organizational
effectiveness can be heightened through systems which can identify and measure
key performance criteria and reinforce these through the more selective
application of rewards". (Bright and Williamson 1995: 73). The objective is to
support the corporate objectives through the management of performance towards
these objectives.
Managerialism is associated with the introduction of performance appraisal on a
more formal and extensive basis, and of contingent pay schemes linked to
performance appraisal. Informal methods of appraisal were considered to be
ineffective, resulting in inferior organizational outcomes. Performance of
individual staff is to be measured more systematically than before. Staff are
rewarded or sanctioned according to progress towards agreed objectives. The
general aim is to "monitor and improve the progress of staff towards achieving
objectives" (Hughes 1994: 206). Instead of exercising control by rules and
hierarchical authority, control is now maintained through imposing strict
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performance targets and improving management of human resources through
introduction of contingent pay (OECD, 1991: 11).
In the traditional model of public administration, "controlling performance is
rather weak" (Hughes 1994: 62). However, controlling performance through
performance appraisal is an important function of the management (Allison 1982),
assisting it to measure progress towards the organizational goals and to make
decisions. Control is necessary for co-ordination and integration purposes under
the managerialist model where objectives and goals are set at the top while
managers at the local levels do implementation. If the central authority "is to
maintain control over the implementation of policies while at the same time
decentralising day to day responsibility, the performance indicators become an
essential tool" (Carter, Klein and Day 1992: 179). "A battery of evaluation,
measurement and reward systems" helps "steer them (local managers) in their
work" (Considine 1988: 9). Staff performance appraisal appeals to the senior
management as it gives the promise of improved control of the lower levels in the
hierarchy.
In the United Kingdom, for instance, there was a continuous increasing emphasis
on performance after the launch of the Financial Management Initiatives. A white
paper of July 1984 suggested that: "More measures of achievement are needed to
translate objectives for improved management into targets for individual
managers who can then be held accountable for achieving an agreed level of
performance". It called for "more performance-related staff appraisal and
reporting procedures, performance incentives (including merit pay) and new
procedures for dealing with inefficiency and poor performance". In education,
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most appraisal schemes were introduced as a result of implementation of national
pay settlements, i.e., appraisal was a condition of the settlement. Developments
occurring from the early 1980s included the appraisal of individual teacher
performance which is linked with the idea of salary restructuring and contingent
pay, and the assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of particular schools
and the local education authorities. The Jarrett Report (1985) proposed specific
performance indicators for universities funded by the University Grants
Committee. It recommended that consideration be given to staff development,
appraisal and accountability (Elliot 1987: 172).
While performance appraisal has been extensively used as a management tool in
the private sector and the government, its systematic application in higher
education is relatively recently (Imrie 1996). Appraisal was externally imposed
by government on institutions and their staff as a test of efficiency and
competence under a climate of doubt over the efficiency of public services, as
perceived failures in public service programmes by a variety of professional
groups including doctors and teachers had weakened public confidence in these
groups. The purpose was to manage and control performance. Naturally the
imposition generated suspicion and resentment among the institutions and their
staff (Hughes 1998). The schemes were seen as procedures which were to fulfill
compliance but which would not generate enthusiasm.
During the period of reforms in both the United Kingdom and the United States,
morale in the public service was said to be extremely low (Lee 1986; Wildavsky
1988). Pollitt (1990: 178) argues that "while indicators may show significant
improvements in economy and efficiency, there is much less information
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available concerning the overall effects of these changes on the effectiveness or
quality of services. On the contrary, such evidence as there is points towards a
widespread demoralization of those working in the public services". There were
specific events which were thought to have demotivated public servants.
Contingent pay schemes were a focus of discontent (Brighhouse 1987) and have
led to widespread perceptions of unfairness in both the federal service (Perry and
Pearce 1985) and in teaching (Hughes 1994). Even "if performance pay is a good
idea in the abstract, it has been hard to implement it in a fair and reasonable way"
(Hughes 1994: 209). The Civil Service Reform Act in the United States has not
convinced public managers of its merits, as they perceived no particular
improvement in the relationship between performance and incentives.
Various studies on the effect of appraisal of academic staff in different
universities in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia (Blackburn and
Pitney 1988; Smith 1996; Haslam et al 1992; Hutchinson 1995; Lonsdale 1990)
suggest that the overall impact of the appraisal schemes was negative. Most
academics found appraisal costly and time-consuming. Consequently, some
appraisal schemes had degenerated into useless paper exercises, their only
purpose being to comply with the procedures (Suffolk Education Department
1995). At best appraisals were regarded as irrelevant and at worst they were
considered as having a negative effect (Hughes 1998). Many schemes were
subsequently neglected as institutions were busy coping with other changes
required of them (Hughes 1998).
In Hong Kong, the traditional performance appraisal scheme in the Civil Service
which focused more on personality traits was replaced by a more rigorous scheme
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which emphasizes objectives setting and the alignment of personal and work-
related goals to those of the organization (Hayllar 1997). As for the universities,
attempts have been made to implement appraisal schemes of one kind or another
(see Chapter Five). The effects of all these moves have yet to be fully evaluated.
Validity of Assumptions under New Managerialism
The concept of measuring and appraising performance is based on the assumption
from economics that "organizations and individuals will not perform to their
fullest unless an appropriate system of incentives is in place" (Hughes 1994: 71).
It is based on the belief that "viable systems of reward and recognition are a key
ingredient in the success of any organization" (Bright and Williamson 1995: 71).
It will be worthwhile to examine whether these concepts and beliefs are applicable
to academia. The purpose is to find out whether performance appraisal of
academic staff, which distributes rewards according to performance, is an
effective tool to motivate staff towards enhancement of performance.
According to Stumph and Rindova (1997: 270), most assessment techniques treat
individuals in organizations as objects of evaluation, and the administrative
representatives of the organization as an authoritative source of correct judgment,
based on the following assumptions which have their roots to the NPM
perspectives:
External appraisals are more valid than internal ones because people tend to
overrate their own effectiveness.
Appraisals are based on standardized information that ensures comparability
and objectivity.
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Appraisals measure outcomes relative to clearly defined goals and
performance standards.
People derive value from knowing how well they fulfill organizational
expectations because organizations control future outcomes that individuals
value.
Economics is one of the two main theoretical bases for new public management
(Hughes 1994: 74); the other one being private sector management, which is itself
based on economics. With its roots in public choice, agency and transaction cost
theories, economics assumes individual rationality, that is, individuals will prefer
more of something than less. It offers "precision, prediction and empiricism,
backed by a motivational theory of how people acted". (Hughes 1994: 75). This
thesis investigates the validity of the motivational and psychological assumptions
behind performance appraisal. In particular, it examines whether the assumption
of economic rationality is valid in its application to motivate academic staff by
means of performance appraisal. The key research question was whether
performance appraisal can motivate academic staff, and under what conditions. A
case study of the Performance Planning, Appraisal and Development Scheme
introduced in the City University of Hong Kong for academic staff in 1995 was
conducted. In the process of examining the validity of the assumption of the
importance of incentives, other assumptions that underpin new public
management are also examined, including the role of efficiency, quantification,
calculability and predictability of public products, as well as the merits of
managerial control.
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The Expectancy Theory of Motivation has been used as the framework of analysis,
given its base on economic rationality. The theory predicts that a person will
perform some kind of cost-benefit analysis for his/her own behavior at work, and
if the estimated benefit is worth the cost, then he/she is likely to apply more effort
(Newstrom and Davis 1993). The theory posits that a person considering an
action sums up the values of all the outcomes that will result from the action, with
each outcome weighted by the probability of occurrence. The higher the
probability of good outcomes and the lower the probability of bad ones, the
stronger the motivation to perform the action.
An analysis using the expectancy theory helps focus the analysis on key
components of the motivation process. The analysis will shed light on
implications on managerial practices as it may help identify the points in the
model where motivations (expectancies) are low (Walker and Symons, 1997) and
attempts can then be made to find out ways to enhance the motivations
(expectancies). In particular, the findings will reveal whether and how appraisal
and reward systems will affect the motivation of academic staff, so that
improvement could be made. More importantly, further analysis on the reasons
why the motivations (expectancies) are high or low will provide useful
perspectives for examining the validity of the assumptions underlying
performance appraisal and NPM doctrines as they are applied to the universities.
Summary
The new public management doctrines are built on concepts of market values,
managerial control supported by performance appraisal, performance
measurement and extrinsic reward structures. Market values emphasize
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competition, consumer sovereignty and economic efficiency. Managerial control
relies on the quantification, calculability and predictability of the public service.
Given these focuses, the motivation to work is necessarily biased towards the use
of externally - mediated rewards, which are more readily controlled by the
managers. While such an approach may be effective in enhancing performance in
private organizations, its applicability in public organizations, such as in higher
education, may not be equally relevant.
The thesis examines the validity of the assumptions underlining new
managerialism, particularly in respect of performance appraisal centering around
extrinsic rewards, based on the case study of the Performance Planning, Appraisal
and Development Scheme of the City University of Hong Kong. To draw up a
suitable framework for conducting the inquiry, literature on relevant concepts of
performance appraisal and staff motivation has been reviewed (see following
chapter and Chapter Three). Particular attention has been paid to the Expectancy





Performance Appraisal and Work Motivation
Literature on relevant concepts ofperformance appraisal and staff motivation is
reviewed, with a view to drawing up a suitable theoretical framework for
examining the validity of the assumptions underlining performance appraisal, and
thus its effects on staff motivation. The review focuses on finding answers to the
question of whether performance appraisal of academic staff should be
conducted, structuring around the possible effects of performance appraisal on
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. The use of punishment as a kind of negative
incentive is also covered.
Purposes of Performance Appraisal
Appraisal is defined as "a method of reviewing and monitoring performance
within a given time period and agreeing courses of action for the future" (Bright
and Williamson 1995: 73). It may serve a variety of purposes (Beach 1985;
Comstock 1987; Haslam et al 1992, 1993; Klingner and Nalbandian 1985;
Randall 1989; Shafritz eta! 1986). The most common ones are:
(a) motivate employees to maintain and improve work performance;
(b) highlight needs and opportunities for growth and development;
(c) facilitate mutual understanding between the supervisor and subordinates;
(d) aid personnel decisions, including promotions, transfers, layoffs;
(e) define the specific job criteria against which performance will be measured;
(f) accurately measure past job performance;
(g) distribute and justify the rewards by discriminating between high and low
performance;
(h) provide a profile of the organization in terms of its human resources capital;
(i) place the right person in the right job;
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(j) clarify goals, matching employee goals with those of the organization;
(k) provide some form of accountability;
(I)	 aid succession planning.
"Most performance evaluation systems have not been very successful" (Shafritz et
a! 1986: 430). In those systems they studied, Shafritz et a! (1986) found that
"almost half of the employees said their performance ratings are not useful in
assessing their strengths and weaknesses, improving their performance or
determining their contribution to the organization" Q.431). Haslam et al (1993)
found that 50% of staff in both the pre- and post-appraisal surveys conducted
among universities in the United Kingdom felt that appraisal had not improved
efficiency nor staff motivation. The lack of impact reflected some problems with
performance appraisal. What follows gives a review of the most critical and
common problems, particularly those in relation to academia.
Major Debates about Performance Appraisal of Academic Staff
Judgmental or Developmental Purposes
The variety of functions of performance appraisal can be grouped according to
two main purposes, one focusing on judging performance to maintain managerial
control and accountability, the other one focusing on professional development of
individual staff (Beach 1985; Bright and Williamson 1995; Comstock 1987; Duke
and Stiggins 1990; Elmuti, Kathawala and Wayland 1992; Hutchison 1995;
Kearney 1977; Lopez 1968; Lovrick 1990; Poster and Postor 1993; Ramsden
1992; Schweiger and Sumners 1994; Webb 1994). There is a growing consensus
among personnelists that these two main purposes represent "two very different -
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and in many ways antithetical - phenomena" (Lovrich 1990: 99). On the one
hand, the appraisal process is used by employers in a summative way to
differentiate good and bad performance to support personnel decisions; on the
other hand, it is intended as a formative evaluation to help staff members identify
strengths and weaknesses so as to pian appropriate professional development
activities (Suffolk Education Department 1995).
It is not surprising to find that many educational institutions have got trapped in
the polarity of purpose of staff appraisal. In the appraisal scheme implemented in
Local Education Authorities and Schools in England and Wales during 1990-94,
"teacher appraisal was, from the outset, conceived of as a positive developmental
process" (McMahon and Bolam 1989: 31). The Advisory, Conciliation and
Arbitration Service Working Group Report (ACAS Report 1986) states that
appraisal is not "a series of perfunctory periodic events, but a continuous and
systematic process intended to help individual teachers with their professional
development and career planning". At the same time the information gathered in
the process will help "to ensure that the in-service training and deployment of
teachers matches the complementary needs of individual teachers and the
schools". The intention of the teacher appraisal was "to raise the quality of
education in schools by providing teachers with better job satisfaction, more
appropriate in-service training and better planned career development based upon
more informed decisions" (McMahon and Bolam 1989: 31). Thus it transpires
that the policy makers were concerned with the managerial function of monitoring
and controlling the performance of the staff in terms of the quality of education
delivered, in addition to the professional development of the teachers.
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The teacher evaluation policy developed by the Alberta Education (the provincial
department of education) in 1984 was also designed to achieve two purposes: to
inform persoimel decisions and to develop staff. However, the reality as revealed
by a comprehensive review of the policy conducted by the Alberta Education in
1991 is that the "predominant purpose of teacher evaluation is to monitor and
control teacher performance in order to discharge the legal responsibility of the
school boards and administrators" (Bosetti et al 1996: 155).
The tension between the summative (controlling) purposes and the formative
(developmental) purposes of appraisal constitutes part of the reason for the
negative perception of staff appraisal schemes. The second purpose which
facilitates "the development of professional competence and careers" would
naturally be welcomed by staff as it can "professionally empower them" (Elliot
199ja: 95). However, staff would be resistant to the first purpose, as it uses
"appraisal as a strategy of hierarchical surveillance and control" (Elliot 1991 a:
93). It is a common perception among employees that "performance appraisal is
directed toward technical and management goals but rarely toward employee
aspirations". (Klingner and Nalbandian 1985: 213).
There appears to be "a tension between corporate needs for control and individual
needs for freedom and fulfillment" (Hendry 1995: 15). The universities' wish to
give academic staff the latitude to decide for themselves how to improve and
develop may have to give way to their obligation to "control education in order to
respond to public demands and economic realities" (Bosetti et al 1996: 157).
Both the organization and the individual staff want the performance appraisal to
meet particular objectives to serve their own needs. These objectives may or may
29
not be compatible. The organization's objectives are at least two-fold: seeking
information from the staff to assist judgment in deciding rewards and other
personnel issues; and developing staff through counselling, coaching, career
planning, etc. On the other hand, while the staff want to seek valid feedback on
their performance and what management values, they are really looking for
feedback in order to satisfy their ego for success and to maintain self-image (Beer
1986).
The two organization's objectives are in conflict within themselves. When the
managers conduct performance appraisal to meet a judgmental purpose, the
scheme is a tool by which the managers make difficult judgments that affect the
staff's future. When the managers communicate their judgments to their
subordinates, "they may well have to justify their appraisal in response to, or in
anticipation of, subordinates' disagreement. The result can be an adversary
relationship, faulty listening, and low trust. None of these are conducive to the
coaching and development objectives of performance appraisal" (Beer 1986: 143).
The individual's own objectives are conflicting too, as they would tend to avoid
accepting failure and negative feedback although these would be useful to their
future development. The greatest divergence is between organizational and
individual objectives. "The individual desires to confirm a positive self-image
and to obtain organizational rewards, such as promotion or pay. The organization
wants individuals to be receptive to negative information about themselves in
order to improve their performance and promotability" (Beer 1986: 144).
It was believed that the predominant form of teacher evaluation was a deficit
model of performance, based on "presumption of incompetence" (Bosetti and
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O'Reilly 1996: 156). The debates about appraisal of academic staff in universities
have also revolved around the poles of "professional autonomy versus managerial
control" (Elliot 1987: 172) with the university academic staff displaying "a
great(er) disdain towards appraisal by management" (Elliot 1987: 172). The
academic staff supported professional appraisal which "embraced the aim of
improving performance through self-and peer appraisal and rejected any linkage
between the appraisal process and management decisions about promotion and
salaries" (Elliot 1987: 172).
The focus on the managerial aspect of performance appraisal has led to great
misgivings in the many universities that practised it. Such appraisal has "a
negative feel, because it was geared toward checking up on people rather than
promoting development" (Clandinin et a! 1996: 172), resulting in a "negative
effect upon faculty members' feeling of autonomy, responsibility and opportunity
for creativity and innovation" (McKeachie 1997: 34). The academic staff felt
demoralized as appraisal connotes distrust of their professional integrity.
Academics prefer a model of growth rather than a deficit model. Smyth (1996:
185) contends that "there is a good deal of intrinsic appeal and widespread
support for the notion of teacher evaluation for development and growth, as
distinct from conformity, compliance and control"; teaching staff are "more
favourably disposed towards models that respect them as competent professionals,
that allow them to identify professional goals, that are based on trusting
relationships, and that make provision to construct a continuous learning culture".
Academics wish to have control over their o'. performance. They emphasize
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professional learning and career development as the primary purposes of appraisal
(Elliot 1991a: 95).
Universities have to account to the public for the performance of its staff. At the
same time they should help staff develop for the long-term benefits of the
universities. A judgmental staff appraisal scheme may immediately serve the
accountability function; however, it may inhibit staff growth in the long run rather
than develop it. As Hall (1996: 152) asserts "the potential of appraisal systems in
education for identifying development needs is muddied by their accountability
purpose of performance, potential and reward review". Shall the universities
adopt a judgmental appraisal and abdicate its responsibility for staff development,
or is there a possibility of getting the best of both worlds?
Assessment Criteria
Any attempt to reinforce good academic work by rewarding it is a difficult
endeavour because of the problems in defining good academic work and
measuring it (Schuster and Zingheim 1992). Measurement of performance is
often associated with quantification, which "has been considered the necessary
and sufficient criterion for an objective evaluation" (Braskamp and Ory 1994: 7).
Very often, the management believes that reward systems that tie rewards to
"hard" criteria (such as quantity of output, profits, or sales) will "stand a much
better chance of succeeding" (Lawler 1994: 176) since such measurements appear
to be objective and verifiable. However, for academic work such as teaching,
hard criteria of measuring performance are not readily available. Consequentially,
the giving of rewards differentially to academic staff may not serve to motivation
staff. On the contrary, it may even be dysfunctional if it neglects good
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performance in an area that is difficult to measure and yet important for the
effectiveness of the universities (Lawler 1994). Moreover, many aspects of
performance which are quantifiable "may not be very important in the long run"
(Porter and Lawler 1968: 26), for example, the number of hours taught
irrespective of the student's learning.
The criteria for measuring successful performance of academic staff are "diffuse
and qualitative", and some academic work "does not bear immediate fruit"
(Suffolk Education Department 1995: 3) since "to research effectively or to teach
successfully requires long-term planning" (Bright and Williamson 1995: 72). The
performance criteria "are not easily measurable, as is the case with industrial or
commercial employment, in market terms" (Bright and Williamson 1995: 72).
Although some quantitative measures have been developed, for example, research
output and teaching evaluations, those are "not subtle enough to distinguish the
qualitatively different levels of performance of different groups of academics".
As a result, "there is the danger that neither the potential high fliers nor the serious
underachievers will be adequately managed" (Bright and Williamson 1995: 72).
For instance, it is "impossible to isolate and measure the singular effect of
teaching" (Walker and Symons 1997: 6) along "any single dimension of quality"
(Trow 1997: 390). Teaching is an inherently ambiguous and non-standardized
technology because outcomes are often complex, multifaceted and non-specified
(Stumph and Rindova 1997). It involves both the teacher and the students and
thus it cannot be assessed as an attribute or skill of the teacher, independent of the
students. "Teaching is not an action but a transaction, not an outcome but a
process, not performance but an emotional and intellectual connection" between
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the teacher and the students, and "the quality of teaching is not a quality of a
teacher but of a relationship" (Trow 1997: 390), and is affected by the character,
talents, and motivations of the students. 	 Teaching can hardly be assessed at all
in the short term, as the impact on the students may take years to emerge. Indeed,
it is difficult to know what the effect of teaching will be on the students over their
lifetime (Trow 1997).
The educational process should not be confined to the learning of the subjects:
students should learn to enhance problem-solving ability, to prepare for their
career, to develop independence, to recognize their increasing competence and to
become more constructive and responsible members of the society. "Much of
these educational objectives are difficult to measure" (Suffolk Education
Department 1995: 2). Furthermore, there are "factors other than the individual's
efforts" (Porter and Lawler 1968: 26), for instance, "student achievements are
influenced by home environment, peers, level of ability, class size, and other
factors that complicate the assessment of teachers based on student performance"
(Klingner and Nalbandian 1985: 216).
There are some generally accepted characteristics of good teaching (Goodwin and
Stevens 1993): enthusiasm, knowledge of the subject area, stimulation of interest
in the subject matter, organization, communication clarity, concern for students,
use of higher cognitive levels for discussion, encouragement of active learning
and student participation, and provision of constructive feedback. However, it is
also generally agreed that it is difficult to measure teaching effectiveness, and the
difficulty is still a major concern that is unresolved today (Goodwin and Stevens
1993; McKeachie 1963). Furthermore, performance appraisals are often loaded
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with problems of invalid assessment due to inconsistency between supervisors,
and many of the common mistakes made by evaluators, such as halo effect,
central tendency error, recency error, and personal bias, etc. Consequently, good
performance may not result in good ratings. There is also the question of equity
as not every staff member is given equal opportunity to demonstrate individual
merit.
Minimum Corn petencies
An organization justifiably exists if it serves its purposes. In order to survive, it
has to exercise control over the quality of its products or service. However, when
quality control resorts to the form of managerial control from the top, the quality
is often defined in terms of minimal competencies, confining to the most generic
of technical skills (McLaughlin and Pfeifer 1988; Haughey and Howard 1996).
The managerialist form of appraisal inhibits staff's commitment to both the task
and the organization (Hutchinson 1995). When teacher appraisal schemes are
concerned primarily with managerial control, the results will also be minimum
competencies (House and Lapan 1989). "Some teachers will learn to perform
certain tricks in order to pass examinations in subjects they do not understand.
They will not become qualified to teach better, but to hide their inefficiencies
better" (Ramsden 1992: 226).
Appraisal systems which stress control will demotivate competent staff, as they
are "rewarded by being ignored" (Haughey and Howard 1996: 168). A system of
judgment based solely on the achievement of pre-determined targets presents too
much risk. "The greater the challenge the greater chance of failure" (Duke and
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Stiggins 1990: 128). The risk may make competent staff choose to "play it safe"
confining themselves to goals that they can easily exceed. Eventually, no one is
willing to take up new initiatives beyond the terms of the contract. The resulting
fixed-term "performance contract" stifles innovation.
The managerialist form of appraisal fosters an unhealthy dependence on the
supervisor for quality control, it also "denies any generative component in the
teaching profession. The evaluation process is not used to generate a new or
deeper understanding of teaching and learning" (Bosetti and O'Reilly 1996),
especially when there is no follow-up action to assist the staff to develop in
accordance with the agreed action plans arising from the appraisal (Smith 1996).
Other Common Appraisal Problems
The focus of managerialist form of appraisal on getting good results may lead to
sub-optimization, manipulation or dishonest report of performance data. For
those staff who perceive that they have received a rating lower than they deserve,
it may be extremely demoralizing. In order to maintain a harmonious working
relationship, supervisors may be pressured by their subordinates to give
undeserved good ratings. Suspicion of manipulation may lead to mistrust. Many
staff may feel that their performance ratings are not accurate or fair; and thought
that "their superior gave the same rating regardless of performance" (Shafritz et al
1986: 432). Furthermore, rivalry may cause bitterness, and damage solidarity
among the staff members.
When appraisal systems are designed to stimulate competition among staff for
personal acquisition of scarce resources, their longer-term effect will be to deter
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rather than to develop staff. At the end of the day, they will "encourage
mediocrity, foster brooding resentment, and dampen the desire to excel"
(Ramsden 1992: 220). However, there are appraisal schemes which were found
beneficial.
Benefits from Appraisal
Bryman et al (1991) found that for most people in universities, their experience of
appraisal was more positive than they had expected; while some were skeptical
about the motives behind the introduction of appraisal schemes, many "value the
specific contribution that appraisal makes to staff development" (Lewis, 1993 a:
13). Hughes (1998) also identified a range of benefits for both individuals and
their institutions despite numerous shortfalls in the appraisal schemes. Individuals
benefited from better communications, planned training, clearer work objectives,
and a sense of being valued. The greatest benefit to the institution seemed to be
the improvement in departmental planning, aligning individual goals and
departmental/institutional goals. These potential benefits give some reasons why
performance appraisal should be conducted. To a closer examination of how
these benefits can be brought about we now turn.
Should Performance Appraisal be Conducted?
What constitutes the main purpose of an appraisal scheme affects its acceptance
by staff, and thus the impact of the scheme on staff motivation. It is believed that
performance appraisal which is based on the new managerialism doctrines has the
main purpose of controlling (motivating) staffs behavior towards increased
performance, so that the organization's productivity can be increased as a whole.
The means to achieve such a purpose is by defining and measuring performance
37
and linking it to rewards, assuming that the rewards are wanted by the employees.
The question is "Will such means achieve the purpose?" To make an appraisal
and reward system effective, it must be formulated with an understanding of why
people work. The rest of the chapter is devoted to a review of the literature on the
reasons that make people work.
Why People Work?
The list of reasons why people work can be organized in terms of extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation. The term motivation derives from the Latin word for move,
as do the terms motor and motif Here, work motivation refers to a person's desire
to work hard and work well, and is defined as "the conditions and processes that
activate, direct and sustain behavior" (Walker and Symons 1997: 4). It does not
refer to the motivation to join and stay in an organization. Extrinsic motivation
refers to the performance of an activity in order to attain external rewards,
whereas intrinsic motivation is the internal feeling and is derived from the
performance of the job. A person is intrinsically motivated if he/she performs a
task for no apparent rewards except the activity itself (Deci 1971).
Extrinsic rewards are those rewards that come after successful completion of an
activity. Pay, fringe benefits, awards or titles, decreased workload, letters of
commendation, prestige, recommendation for tenure and promotions are extrinsic
rewards that bring extrinsic motivation because they provide satisfaction that is
independent of the task itself, and are controlled by someone other than the person
himself/herself, for example, supervisors, co-workers, the organization's
rewarding system. Intrinsic satisfaction is an integral part of the task itself and
over which the person has a high degree of self-control. Self-esteem, personal
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growth, a challenging task, feelings of accomplishment for a job well done,
feelings of using and developing one's skills and abilities, delight in satisfying
curiosity and the pleasure from participating in a stimulating discussion are
examples of intrinsic rewards.
Extrinsic Motivation - the Psychological Assumption of Performance
Appraisal
Scientific management (Taylor 1911) assumes that workers are indolent, lazy and
need to be told what to do and how to do it. Theory X Management (McGregor
1960) contends that careful controls have to be set up to ensure that the workers
will do exactly what the management has planned for them to do. Economic drive
is the only firm rational basis for work (Mills 1951). People do not have intrinsic
motivation and their behaviors are entirely under the control of the external
rewards, which serve as a reinforcer. People will only do their best when the
rewards are made contingent upon performance. Behaviors which are reinforced
will be strengthened and those which are not reinforced, or which are punished,
will be weakened, as stipulated by the Law of Effect. It has been firmly
established in the experimental literature of psychology that "extrinsic rewards
(reinforcement) motivate behavior (increase the likelihood of a response).
Further, the introduction of extrinsic rewards often improves performance
although the introduction of extrinsic rewards impaired performance in a study by
Kruglanski et al (1971)" (Deci 1975a: 207).
The importance of extrinsic motivation is supported by the Expectancy Theory of
Motivation, which stresses heavily on extrinsic rewards although intrinsic
motivation is also recognized as a kind of motivation (Porter and Lawler 1968:
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163). The theory assumes that human behavior is goal-directed such that people
will engage in behaviors which they believe will lead them to desired end states.
Expectancy Theory of Motivation
Expectancy theory constitutes one of the two basic motivation theories together
with the drive theory (Porter and Lawler 1968). Drive theory emphasizes
physiological motives while expectancy theory stresses psychological motives. It
is a process theory of motivation which attempts to explain "how behavior gets
started, is energized, is sustained, is directed, is stopped and what kind of
subjective reaction is present in the organism" (Jones 1959 as quoted in Porter and
Lawler 1968: 7). The Expectancy Theory of Motivation was chosen as the
framework of analysis in this thesis given its basis in rationality, as it covers non-
physiological motives such as status, achievement and power. It was chosen also
because it has been "the most promising theory yet proposed and has had the most
important applications in public organizations" (Rainey 1991: 136).
The theory is a cognitive choice theory that focuses attention on how people make
decisions about where to allocate their effort (Mowday and Nam 1997: 112). It
helps to explain individual differences in motivation and behavior. It predicts that
a person will perform some kind of cost-benefit analysis for his/her own behavior
at work. If the estimated benefit is worth the cost, then he/she is likely to apply
more effort (Newstrom and Davis 1993). The person considering an action adds
up the values of all the outcomes that will result from the action, with each
outcome weighted by the probability of occurrence. The higher the probability of
good outcomes and the lower the probability of bad ones, the stronger the
motivation to perform the action.
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The theory was based on two main assumptions. First, people have expectations
about the outcomes of their behavior, in the form of beliefs relating to the
probability that a particular action will be followed by a particular outcome.
Second, people have preferences among the different outcomes of their behavior.
The theory was stated by Vroom (1964) formally with algebraic formulas. A
person's motivation to perform effectively, i.e., the force acting on a person to
exert a particular level of effort is a function of the sum of the products of:
V:	 The perceived desirabilities (values) of the outcomes (rewards) that might
be obtained by performing effectively; people learn to place a value on the
rewards and to develop expectancies through experience and observation;
E:	 The "expectancies" for the outcomes (rewards).
Later on, the concept of expectancies was broken down into two types:
El:	 Expectancy (perceived probability) that performance depends upon effort.
Eli: Expectancy (perceived probability) that reward depends upon
performance.
Some authors refer El as expectancy and Eli as instrumentality.
Effort (Motivation) refers to the amount of energy an individual expends in a
given situation. It does not necessarily correlate with performance (the end result
of effort), although "increased effort can be expected to lead to increased
performance, at least under most conditions" (Porter & Lawler 1968: 32).
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Expectancy is the person's subjective estimates of the effort-reward probability,
i.e., the probability that directing a given amount of effort towards performing a
task effectively will result in obtaining a positively valued reward. Motivation is
proportional to the sum of each value of reward multiplied by the perceived
probability that the reward depends on effort. A higher sum reflects higher
expectancies for more positive valued rewards and should predict higher work
motivation.
n
Motivation oc V x EIr X Elir
r= 1
focmeans in proportion of Emeans
summation; r refers to the n items of reward
valued by the person]
The value of reward and effort-reward expectancy interact to produce motivation
(effort), and the interaction is multiplicative (i.e., the product of two variables)
(Porter and Lawler 1968), i.e., each of the two is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for effort to be expended in a job. Because of this multiplicative
relationship, highly valued rewards will not lead to high motivation if the person
expects no chance of obtaining them; nor will a high expectancy of obtaining
rewards produce high motivation if the rewards are regarded as unimportant.
At the same time, the two expectancies also work multiplicatively to influence
motivation. If either is low, the probability that reward depends upon effort must
also be low. One may expect to perform well enough to get a high performance
evaluation (El), but the good performance may not necessarily result in a high
probability of getting a significant reward (Eli). El is within the control of the
person, as it depends on the person's ability; Eli may be influenced by managerial
practices. Performance appraisal may serve as a means to enhance the probability
that performance will lead to rewards by reflecting and rewarding good
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performance. The more the valued rewards "can be tied to effective performance,
the higher will be the motivation to perform effectively" (Porter and Lawler 1968:
97).
While the Expectancy Theory of Motivation was used as a framework of analysis
in the thesis, it was noted that some studies found that the theory failed to predict
effort and productivity (Rainey 1991: 137). Critics (Behling et a! 1973; Connolly
1976) pointed out that the theory does not accurately represent human mental
processes because human beings do not make exhaustive lists of outcomes and
their probabilities and add them up systematically. "People don't have full
knowledge either of all possible behaviors or of all outcomes. They are not
capable of highly complex computations" (Lawler 1994: 75), and so they "don't
consider all alternatives and they satisfy rather than optimize" (Lawler 1994: 76).
Many human behaviors are not analytical or rational. As a response to these
critics, the more recent versions of the theory has relaxed the algebraic formulas,
and it simply states that "motivation depends generally on the positive and
negative values of outcomes and their probabilities, in ways that we cannot
precisely specify" (Rainey 1991: 137).
Porter and Lawler (1968) refined Vroom's theory by examining two variables that
affect the relationship between effort and performance: abilities and role
perception which interact multiplicatively with effort to produce performance.
Ability is the person's power to perform, including intelligence, manual skills,
personality traits, etc, which are relatively stable and are composed of long-term
characteristics of the person. Although they can be modified, they rarely change
very much over the short run. Role perception refers to the kinds of activities and
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behavior the person feels he/she should do in order to perform the job effectively.
It can be affected by immediate cues from the environment. Higher effort will
lead to higher performance, the greater the extent to which the person possesses
abilities that are relevant to the task, and the greater the extent to which his/her
role perception is congruent with that held by the one who will be evaluating the
performance.













Diagram 1: A Motivational Model (adaptedfrom Porter and Lawler 1968: 165)
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As can seen from the Diagram 1, in order for any performance appraisal scheme
to serve motivational purpose by allocating rewards, it must fulfill certain
conditions:
(a) It must address the kinds of rewards which are valued by the staff
members whom the scheme intends to motivate. In another words, the
management must know what kinds of rewards are valued by staff, so as
to bring need satisfaction to them.
(b) The scheme must be clear enough for staff members to believe strongly
that substantive consequences (not necessarily pay) will follow
performance (Bright and Williamson 1995). Clarity of linkages between
valued rewards and high performance will lead to the work efforts or
increase in the efforts (Ilgen, Nebeker and Pritchard 1981) and increased
productivity (Neider 1980). The link is important as the stronger the
performance-reward relationship, the higher the work motivation for the
organization as a whole. In organizations where rewards are largely
unrelated to performance, many staff members will exhibit little work
motivation (Kopelman 1983).
(c) To link reward to performance, there must be effective measurement, so
that the actual performance can be measured against pre-determined
objectives. The management has to define objectives that are "realistic
and capable of being measured" (Bright and Williamson 1995: 79). The
standards of performance need to be very precise, so that the organization
can discriminate among individual staff members in terms of performance.
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The behavior must be monitored so that the rewards can be administered
consistently.
(d)	 Clarity in roles is crucial if the reward system is to contribute to the overall
strategic management of the organization. The system should enable
individuals to integrate their goals with those of the organization.
Intrinsic Motivation
McClelland (1962) holds the view that people do not work for external rewards
alone. His Need for Achievement Theory argues that people have an intrinsic
need for achievement, which refers to the desire to do something better than it has
been done before. According to Deci's (1975a) cognitive approach to motivation,
people make choices about what to do by processing information obtained from
the environment, memory, or "personal knowledge" which consists of people's
attitudes, feelings, and other internal states. People will choose to engage in
behaviors which are motivated by a person's need for feeling of competence and
self-determination in dealing with the environment. Intrinsic motivation is
spiritual and "has to do with life itself: It is vitality, dedication, transcendence. It
is what one experiences at those times that Robert Henri called 'more than
ordinary moments of existence" (Dcci and Flaste 1995: 45). It is a state of
"flow" where "one is so carried away by what one is doing and feels so immersed
in the activity. In a state of flow, a person knows precisely how well he or she is
doing. In flow, a person usually does not worry about the consequences of his or
her performance" (Csikszentimihalyi 1997: 82). "Time seems to collapse and
disappear, when intensity in the process takes over and the thrill is so great that
one hates seeing it end and can't wait to get back to it. Experiences like these
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ennoble life, make it vastly more enjoyable and ultimately result in greater self-
understanding and self-honesty. They give us the opportunity to observe what
real, deep interest feels like - the joy of it - as opposed to the drudgery that
external control tends to bring" (Deci and Flaste 1995: 45-46).
The experience of intrinsic motivation is its own justification. 	 Intrinsic
motivation is "associated with rich experience, better conceptual understanding,
greater creativity, and improved problem solving, relative to external controls"
(Deci and Flaste 1995: 51). Thus performing effectively is rewarding in its own
right. People will be committed to doing their jobs well when they derive
satisfaction from seeing that they are being effective (Deci 1975 a). Morse and
Weiss (1955) concur with this view, thinking that for most people working does
not simply function as a means of earning a livelihood; it means "having a
purpose, gaining a sense of accomplishment and expressing himself' (p.56). Even
if there were no economic necessity for them to work, many people would still
work. It is through such a producing role that most people tie into the society, and
maintain their sense of well-being. Porter and Lawler (1968) found that "the most
statistically significant findings for need fulfillment and need satisfaction attitudes
occurred in those need areas most directly reflecting the intrinsic rewards
available in jobs" (p. 150).
According to Herzberg' s (1964) Two-factor Theory, Motivators (achievement,
recognition, the work itself, responsibility, growth and advancement) which are
intrinsic to the job produce high levels of job satisfaction. Intrinsic rewards
satisfy higher-order needs such as self-esteem and self-actualization; whereas
externally mediated rewards satisfy only lower-order needs (Lawler 1969; Lopez
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1968). It is believed that the intrinsic rewards of achievement and satisfaction
stimulate work performance, whereas extrinsic rewards are not significantly
related to job satisfaction (Drummond and Stoddard 1991) although productivity
may be enhanced (Lawler 1971) in the immediate terms. Many theorists believe
that if one is concerned with long-term effects than the immediate performance,
"the appropriate route becomes the intrinsic one" especially "if one is seeking
more creative work" (Deci 1975a: 208, 228).
Expectancy Theory of Motivation supports the view that people should be given
greater freedom to do the job, so that the challenge will elicit their intrinsic
motivation. The role of management is to create conditions within which the staff
members will motivate and reward themselves. The kind of work should be one
the staff members delight in doing, so that they can attain satisfaction from the
expression of their own abilities, the exercise of their own decisions, and their
achievement (Katz 1964). For the job to be intrinsically motivating it must be
challenging enough for the person (Danner and Lonky 1981). Work will be more
motivating when it is meaningful, allows autonomy, provides feedback (Hackman
and Oldham 1980), and is of a variety (Morse 1953).
Deci (1975a) pointed out the primacy of intrinsic motivation as an ongoing
motivator of behavior, as distinct from primary drives which may extinguish after
extrinsic rewards have been obtained (Maslow 1943, 1954, 1970). A person's
intrinsic needs are potentially operative all the time. "With intrinsically motivated
behavior, the goal will be attained and the behavior will be rewarded, but the need
will not be reduced. Rather, the need is ever-present, so it will remain, and other
goals will be set, unless the process is interrupted by a drive or an emotion" (Deci
48
1 975a: 101). Rewards that satisfy lower-order needs, such as monetary rewards,
will have "a reduced value for at least a limited period of time" (Porter and
Lawler 1968: 40), but intrinsic rewards which are associated with "higher-order
needs - such as esteem, autonomy, and self-actualization needs - become more
attractive the more a person is rewarded and feels satisfied with a given level of
rewards" (Porter and Lawler 1968: 40). Indeed, the need for self-actualization
and competence is not "satisfiable" (Lawler 1994: 44).
Those who are intrinsically motivated are more likely to have lasting satisfaction
(McKeachie 1997: 29) because factors leading to intrinsic motives are within the
person and are relatively stable, whereas factors relating to extrinsic motives, such
as budgets or administration, are more uncertain as far as the person is concerned.
Lawler (1969) considers intrinsic rewards "excellent motivators" since the
connection between the reception of the rewards and the performance is more
direct, as the individuals reward themselves. In the terminology of the
Expectancy Theory of Motivation, there is a higher-effort reward probability.
The most effective motivation in the work place is believed to be intrinsic
motivation. Lawler (1969) has defined intrinsic motivation as the degree to which
feelings of esteem, growth, and competence are expected to result from successful
task performance. Theory Y Management which advocates management by
objectives (Argyris 1957; Likert 1961, 1967; Maslow 1965; McGregor 1960)
focuses on intrinsic motivation. Prominent motivation theorists argue that
"employees at all levels can be motivated by higher-order motives" (Rainey 1991:
127). All people want appreciation, recognition, influence, a feeling of
accomplishment and a feeling of being liked by other people (Likert 1961). Those
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who are deprived of opportunities to attain these needs will display indolence,
passivity, resistance to change, lack of responsibility, readiness to follow the
demagogue and will make unreasonable demands for economic benefits
(McGregor 1960).
The Effect of Extrinsic Motivation on Intrinsic Motivation
The new managerialism doctrines place heavy emphasis on externally mediated
rewards, under the assumption that" individuals will not perform to their fullest
unless an appropriate system of incentives is in place" (Hughes 1994: 71).
Incentive systems assume that extrinsic rewards affect people's behavior more
than intrinsic rewards do (Lawler 1981). The main purpose of performance
appraisal schemes is to distribute extrinsic rewards by measuring performance and
linking it to those rewards. Assuming that the administration of extrinsic rewards
does motivate staff performance, it will still be necessary to find out whether these
external rewards will reduce intrinsic motivation to perform a task, resulting in an
overall reduction of motivation. On the other hand, will extrinsic rewards create
or enhance intrinsic motivation?
Most theories of work motivation have assumed that the effects of intrinsic and
extrinsic rewards are additive (Deci 1 972a; Lawler 1971; Porter and Lawler 1968;
Vroom 1964). Satisfaction is regarded as a function of the sum of the effects of
both kinds of rewards. Porter and Lawler (1968) thus suggest that extrinsic
rewards should be made contingent upon performance to maximize the effect of
the extrinsic rewards on motivation; at the same time work should be structured in
such a way that intrinsic rewards will accrue to the person who performs
effectively. However, it has been reported in many psychology books that
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external rewards decrease intrinsic motivation (Atkinson 1964; deCharms 1968;
Murray 1964).
The early Michigan leadership studies (Katz et a! 1950; Katz et a! 1951) indicate
a low positive relationship between job performance and satisfaction with pay.
Kruglanski eta! (1971) found that extrinsic rewards undermine performance. The
study by Daniel and Esser (1980) concurs with McGraw's (1978) conclusion that
rewards improve performance on relatively routine tasks but adversely affect
performance on more complex tasks. Doubts were cast suggesting the possibility
that extrinsic rewards would inhibit other powerful and pleasurable motives for
working, such as the pleasure of work for its own sake and the solidarity of the
working group (Davis 1948). Deci and Flaste (1995) show that "people perform
less well at problem solving when they are working for an extrinsic reward than
when they are intrinsically motivated" (p. 50). The conclusion is that "not only
do controls undermine intrinsic motivation but they also have clearly detrimental
effects on performance of any tasks that require creativity, conceptual
understanding, or flexible problem solving" (Deci and Flaste 1995: 51).
Based on a self-perception theory, deCharms (1968) explains why extrinsic
rewards may decrease intrinsic motivation. The distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation lies in the perception of personal causation. "Whenever a
person experiences himself to be the locus of causality for his own behavior, he
will consider himself to be intrinsically motivated. Conversely, when a person
perceives the locus of causality for his behavior to be external to himself (that he
is a Pawn), he will consider himself to be extrinsically motivated" (p. 328).
Satisfaction derives from an intrinsically motivated task when a person feels a
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sense of personal causation for his/her action. However, when external rewards
are administered for an intrinsically motivated task, the person perceives that the
feeling of personal causation or the locus of causality of the knowledge shifts to
an external source, leading himlher to become a "pawn" to the source of external
rewards. The behavior will then be motivated by the external rewards, rather
than by the intrinsic satisfaction. The person's perception of self-control, free
choice, and commitment degenerates and motivation dies down. Festinger (1967)
also predicts that external rewards should decrease intrinsic motivation as the
rewards will affect the person's concept of why he/she is working, thus changing
his/her attitude towards the work. Both deCharms and Festinger cited the Harlow
(Harlow et al 1950) studies which used monkeys to support the hypothesis that
extrinsic rewards decrease intrinsic motivation. [However Deci (1971) listed
several factors which weakened that conclusion: there were very few subjects
used; periods of observation were only 5 minutes each; and the effect might be
short-term. Deci (1971) also pointed out that a third study in the Harlow series
(Davis, Settlage and Harlow 1950) actuallyfoundan increase in performance.]
deCharms' theory postulates that withdrawing and reducing an extrinsic reward
may enhance intrinsic motivation. This hypothesis is supported by two
experiments (Staw 1974; Weick 1964): intrinsic motivation was liberated after the
withdrawal or reduction of extrinsic controls over the behavior; the perceived
locus of causality shifted from the extrinsic reward to the self However, it is
unclear "what conditions must be satisfied before these paradoxical effects will
emerge. It may be that substantial interaction will occur only if the extrinsic
rewards are expected or are administered contingently upon performance. Or,
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alternatively, it may eventually turn out that both of these conditions must be met
before the interaction will occur" (Notz 1975: 890).
No Definitive Answer
Many earlier studies uniformly indicate that extrinsic incentives or constraints
tend to impair the experience of autonomy and undermine intrinsic motivation
(Deci 1971; Kruglanski, Alon and Lewis 1972; Kruglanski et al 1975; Lepper,
Greene and Nibsbett 1973; Pinder 1976; Pritchard, Campbell and Campbell
1977). Subsequent research has shown, however, that although extrinsic rewards
do often reduce intrinsic motivation, they sometimes enhance or leave it
unchanged (Ryan, Mims and Koestner 1983). Woodworth (1918) contends that
many activities, regardless of the initiating motive will become intrinsically
interesting. Aliport (1937) refers this notion as "functional autonomy". Through
the continued reinforcement of the desired behavior, internal control of behavior
will develop. Some psychologists suggest that external rewards will enhance or
create intrinsic motivation through the process of internalization. Aronfreed
(1968) assembled a large number of studies (primarily with animals) which
reported the persistence of behavior after the external rewards have been removed.
Ferster and Skinner (1957), Morse (1966) and Uhi and Young (1967) have
demonstrated that animal behavior strengthened by intermittent food rewards
persists after the food is removed. The third study in the Harlow series (Davis,
Settlage and Harlow 1950) also seems to support the hypothesis that external
rewards enhance intrinsic motivation.
It seems that there is no definitive answer to the question of the effects of
externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Deci (1975a) suggests that
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different kinds of external rewards would have different effects on intrinsic
motivation. Tangible rewards (e.g. money) may affect intrinsic motivation in a
way different from that of non-tangible rewards (e.g. verbal reinforcement, social
approval). The allocation of tangible rewards suggests to people that they should
probably not do the work without the rewards and so they should NOT be so
intrinsically motivated. This could lead to a process of cognitive reevaluation of
the work, and the once intrinsically motivated work would become one which is
motivated by the expectation of external tangible rewards. As the perceived locus
of causality shifts from an internal source to an external one, the extrinsic rewards
will decrease the intrinsic motivation (deCharms 1968; Heider 1958). On the
other hand, non-tangible external rewards will less likely be perceived as a
controlling device, and thus the process of cognitive reevaluation will less likely
take place. If the perceived locus of causality still rests with an internal source,
the person will continue to be intrinsically motivated; and the behavior will persist
even after such non-tangible rewards have been removed (Deci 1971).
Deci (1 972a, 1 975a) further explains the predictions using Cognitive Evaluation
Theory which assumes that intrinsically motivated behavior is behavior which
allows a person to feel competent and self-determining (deCharms 1968; White
1959). The theory asserts that there are two processes by which extrinsic rewards
can affect intrinsic motivation: a change in perceived locus of causality and a
change in one's feeling of competence and self-determination. Rewards that
strengthen the feelings of competence and self-determination enhance intrinsic
motivation, arid punishment that weakens these feelings decreases intrinsic
motivation. Any extrinsic reward possesses two aspects: a "controlling" aspect
and an "information" or "feedback" aspect. While extrinsic rewards can control
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behavior, they can also provide information to people about their effectiveness.
The controlling aspect will decrease intrinsic motivation by changing the
perceived locus of causality to an external source while the feedback aspect will
increase intrinsic motivation by increasing the person's sense of competence and
self-determination. Which of the two processes will be invoked depends on
which aspect of the reward is more salient. When tangible rewards are given, the
controlling aspect is salient; when non-tangible rewards are given, the feedback
aspect will be perceived as more salient.
Intrinsic motivation theories view information as a motivating factor. When
feedback is positive, the perceived competence will enhance intrinsic motivation
(Deci and Ryan 1985; Pinder 1976; Ryan, Mims and Koestner 1983; Stumpf and
Rindova 1997). Negative information is however demotivating, as it reduces
one's sense of competence (Deci and Ryan 1985). Positive verbal feedback
increased the intrinsic motivation of males, while for females the opposite effect
was produced (Deci, Cascio and Krusell 1975). For males, the change in feelings
of competence and self-determination was set in train. For females, the locus of
causality changed to an external source when they were told by their supervisors
that they had done very well on a task; they lost intrinsic motivation since the task
became dependent on the praise.
Contingent Pay
The inconclusive effect of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation is evident in
the continuing debate about contingent pay. Some researchers found that
contingent pay resulted in higher performance (Ayllon and Azrin 1965; Burnett
1925; Lawler 1981; Opsahl and Dunnette 1966; Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939;
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Taylor 1911; Viteles 1953; Wyatt 1934). "Even the most conservative results
from these studies seem to suggest that individual-incentive plans can increase
productivity by 10 to 20 percent" (Lawler 1994: 151). Atkinson and Reitman
(1956) found that the offer of a financial reward led to increased performance in
general, especially among people who had low achievement motivation. Lawler
(1994) concludes that compared with "systems in which raises are not merit
based", contingent pay systems "do achieve some success in relating pay to
performance" (p. 147). On the contrary, some researchers found that contingent
pay did not result in improved performance (Perry and Pearce 1985; Perry 1997),
while others contend that contingent pay might even harm productivity (Meyer
1975). Gabris and Mitchell (1988) reported that although good performers under
a contingent pay system continued their good performance, the average to low
performers became more alienated as a result of the negative feedback associated
with contingent pay. Deci and Flaste (1995) insist that rewards should be used as
a way to express appreciation; in order to bring positive effects they should not be
given contingently. There is also a widely held view that appraisal should not be
linked to pay (Randall et a! 1984; Fidler 1989b; Pennington and O'Neil 1988;
Poster and Poster 1993).
Some theorists consider that extrinsically mediated reward systems often threaten
the intrinsic feeling of self-esteem (Perry 1997). When staff members are
recognized with rewards that fall short of their definition of their worth, the threat
may lead to rejection of the system. Meyer (1975) found that everyone thinks that
they should get at least the average amount of reward and 75% think they should
get more than the average. He concludes from the General Electric Company
experience that as the vast majority of staff will get the average award, contingent
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pay award will cause a harmful effect on morale and motivation. The majority of
staff members will feel that management does not recognize their true worth. The
effect is to damage staff members' self-esteem, resulting in lower productivity.
Although such a negative effect may be avoided by adopting criterion-referencing
evaluation, there may be a pressure to use norm-referencing method, for example,
when the limited budget allows only a limited number of staff to be rewarded with
pay raise despite the good performance of all staff.
While contingent pay may lead to an incremental effect on quantity of
performance, it will have a detrimental effect on quality (Vecchio 1982: 452).
There are numerous studies which demonstrated the negative side effects on
linking performance to extrinsic rewards, such as lack of cooperation among
peers, competing for the same promotion, manipulation of performance data with
a view to report invalid data (Lawler 1994), and separation of staff members into
different categories, resulting in dysfunctional competition (Perry 1990).
Deci (1972b) found that the introduction of contingent monetary rewards for an
interesting task decreases people's subsequent desire to work on the task, while
that of non-contingent monetary rewards will not. Pinder (1976) contends that
people receiving a non-contingent pay award derive more intrinsic satisfaction
from work than people who are paid according to a contingent pay schedule. Dcci
(1975a) asserts that the "important factor leading to a decrease in intrinsic
motivation is the person's perception that the reward was the cause of his
behavior" (p. 152). Thus contingent rewards are more likely to decrease intrinsic
motivation (Deci 1975a) as the person will perceive the rewards as the cause of
doing the work. Although Calder and Straw (1975 a) pointed out a number of
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methodological problems that rendered Deci's (1975a) work very difficult to
interpret, further studies provided firmer evidence to show that salient contingent
rewards decreased intrinsic motivation (Kruglanski et al 1972; Kruglanski et al
1975; Lepper, Greene and Nisbett 1973; Pinder 1976; Pritchard et a! 1977).
Several researchers, however, have not been able to replicate the findings that
contingent pay decreases intrinsic motivation (Farr 1976; Farr, Vance and
McIntyre 1977; Hamner and Foster 1975).
On the other hand, it has been shown that even non-contingent rewards could
decrease intrinsic motivation (Calder and Staw 1 975b; Kruglanski, Friedman and
Zeevi 1971; Notz 1975). Such a situation will occur, if the "controlling" aspect
of the reward appears more salient than the "feedback" aspect, such that the
person perceives that the locus of causality to be outside of himself/herself (Deci
1 975a). Therefore, non-contingent rewards could decrease intrinsic motivation
although the decrease would be smaller and less likely to occur than in those cases
when the rewards are contingent upon performance (Dcci, Cascio and Krusell
1975). On the other hand, if contingent rewards provide "signals of competence
that are more salient then their signals of control, intrinsic motivation may not be
decreased and could even be increased" (Phillips and Lord 1980: 211). In
summary, it has been established that whether extrinsic rewards will decrease
intrinsic motivation depends essentially on whether or not the controlling aspect
of the reward is salient (Deci 1975a), and not simply on whether the rewards are
contingent upon performance.
Kopelman (1983) considers that contingent pay based on outstanding performance
will still serve a motivational purpose even for staff who are already satisfied with
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their level of pay. According to the Expectancy Theory of Motivation, if people
value pay, then tying pay to performance will enhance motivation and thus
productivity. The theory supports contingent pay, since it postulates that rewards
which are obtained as a result of one's performance will have more psychological
value than (the same) rewards obtained for non-performance reasons (Kopelman
1983). Contingent pay does not only satisfy the basic physiological needs, but
also self-esteem and self-fulfillment needs as it is an indication of recognition by
the management.
Another Intrinsic Satisfaction: Social Satisfaction
The results of the Western Electric Company studies (Roethlisberger and Dickson
1939) show that factors other than financial ones influence a person's productivity
too. As people derive satisfaction from their social relations with groups, the
greater the extent to which workers are members of integrated work teams on the
job, the higher the level ofjob satisfaction (Blauner 1967). These social relations
on the job (Mayo 1945) will, however, affect the level of performance which
often depends on a group norm (Brayfield and Crockett 1955), for members who
do not conform to the group norm face disapproval (Tannenbaum 1966).
Installation of contingent pay schemes does not necessarily result in greater
output. Groups may direct their members' efforts in opposition to organizational
goals just as readily as they can direct the efforts to support these goals (Schachter
et a! 1951; Seashore 1954; Tannenbaum 1966). Group pressures frequently make
workers perform considerably below their potential (Opsahl and Dunnette 1966)
in order to protect the group's interest. While a group member can obtain
financial gains by enhancing productivity, he/she may choose to give up the gain
if it will be a block to social acceptance.
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Punishment and Negative Feedback
Workers can be motivated for good and bad reasons. They can be induced to
work hard, or they can be constrained to do so (Bess 1997). Kopelman (1983)
argues that evidence indicates that the most powerful motivational systems are
those that provide rewards for good performance, and take rewards away for poor
performance. Goode and Fowler (1949) also support the use of negative
incentives. They described a group of workers who, although most dissatisfied
with their jobs, produced at a very high rate because of the difficulty they would
face in finding another position should they be dismissed. "Performance can also
be motivated by punishment. Significant negative outcomes can be attached to
poor performance, making it less attractive than good performance. If dismissal is
believed to result from poor performance, it can be a significant motivator"
(Lawler 1994: 169). McGregor (1957) advocates the use of punishment which
will arouse uncertainty with respect to continued employment as they "can be
powerful motivators of the safety needs in the employment relationship at every
level from worker to vice-president" (p. 311). Some university managers
expressed the opinion that while staff appraisal should primarily be used to
encourage individuals to discuss their problems and to help them do a better job, it
should also be backed up by sanctions against the poor performer and rewards,
such as contingent pay, for the good performers (Haslam et al 1992).
On the other hand, many theorists object the use of punishment and negative
feedback. Threats of punishment, the imposition of deadlines, competition, and
evaluations were found to have detrimental effects when made salient to motivate
people (Amabile et a! 1976; Deci and Cascio 1972). Emphasizing weak points is
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unlikely to produce change (Richards 1960). The more the criticism, the less the
evidence of improvement in performance (Becker and Klimoski 1989; Meyer et al
1965) since defensiveness on the part of the subordinates in the face of criticism
leads to deteriorated performance. Furthermore, when the subordinates perceive
evaluation to be punitive, they exhibit an adaptive response: in an attempt to find
safety and protection, they become defensive, try to hide errors, and minimize
risk-taking (McLaughlin and Pfeifer 1988). Growth will be inhibited "as a result
of evaluation that is overly threatening" (Duke and Stiggins 1990: 119).
Deci and Cascio (1972) reported that punishment and negative feedback for poor
performance would decrease intrinsic motivation. They believe that if monetary
rewards, a kind of extrinsic rewards, will decrease intrinsic motivation because of
the change in the perceived locus of causality, then other kinds of extrinsic
rewards will decrease intrinsic motivation too, provided that the rewards have a
strong controlling aspect. The performance behavior will become dependent on
an external control. Given that the punishment and negative feedback will
weaken the feelings of competency and self-determination, intrinsic motivation
will diminish. Punishment will not improve performance as it often tells the staff
what not to do, but not what they should do (Lawler 1994).
Summary
The Expectancy Theory of Motivation stresses the importance of the linkage
between valued rewards and performance. The theory predicts that if a person
performs an action and this action is followed by a valued reward, be it extrinsic
or intrinsic, the probability that the action will be repeated increases. On the other
hand, if the person performs an action which is ignored or followed by a
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punishment, that action is less likely to be repeated. According to the theory, for a
given reward the person's motivation to perform an action is determined by the
value of the rewards, expectancy and instrumentality multiplicatively (i.e., V x El
x Eli). People will decide how their efforts should be expended to get the best
combination of all kinds of valued rewards.
The Expectancy Theory of Motivation suggests that in order for any performance
appraisal scheme to serve a motivational purpose by distributing rewards, the
management must:
(a) Make use of information about staff members' preference to select those
rewards which will have a predictable effect on their behavior (Newstrom
and Davis 1993). In another words, the management must know what kinds
of rewards are valued by the staff members, in order to bring need
satisfaction to them. The management should also be aware of the effect of
administering one type of rewards in relation to other types, such as the
possible detrimental effect on intrinsic motivation as a result of offer of
extrinsic rewards. The Cognitive Evaluation Theory predicts that extrinsic
rewards will reduce intrinsic motivation if they are perceived as a
controlling device. However, extrinsic rewards will enhance intrinsic
motivation if they are perceived as a kind of recognition which gives a
signal of one's competence and self-determination rather than of control by
management (Deci 1971).
(b) Structure the rewards in a way that staff members can perceive a direct
relationship between the rewards and required performance (Katz 1964).
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The appraisal results must be linked to some rewards by means of some
effective measurements, which measure the actual performance against pre-
determined objectives. Standards of performance need to be explicit,
precise, quantifiable and measurable so as to discriminate among individual
staff members in terms of performance.
(c) Define objectives that are capable of being measured and specify clearly the
roles of the staff. Clarity in objectives and roles is crucial if the reward
system is to contribute to the overall strategic management of the
organization. The system should enable individual staff members to
integrate their goals with those of the organization.
As discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter One, performance appraisal
schemes introduced under the doctrines of new managerialism are based on the
belief that the management can motivate staff members towards improved
performance by allocating extrinsic rewards for good performance. To find out
whether such performance appraisal schemes will actually achieve these aims, and
to gain a better understanding of what will make performance appraisal schemes
effective, a case study on the Performance Planning, Appraisal and Development
Scheme of the City University of Hong Kong was conducted. Based on the
Expectancy Theory of Motivation and the Cognitive Evaluation Theory as




To what extent do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong value
intrinsic rewards, such as satisfaction from teaching and research; as compared
with the extent to which they value extrinsic rewards, such as job security, pay,
promotion, etc. used by the management? Do they wish to avoid punishment and
negative feedback?
Question Two
What kind of a performance appraisal scheme do academic staff of the City
University of Hong Kong prefer or resist?
Question Three
Under what conditions will extrinsic rewards reduce intrinsic motivation in
relation to academic work?
Question Four
How far do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong believe that their
performance will be rewarded? How much do they consider that academic
performance is quantifiable, measurable or predictable, and that it can be assessed
objectively?
Question Five
In what ways do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong consider that
their ability to perform will be affected by a clear understanding of the goals of
the University and of their role in helping to attain these goals?
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Further Literature Review
Search for answers to the research questions has guided the investigation on
whether performance appraisal of academic staff should be conducted in order to
motivate staff; and if so, under what circumstances will the appraisal be
successful. The results of the investigation are given in Chapters Six and Seven.
Based on the findings, some implications on the assumptions underlying the new
managerialism doctrines have been accounted for in Chapter Eight. As the
investigation is structured around extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, a further
review of the literature on some common rewards and their values as assigned by




Rewards and their Values as Assigned by Academic Staff
An account of the literature on some common rewards and their values as
assigned by people particularly academic staff is given in this chapter.
Valued Rewards to Satisfy Needs
The term "Valued Rewards" refers to the attractiveness of possible outcomes to
people. A given person differentially desires different positively valued rewards
and the same reward may be differentially desired by different persons. Potential
rewards acquire value because of their ability to satisfy various needs of the
individual persons.
Maslow's (1943, 1954, 1970) Theory of Motivation posits that people seek to
satisfy five categories of needs arranged in a "hierarchy of prepotency": lower
order needs for physical comfort and safety followed by higher order needs such
as social needs, esteem needs, needs for autonomy and self-actualization.
Physiological needs include the needs for relief from hunger, thirst, and sleepiness
and for defense; safety needs include the need to be free from the threat of bodily
harm; social needs include love, affection, and belongingness; esteem needs
include the need for a sense of achievement, confidence, recognition and prestige;
self-actualization needs involve the desire to become everything that one is
capable of becoming, to achieve self-fulfillment. These needs guide people to
seek fulfillment in a particular role. Lawler and Porter (1967) share a similar
view, believing that rewards will be valued by a person to the extent that he/she
believes that they will give satisfaction of his/her security, social esteem,
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autonomy and self-actualization needs. According to the theory, a certain need
takes precedence until satisfied to an acceptable level, then the person will
concentrate on the next higher level of needs, and so on. Once the lower order
needs are satisfied, they become unimportant as motivators. Thus giving more of
the same reward (especially those which satisfy lower order needs) may have a
diminishing impact on motivation (Newstrom and Davis 1993).
Maslow's theory has been much criticized. Research has not supported the
presence of all five levels of needs. There is little evidence to support that "a
hierarchy exists above the security level": employees may first seek to satisfy the
lower order physiological and security needs, but "in which order they (higher-
order needs) will come into play cannot be predicted" (Lawler 1994: 43). There is
no real empirical evidence to show that needs influence behavior in this
hierarchical manner (Locke 1976) and for every individual. People have many
competing needs, the mixture, strength, and priority of the needs vary among
them and may also change over time. Different individuals may append different
values to different needs. Some satisfied needs may stimulate the desire to obtain
more of them.
Alderfer (1972) agrees that work motivation can be gauged according to a
hierarchy of needs but disagrees (with Maslow) that a satisfied need will diminish.
He stresses that when higher order needs are frustrated, lower order needs will
return, although they have already been satisfied. Rainey (1991: 124) reported
that some researchers have found that Maslow's hierarchy does not hold
(Campbell and Pritchard 1983), but the evidence indicates a two-step hierarchy:
lower-level staff show more concern with material and security rewards, while
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higher-level staff place more emphasis on achievement and challenge (Lawler
1973; Pinder 1984). Nonetheless staff "at all levels can be motivated by higher
order needs" (Rainey 1991: 127).
Despite the many criticisms it has attracted, Maslow's work is significant as it
portrays a conception of the range of human needs, differentiating intrinsic from
extrinsic stimuli. Maslow's hierarchy of needs as a content theory of motivation
attempts to examine what it is that motivates people, and the specific things
within people that initiate, direct, sustain and stop behavior.
Research shows that there is "significant individual difference among employees
in the importance of different needs" and the importance is influenced by
"organizational factors and personal characteristics" (Lawler 1994: 48).
Management must find out the needs of their employees. In terms of this study,
the most common needs expressed by academic staff are work satisfaction,
recognition and self-esteem, autonomy and academic freedom, creativity and
achievement, exercise of talents and growth, positive feedback, prestige, pay,
security and tenure, promotion, social harmony and decreased workload. These
needs will be discussed in the remaining part of this chapter, with particular focus
on those needs as perceived by people in academia.
The thesis is devoted to examining the perspectives on satisfaction and motivation
of academic staff who work in a university in Hong Kong. However, there are
only a few studies on satisfaction of members of the teaching profession in Hong
Kong, let alone on university academic staff In order to structure a suitable
theoretical basis for the thesis, reference was made to the numerous studies on
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satisfaction of school teachers and university faculty members conducted
elsewhere. "No research findings are context-free" (Elliot 1987: 153). It was
recognized that the differences in culture and other contextual factors that
differentiate the various types of academic work across different countries or even
across institutions may cause different perspectives regarding satisfaction and
work motivation among the staff members. It was, nonetheless, considered useful
to draw reference to those studies.
It should also be pointed out that despite the differences as described above, there
are similarities in different types of academic work across cultures. Other than
the observation that "university teachers inherit a stronger tradition of
professional independence from regulations by management" (Elliot 1987: 172),
"the array of studies extending over several decades and with differing samples
reveals a good deal of commonality in the motives that characterize
academicians" (Mckeachie 1997: 24). The teaching profession, in schools or in
universities alike, is relatively "unstaged" (Lortie 1975: 82); except in some
special cases, salary is predictable, salary gains may be steady but stable;
members with long service earn only little more than beginners. Given that
efforts will not make much difference in attaining extrinsic rewards in the short
run (Lortie 1975), those who remain in the profession hold "a present-oriented
rather than future-oriented point of view" Qj. 101). They emphasize rewards that
can be earned in the present, that is, the immediate psychic rewards from the
work. People "tend to prefer those occupations that they perceive as offering
outcomes that are attractive to them" (Lawler 1994: 120). It thus can be inferred
that academics in general put up with relatively low pay and hard work, as
compared with those who choose other occupations requiring similar
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qualifications, mainly because of their intrinsic interest in academic work. [It was
recognized that academics in Hong Kong are highly paid by the world standard,
their salary gains are nonetheless steady.] It was with this approach that the
relevant literature as follows has been reviewed.
Intrinsic Job Satisfaction
It has been shown in Chapter Two that intrinsic job satisfaction is crucial for
many people. For university academic staff, most of the motives to work are
intrinsic (Hutchinson 1995; McKeachie 1997; Olsen 1993). Studies of motivation
suggest that when teachers or faculty members report satisfactions, they
emphasize intrinsic motives; when they report dissatisfaction, they mention
extrinsic factors such as pay, administrative policies, and working conditions
(McKeachie 1997; Sergiovanni 1967). Teaching at the university level involves
many features that can make it intrinsically rewarding. The task of fostering the
development of conceptual understanding, aesthetic appreciation, interaction with
students, a sense of making a difference, seeing students develop and grow;
seeing students respond with enthusiasm and excitement about new ideas, a sense
of competence in skill and knowledge, and autonomy (Mowday and Nam 1997)
can all be a source of great satisfaction. The task provides them opportunities to
satisfy their fundamental psychological needs for competence and autonomy
(Deci, Kasser and Ryan 1997).
For academic members of staff, a significant motivating factor has been "the
right, within course boundaries, to develop and deliver lectures, conduct research
programmes and to engage in scholarly work with other members of the academic
community through seminars and conferences" (Bright and Williamson 1995: 80).
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They value the work itself, colleagues and the work environment. They see as
important intrinsic features such as "having independence and freedom, doing
challenging work and using initiative" which are crucial in sustaining the creative
commitment of academic staff (Bright and William 1995: 81).
Lortie (1975) contends that a major attraction to the teaching profession is a
secular form of the service ideal and a special mission traditionally given a level
of respect and occupational prestige. He argues that teachers have essentially
underplayed the importance of material rewards because of normative views of
teaching as pursued by "dedicated" individuals. This view is shared by Bess
(1982, 1997) who re-iterates that the desire to teach well among faculty members
has long been closely associated with intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivation.
Given that the work is exceedingly difficult, teaching well and liking it requires
extremely high energy, focus, total commitment, and dedication that is initiated
and sustained by strong motivation.
A survey of 3000 academics in the United Kingdom conducted by Pearson et al
(1990) show that most respondents attached great importance to intrinsic features
related to their work such as job satisfaction, doing challenging work, having
independence and freedom and using one's own initiative (Kogan 1995). In a
study among secondary school teachers in Hong Kong (Wong 1980), using
Sergiovanni's (1967) method, it was found that the perceived degree of
importance of intrinsic factors was higher than that of the extrinsic factors in
bringing job satisfaction.
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Teach and Work with Students
The love of teaching and reinforcement from students are cited as the
characteristics of teaching most valued by teachers (Lortie 1975; Peterson and
Martin 1990). Academic staff typically have a strong professional commitment to
their subjects and to their students (Bright and Williamson 1995: 72) which
provides the impetus for attempting to improve the efficacy of practice
(Hutchinson 1995; MeKeachie 1997). They have a sense of responsibility for
other persons and a desire to serve students forms the base of professional
incentives (McLaughlin and Pfeifer 1988). Many faculty rated teaching as more
rewarding to them personally than scholarly work although they felt that their
universities reward scholarly activity more than teaching (Cook, Kinnetz and
Owens-Misner 1990). Despite their knowledge that promotion would depend
upon research, the new faculty devoted tremendous amount of time to preparation
of classes and other aspects of teaching (Olsen 1993). This suggests that they are
motivated by a desire to do a good job in teaching.
A maj or attraction to teaching as an occupation is the interpersonal theme (Lortie
1975), the attraction of working with young people. The majority of Lortie's
1964 sample (86%) revealed that teachers derived the greatest satisfaction from
reaching students (p.105). In the small interpersonal world of the classroom rests
the potential, although without guarantee, the most potent rewards from work that
teachers may reap (Lortie 1975). They operate with assumed although not legally
grounded autonomy (Lortie 1969). The intrinsic rewards "consist entirely of
subjective valuations made in the course of work engagement" (Lortie 1975: 101).
While reasons for staying in the profession are relationships with students, and
seeing students grow (Holdaway 1978; Metropolitan Life 1985a), a lack of
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motivation among students is ranked behind low salary and working conditions as
a cause of leaving the teaching profession (Metropolitan Life 1985a).
In Hong Kong, teaching itself was found to be a significant predictor of job
satisfaction among secondary school teachers (Cheng 1994). Sun (1996) found
that while the secondary school teachers were dissatisfied with the ability and
achievement of their students, their main concern remained that of their students;
achievement and growth of their students were cited as satisfaction factors.
Research
The ability to conduct research is often quoted as something faculty members
treasure (Noser et al 1996). Clark (1987) contends that many teaching members
were attracted to teaching by intrinsic interest in the field of study and research
and not by the opportunity of teaching. Mowday and Nam (1997) believe that
faculty members are often socialized to believe that research and scholarship are
the most critical components of their professorial role.
As Webb (1994) pointed out, the personal satisfaction which faculty members
"experience from taking on a particular research project and seeing it through to
publication is obviously of immense satisfaction", it takes the faculty "close to the
values of academic freedom and autonomous inquiry which are at the heart of
higher education" (p.80). In a survey conducted among faculty members at
colleges and universities in the United States (Noser et a! 1996), 75% of the
respondents revealed that they enjoyed the challenge of producing quality
research, while only 25% claimed that they conducted research because it was
required for tenure, promotion, and pay raise purposes. In another survey
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conducted by Startup (1979), the main reason given by respondents for doing
research was 'because one enjoys doing it'. Some faculty members engage in
research so as "to enliven their teaching" (Webb 1994: 80).
Startup (1985) found that junior academics felt themselves to be under more
pressure to publish (although many senior academics still feel the pressure too, in
order to maintain their reputation and as an example to junior colleagues), and the
pressure "derives from the failure of the university to accept other criteria for
promotion" (p. 72). In these cases, the driving force is one of motivation for
extrinsic rewards. Other extrinsic reasons given by academics for doing research
and for feeling the pressure to publish include needs for "personal prestige, to
attract funding or for financial reward" (Webb 1994: 80).
Recognition and Self-esteem
Many studies of staff motivation have suggested that most staff are stimulated to
higher performance level by recognition of their efforts (Lopez 1968), as it will
boost their self-esteem. Locke (1976) identified recognition as one of the single
most frequently cited factor causing either satisfaction or dissatisfaction at the
work place, and pointed out that those using Herzberg et al's (1959) theoretical
framework frequently found recognition as a major source of satisfaction.
Stornich (1986) while recognizing the importance of pay as a motivator maintains
that people's psychological needs often go beyond pay.	 Promotion,
organizational placement, recognition, title, or even simple visibility within the
organization can be an extremely powerful motivator, as these rewards often
come together with power. McGregor (1957) accords prominence to self-esteem
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needs, because unlike the lower order needs, self-esteem needs are rarely
satisfied. People seek indefinitely for more satisfaction of these needs once they
consider them to be important.
Such a shift towards higher order needs is predicted by Maslow's (1943, 1954)
theory. When the physiological needs are reasonably satisfied, needs at the next
higher level begin to dominate people's behavior - to motivate them. But the
higher level needs will not appear in any significant way until physiological,
safety and social needs are all reasonably satisfied (McGregor 1957).
In the teaching environment, "academic staff are particularly concerned to secure
their professional recognition among academic peers" (Bright and Williamson
1995: 70), and recognition and approval from supervisors (Chapman 1983).
Recognition was found to be important among secondary school teachers in Hong
Kong (Sun 1996) as respondents in a study indicated dissatisfaction with the
recognition they obtained from the job.
Autonomy and Academic Freedom
More job satisfaction will be generated if staff are given greater potential for
personal development in terms of exercising creativity and responsibility (Miskel,
Glasnapp and Hatley 1975). The correlation between job satisfaction and
autonomy is higher for those with higher order needs than those who focus on
lower order needs (Hackman and Lawler 1971). The freedom to innovate, to
select the knowledge to teach and to teach in their own way (Dcci, Kasser and
Ryan 1997; Holdaway 1978; Kydd 1997) is what attracted many academic staff,
who often perceive themselves as "experts who value academic and professional
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freedom, and who have considerable autonomy in setting their own goals,
priorities, and rewards" (Stumpf and Rindova 1997: 272). Ip's (1982) study of
secondary school teachers in Hong Kong revealed that autonomy and growth were
key job satisfiers.
However, excessive autonomy may be considered an alienating work
characteristic for young faculty who may prefer guidance from experienced
colleagues and concrete feedback on performance (Hall 1996). It should,
however, be noted that while some theorists contend that various extrinsic
rewards will have differential appeal to academics in different life stages
(Peterson and Martin 1990), others found that "little demonstrable evidence exists
to support predictable phases for academics" (Blackburn 1982: 20).
Creativity and Achievement
Creativity, challenge and achievement are among the strong needs for people
(Morse 1953) as they foster job satisfaction (Miskel, Glasnapp and Hatley 1975).
Faculty members are high in need for achievement (Finkelstein 1984: 27). They
like to feel that their abilities are utilized. Teaching successes are the most
frequently cited source of satisfaction and self-esteem (McKeachie 1997: 30) of
the faculty. These needs are also desired by secondary school teachers in Hong
Kong (Sun 1996).
Exercise of Talents and Growth
Great satisfaction is obtained from opportunities to exercise talents and skills, to
learn and grow (Renwick and Lawler 1978). Jarvinen and Kohonen (1995) view
an academic staff as an autonomous person who feels ethically responsible for
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his/her work assuming the responsibility for his/her personal growth and learning.
"Teaching addresses some critical human developmental needs not only of the
students but also of the academic staff' (Bess 1997: xi). Growth was found to be
one of the key factors that brought j oh satisfaction in a survey conducted among
secondary school teachers in Hong Kong (Ip 1982).
Positive Feedback
People like to receive positive feedback, which has the effect of increasing the
self-esteem of the individuals. People with high order needs for achievement seek
"concrete information on how well they perform" (Rainey 1991: 135).
Academics, with their inclination for high order needs for achievement, prefer to
receive feedback which tells how one is progressing. The more positive feedback
is given to the teachers, the more they will be committed (Reyes 1990).
Status and Prestige
Status and prestige are intangible rewards of egoistic values pursued by many
people who derive satisfaction from status andlor prestige associated with the job
(Thorndike 1922). Teaching attracts some people as a service occupation
traditionally accorded a particular kind of respect and status (Kottkamp 1990;
Lortie 1975). The occupation of a university professor is seen by many as "high
in public prestige" (Bess 1997: ix).
Pay
Views on the effectiveness of pay as a motivator are divided. Prior to the
emergence of the human relations school and the Western Electric Company
studies (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939), people are regarded as "economic
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men" who are rational and creative, using reason primarily to calculate exactly
how much satisfaction that may be obtained from the smallest amount of effort
(Brown 1954).	 "Satisfaction" here does not refer to the feeling of
accomplishment; it refers mainly to money. Many theorists thus regard pay as the
most important single motivator in an organized society (Haire et al 1963;
Kopelman 1983). Some found that pay, together with promotion "are the two
most important extrinsic rewards that most organizations have to offer" (Lawler
1994: 167). Others consider that pay is at least the most obvious and tangible
means of reward (Stonich 1986) although not the only useful one (Vough 1979).
On the other hand, "for some people money is not very important" (Lawler 1994:
168). Some theorists have argued that pay has a limited role in motivating
employees once immediate basic human needs are met. Many contend that there
is no definitive relationship between performance and satisfaction with pay (see
Chapter Two). Porter and Lawler (1968) insist that the failure to find a positive
relationship is NOT because pay is NOT an effective motivator, rather the results
"reflect the failure in practice to link differential rewards closely to differences in
performance" (p. 179).
Many opponents of incentive systems consider pay as an unimportant reward as
far as higher order needs are concerned, since pay primarily satisfies lower order
needs. Lopez (1968), however, thought it an over simplification to assert that pay
is unimportant, although he accepts that increased pay is less attractive once the
lower order needs has been satisfied. "No matter how ideal and uplifting it is to
assert that employees are motivated more by an opportunity to serve and to
achieve self-realization rather than by cash rewards, it simply is not true" (p. 96).
Lawler (1994) found that pay is a very important motivator, as it is able to satisfy
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both lower order physiological and security needs as well as higher order needs
such as esteem and recognition. Pay serves as a proxy for other incentives; it can
indicate successful achievement and recognition by the organization. Higher pay
is a cultural symbol of success. Employees care about their rates of pay, not only
because it can meet physiological needs, but also because it is a visible index of
accomplishment and self-worth. When they see that their pay compares favorably
with that of others, they are more likely to be satisfied with themselves, their job,
and the organization. Since pay can satisfy also the higher order needs, such
extrinsic rewards can be used to motivate the "self-actualizing" man described by
Maslow (1943, 1954).
These results are consistent with the earlier findings of Herzberg et a! (1959) that
pay appeared about equally as a satisfier (which can contribute to job satisfaction)
and dissatisfier (which can contribute to job dissatisfaction if it is particularly
poor). Unlike Herzberg et a!, Lawler (1971) places more importance on pay as an
incentive. Disagreeing with I-Ierzberg et al's ranking, he maintains that a wider
review of research suggests that people rate pay much higher, being "ranked
closer to third" (Lawler 1994: 144).
Teachers have largely underplayed the importance of material rewards (Lortie
1975). Redeffer (1984) found that pay is not a key factor affecting the morale of
teachers. Faculty members are less motivated for money than are members of
other professions (Matthews and Weaver 1989) as the desire to teach well has
long been closely associated with intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivation (Bess,
1982, 1997). Teachers in general hold negative attitudes towards contingent pay
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systems (Kottkamp 1990) and many faculty members are against pay flexibility,
regarding it as divisive, leading to low morale.
McKeachie (1997: 30) maintains that new faculty members show greater concern
about extrinsic rewards (promotion and pay) as compared with tenured faculty
members. Money is found to be important if pay levels are low compared with
those at other comparable institutions. Money is a more important concern for the
more junior faculty and those with lower pay. However, it should again be noted
that there is no definite conclusion of whether academics in different life stages
have different preference for the various extrinsic rewards (Blackbur 1982; Hart
1990; Peterson and Martin 1990). A few studies in Hong Kong suggest that the
secondary school teachers are not particularly concerned about pay. Wong's
(1988) sample of secondary school teachers expressed great satisfaction with their
pay, while in two other studies (Sun 1996; Wu 1993), the teachers were neither
satisfied nor dissatisfied with their pay.
Security and Tenure
Security is one of the basic needs of people, as can be seen from the fact that job
security is an important pursuit of many people. When one is unemployed, one
will not have the opportunity to find satisfaction from job, not to mention that
prestige and social status will be low. All these deprivations will undermine the
person's overall well-being. 	 For some people, security satisfaction may
compensate for low satisfaction from financial rewards (Salinas 1964). It may be
possible that some teachers choose the teaching profession because it offers better
security when compared with other occupations (Metropolitan Life 1985a).
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Promotion
As discussed earlier, promotion and pay are considered the two most important
work motivators by some (Lawler 1994; Stonich 1986; Vough 1979). Promotion
is associated with better pay, it signals achievement and enhances responsibility
and status. Like pay, it is both an economic and prestige incentive, satisfying both
lower and higher level needs. Bright and Williamson (1995) consider that of all
extrinsic rewards, "none are as significant as promotion" (p.81). Lopez (1968)
explains that promotion is potentially the most important motivator because of its
ability to satisfy a variety of needs of different orders. "It represents recognition
of the employee's efforts; it is the most tangible and sincere expression of
management's appreciation for the effort made; it provides a chance for further
growth and development; it always is accompanied by a higher salary; and it
usually implies more tenure in the organization"; and "it raises his prestige in the
eyes of his peers, his family and his friend" (p. 101, 102). However, Gardner
(1945) pointed out that it would be a mistake to assume that strong desire for
advancement provides a strong incentive in all individuals. For some people
"promotion is something to be avoided" (Lawler 1994: 168).
As for faculty members, since pay is not normally structured to provide an
incentive to greater efficiency, the main incentive for the academic staff is the
hope of promotion. Promotion was found to be an important value pursued by
some secondary school teachers in Hong Kong. They were dissatisfied with their
promotional opportunity in general (Wong 1988; Wu 1993) although those in
government schools reported great satisfaction in promotion (Wu 1993). Another
study (Sun 1996), however, indicated apathy among secondary school teachers
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towards promotion. They were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with their
promotional opportunities.
Social Needs
People derive satisfaction from their social relations with groups (Chapter Two).
Family and social relationships are important for most faculty members and have
an impact upon motivation for teaching (Braskamp, Fowler and Ory 1982).
Workload
Many academic staff would like to see lighter teaching load. "Too much to do"
was the biggest concern of about two-thirds of the respondents of Eble and
McKeachie's (1985) study, mostly in the lower academic ranks. The way faculty
members are evaluated for contingent pay and promotion has a major
motivational impact upon faculty's preferred allocation of time. As faculty
members perceive research as the predominant factor determining rewards, they
desire to reduce time spent on teaching and increase time for research (Dornbusch
1979).
Summary
There are individual differences in various kinds of needs. Everyone has a
different mix of extrinsic and intrinsic needs. The Expectancy Theory of
Motivation postulates that a person will behave in a way to maximize the
expectancies of all those rewards he/she values. Academics will behave in a
similar way. They value intrinsic rewards such as opportunities to undertake
research or develop teaching, to enjoy the freedom in doing their work, to satisfy
their own growth needs, to search for recognition and enhancement of prestige
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and self-esteem. They also place importance on extrinsic rewards such as pay,
promotion and job security, etc. Each one will look for "a precarious balance"
(Bright and Williamson 1995: 70) among these intrinsic and extrinsic rewards
according to their values. An organization must design reward systems that
influence staff motivation (Perry and Porter 1982). In search for the rewards
valued by staff, the organization should recognize the range of contextual factors
- the types of individuals attracted to the organization, the job itself, the work




The methodology used in conducting the research and the reasons for choosing a
qualitative approach are explained in this chapter.
The Methodology
The main aim of the research was to find out the differing perspectives of various
categories of academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong about the effect
on staff motivation to perform, as a result of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards,
consequent upon the adoption of an appraisal scheme. The key research question
was whether performance appraisal and reward systems should be conducted for
academic staff The investigation aims at finding out WHY such systems may or
may not serve to motivate staff In-depth interviewing was used as the main data
collection method to facilitate a deeper investigation of the issues involved, in
order to explore and identify respondents' attitudes, to search for meaning and
causes, similarities and differences.
21 interviews were conducted from February to May 1999, including one pilot
interview. The respondents consisted of five academic staff members from the
senior management group, five heads of academic departments, five appraisers
and five appraisees (six including the pilot interview) from a cross section of five
(six including the pilot interview) academic departments such that there was a
good spread between science and engineering disciplines and non-science or
engineering disciplines. In addition, as a means to triangulate the data collected
during individual interviews, views expressed by participants at nine discussion
group meetings were also analyzed.
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Rationale for Choosing Qualitative Research
Purposes of Qualitative Research
Qualitative research is concerned with "understanding behavior from the subject's
own frame of reference" and with "how people.... think... .and how they came to
develop the perspectives they hold" in the "hopes of finding some intersection in
perspectives" (Bogdan and Biklen 1992: 2, 30). Thus qualitative research is
interested in investigating how individuals construct their social reality. "The
mode of understanding implied by qualitative research involves alternative
conceptions of social knowledge, of meaning, reality and truth. The basic subject
matter is no longer objective data to be quantified, but meaningful relations to be
interpreted" (Kvale 1996: 11). Humans give meaning to situations and qualitative
research aims at understanding the process, unfolding and interpreting the
meaning from the subjects' point of view rather than trying to know the facts. An
inductive approach is normally used to analyze the data and to draw abstractions
from the data.
The positivists posit that there is a reality 'out there' in the world which is rational
(Bassey 1990). So the purpose of research is to describe and understand the
phenomena of the world and to share this understanding with others.
Understanding enables prediction to be made. The interpretive researcher,
however, cannot accept the idea of there being a reality 'out there' which exists
irrespective of people, for reality is a construct of the human mind. Because of
differences in perception, in interpretation and in language, it is not surprising that
people have different views on what is real. Human actions are based on social
meanings which change through social exchange. The purpose of research is to
describe and interpret the phenomena in attempts to get shared meaning with
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others. Interpretation may, however, offer possibilities but no certainties as to
what may be the outcome of future events.
In-depth Interviewing
Interviewing, as a form of conversation, is a basic mode of human interaction. A
qualitative research interview is defined as "an interview whose purpose is to
obtain description of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting
the meaning of the described phenomena" (Kvale 1996: 5). The respondent's
lived meanings may be communicated not only by words, but also by tone of
voice, facial expressions, and other gestures (Kvale 1996). The conversation has
"a structure and a purpose"; it is "a careful questioning and listening approach
with the purpose of obtaining thoroughly tested knowledge. It is, however, not a
conversation between equal partners, because the researcher defines and controls
the situation. The topic of the interview is introduced by the researcher, who also
critically follows up on the subject's answers to the questions" (Kvale 1996: 6).
Here the researcher will be part of a research instrument, interpreting the response
made by the respondent as the conversation goes on.
In-depth interviewing enables a rich description of the issues under study. It
permits an exploration of the reasons WHY a particular phenomenon happened. It
"probes beneath the surface, soliciting detail and providing a holistic
understanding of the interviewee's point of view. Interviewing allows the
evaluator to enter another persons' world to understand that person's perspective.
Interviews add an inner perspective to outward behaviors. In this way interviews
are a source of meaning" and "we (the researchers) learn about things that we
cannot directly observe" (Patton 1984: 108-9).
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Conduct of the Study
Sampling
As qualitative in-depth interviews are necessarily labour and time consuming,
most studies have small samples (Bogdan and Bikien 1992). In this thesis, a small
sample of three members from each of the five academic departments selected
was used for practical reasons. A purposive sampling approach was used to select
the departments to ensure a good mix of people from different disciplines and
with different experience in going through the various stages of the appraisal
scheme.
Two forms of samples are commonly used in the social sciences: the probability
sample eliminates the judgment or bias of the investigation so that the findings
can be generalizable; the judgment, purposive or quota samples achieve "a degree
of representativeness without the use of random sampling" (Foster 1996: 21). In
using either form of sampling, due consideration should be given to the
representativeness of samples (Shipman 1981).
Random sampling is often used to select the subjects as it "eliminates any
systematic bias that might occur in the selection of cases. This maximizes the
chances that sample will have similar characteristics to the population as a whole"
(Foster 1996: 20). However, for qualitative research, "the sample will be chosen
to be appropriate for the purposes of the study, rather than randomly" (Simpson
and Tuson 1995: 27), as it does not aim to collect representative data or to claim
that the findings are widely generalizable. Furthermore, random samples do not
guarantee representativeness. As the aim of the study is to explore the variety and
range of views, a limited extent of representation is considered adequate. The
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more usual procedure to ensure some representation without excessive size is
through stratification; ensuring representation without this stratification would
otherwise take a much larger sample (Shipman 1981). In the case study of the
Performance Planning, Appraisal and Development Scheme (PPAD) introduced in
the City University of Hong Kong to appraise its academic staff, the progress
made by the various departments in completing the first cycle of the PPAD by
October 1997 (the date by which the first annual cycle of the PPAD should have
been completed) is used as the indicator to stratify, as the progress gives some
indication of the motivation to engage in the PPAD.
Thus the five departments were chosen purposively in the following way, to
ensure that there is representation from different groups of people with different
experience in going through the appraisal cycle:
(a) Two departments (offering degree courses) which had completed the first
annual appraisal cycle by October 1997;
(b) Two departments (offering degree courses) which had completed a portion
of the annual appraisal by October 1997;
(c) One division (offering associate degree courses) which had completed a
portion of the aimual appraisal by October 1997.
To ensure that there are a good mix of people from different disciplines, a science
and engineering department and a non-science or engineering department were
chosen under each of the stratum (a) and (b).
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In order to explore similarities and differences among different categories of staff,
the head of department, an appraiser (who is at the same time the appraisee of
another person) and an appraisee from each of the five departments were
purposely invited as respondents to the in-depth interviews. An appraisee from a
sixth department was invited to participate in the pilot interview. To compare the
views of the staff with those of the management, five senior management staff
were also interviewed. They included the President, two Vice-Presidents and two
Deans, all of whom are members of the Management Board (the supreme body
governing management matters of the University, which is chaired by the
President and comprises five Vice-Presidents, six Deans/Directors, the Registrar
and the Director of Human Resources). The following table depicts the
distribution of the respondents across the departments/disciplines:
Disciplines	 Department	 Head	 Appraiser	 Appraisee
Science and	 A	 Chair	 Prof	 ASP
Engineering	 B	 Chair	 Chair	 ASP
Non Science or	 C	 APA	 Prof	 ASP
Engineering	 D	 Prof	 APA	 ASP
College of Higher	 E	 Prof	 APA	 ASP
VocationalStudies ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________






SeniorManagement Engineering ____________ _____________ ____________
Non-Science	 Chair	 Chair
or
___________________ Engineering ____________ _____________ ____________
Chair:	 Chair Professor	 Professor:	 Professor (Scale A)







The sampling of appraisers and appraisees is mainly opportunistic, depending on
existing contacts with people and successful approaches made to people who were
willing to discuss the issues. For qualitative interpretive research, the interplay
between the researcher and the interviewees is of vital importance. It is essential
to draw on "people who would be willing" to discuss things about their
institutions (Ball 1987: ix) as they will be the key informants about the issues. It
turned out that some of the respondents are known to the researcher, some were
approached through connection with people known to the researcher, others are
people with whom the researcher has no connection one way or another.
The In —depth Interviews
Research interviews vary in degree of structure, from open interviews which do
not have a predetermined sequence and questions to rigidly structured ones.
Interviews also differ in terms of openness of purpose (whether the purpose is
revealed at the start). Interviews can differ further in their emphasis on
exploration versus hypothesis testing, and on description versus interpretation. In
this study, semi-structured interviews were used. An interview guide (Appendix
1) was used to provide a checklist of questions and issues to be explored during
the interviews. While the sequence will vary depending on how individual
interviews go, the guide will help to decide "how best to use the limited time
available in an interview situation. It helps make interviewing different people
more systematic and comprehensive by delimiting the issues to be discussed"
(Patton 1984: 111) while at the same time allowing flexibility. Respondents were
asked to:
(a) describe their experience of and their feeling about the PPAD scheme;
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(b) account for the functions achieved by the Scheme; and to compare the
achievement with their expectation of the Scheme;
(c) describe the process;
(d) discuss the criteria and standard used;
(e) discuss the people involved in the appraisal process and their competency in
conducting appraisal;
(f) evaluate the impact and value of the Scheme on them;
(g) recall what has had the greatest impact on them;
(h) evaluate the effect of the Scheme on the achievement of the University's
goals, and the reason why such results were attained;
(i) suggest improvements to be made to the Scheme;
(j) recall their experience in other staff appraisal schemes.
Ethical Considerations
A number of significant ethical issues occurred throughout the entire research
process. This is particularly the case in qualitative research where the researcher
is the main instrument for obtaining the knowledge. The researcher must be well
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aware of the sensitive issues that may turn up in the process and has to draw up a
set of ethical guidelines to enable normative decisions to be made.
Informed consent was obtained from all those who participated in the in-depth
interviews. The intention and purpose of the study were made known to them at
the beginning. "Informed consent entails informing the research subjects about
the overall purpose of the investigation and the main features of the design, as
well as any possible risks and benefits from participation in the research project.
Informed consent further involves obtaining the voluntary participation of the
subject, with his or her right to withdraw from the study at any time, thus
counteracting potential undue influence and coercion" (Kvale 1996: 112).
Confidentiality of the identity of the respondents was strictly enforced.
"Confidentiality in research implies that private data identifying the subjects will
not be reported.	 If a study involves publishing information potentially
recognizable to others, the subjects need to agree to the release of identifiable
information" (Kvale 1996: 114). As the project aimed at finding the general
perception of the management and staff about appraisal and reward systems
through consolidating views, no data subject would and needed to be identified
individually by name or other recognizable features. The raw data collected were
not released to anyone for any other purpose than for the submission of the thesis.
The Discussion Group Meetings
As part of the consultation process relating to the introduction of a Merit-based
Reward Scheme in the City University of Hong Kong (see Chapter Five), the
researcher, in her official capacity as Associate Director of Human Resources, has
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visited nine academic departments selected randomly to collect staff's views
about the proposed reward/sanction scheme from April to May 1999. The
departments visited span across different disciplines. The participants in these
meetings represent staff members at various levels of academic rank, and the
number of those staff members who were present at each session ranges from 15
to 30. It should, however, be noted that it was not made known to the participants
that their views would be used for the purpose of this study. In fact, that had not
been the intention at that time. It is also because of these circumstances that no
record of "who said what" was made except for a reference to the disciplines they
belong to. A consolidated official report of the deliberation made by all the
discussion groups was prepared by the researcher, and submitted to the
University's Council via the Management Board in July 1999. The same report
was subsequently circulated openly to members of the two Staff Consultative
Committees of the University, as a public document of the University.
Some Features of the Study
Generalizability of the Findings
While a small sample can still make sound research, for one can adjust the nature
and scope of the claims appropriately, a question regarding generalizability is
often raised in small-scale studies. "Any tool for data-gathering provides only one
picture of the social world, and matches and mismatches between data gathering
by different techniques help to enrich understanding of what is going on"
(Simpson and Tuson 1995: 17). Thus the views expressed by about 200 staff
members who participated in the nine discussion group meetings were analyzed to
supplement the data collected through the small sample of in-depth interviewing.
The inclusion of data collected by other means will contribute to the ability to
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generalize the findings although still to a limited extent, in addition to serving as a
means of validation or triangulation.
The study, being a qualitative research, focuses attention on analytical
generalization (Kvale 1996: 233), as distinguished from naturalistic or statistical
generalization (Stake 1994: 240). Provided that the researchers make the
arguments explicit, readers will be able to judge the validity of the claims on
generalization based on an analysis of the similarities and differences of the
various situations.
Validity and Reliability
The analysis was based upon "the views, experiences, meanings and
interpretations of the social actors involved" which "actors are the basic
constituents of the organization" (Ball 1987: 26-7). The respondents were asked
to reflect generally upon the experience with the appraisal scheme. The
information elicited reflects the different perspectives of the respondents. The
form of research knowledge is subjectivist. This method of analysis is strong on
validity in terms of giving a genuine representation of the nature of a
phenomenon. On the other hand, the work is weaker on reliability mainly because
the opportunistic sampling of a small-scale study. However, given the aim to
generate "theory, description or understanding" (Bodgan and Biklen 1992: 42),
this minor deficiency is considered acceptable on balance. Indeed, "qualitative
researchers do not share exactly" the expectation that "there will be consistency in
results of observation made by different researchers or the same researcher over
time"; and they "view reliability as a fit between what they record as data and
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what actually occurs in the setting under study, rather than the literal consistency
across different observations" (Bogdan and Biklen 1992: 44).
Objectivity
Qualitative research is often criticized as not being scientific or objective.
However, the "automatic rejection of qualitative research as unscientific reflects a
specific, limited conception of science, instead of seeing science as the topic of
continual clarification and discussion", for "quantified data are not given; social
facts are social constructions arising from a specific, chosen technological
perspective on the social world" (Kvale 1996: 61, 63). A broader definition of
science is "the methodological production of new, systematic knowledge" (Kvale
1996: 60). In-depth interviewing is an excellent way to "produce scientific
knowledge in the meaning of methodologically secured new and systematic
knowledge" (Kvale 1996: 61). It can capture the multitude of subjects' views of a
theme and portray a multi-faceted real world provided that sufficient safeguards
are built in to ensure objectivity defined as freedom from bias to the extent
possible. The data collected should be systematically cross-checked, controlled
and verified; and ideally they should also be intersubjectively testable and
reproducible, that is, different interviewers may come up with closely similar
interviews from their subjects, when similar interview procedures are followed.
Subjectivity
No one will disagree that the integrity of the researchers is critical to the quality of
any qualitative research study. They must engage in an independent and unbiased
investigation as far as possible. Researchers must not be co-opted either from
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'above' or 'below'. This is particularly true for researchers who use in-depth
interviews as they may become closely identified with their subjects.
It is recognized that the position of the Associate Director of Human Resources
(who served as the Executive Assistant to the President prior to that posting) may
give rise to a role conflict as a researcher to conduct the study relating to the
effectiveness of the University's appraisal scheme. Thus she must be aware of her
being prone to co-optation by those 'above' which may lead to a tendency to
ignore some findings and stress others in the interest of those 'above' but to the
detriment of an independent enquiry.
On the other hand, the dual role of the Associate Director of Human Resources
and of the researcher can present some advantages. Her involvement gave more
ready access to the research participants. She herself possesses an insider view to
the issues too. In social sciences where educational research is concerned,
subjectivity is not only inevitable but also desirable. Here subjectivity refers to
"the meanings that people give to their environment". As the central interest in
research is focused upon "people's understandings and interpretations of their
social environment, our sense of belonging to a society and the techniques which
we use for understanding are not now impediments to our studies. The procedures
through which we understand and interpret our social world are now necessary
conditions for us to undertake research" (May 1993: 6). "Whatever picture of
social life the scientists present is the outcome of selective observation and
interpretation, because his theory determines not only how the 'data' are
explained but also what are to count as data in the first place" (Furlong and
Edwards 1977, as quoted by Ball 1987: 26). "Good researchers are aware of their
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theoretical base and use it to help collect and analyze data" (Bogdan and Bikien
1992: 30).
Subjectivity will serve as the starting point upon which the researcher will base
the enquiry, but subjectivity must not be allowed to influence the course of
enquiry. The research design and methods must be structured in a way to ensure
objectivity in the process of data gathering and analysis. The researcher should
attempt to "objectively study the subjective states of their subjects", and
"constantly confront his or her own opinions and prejudices with the data" to
"guard against their own biases" (Bogdan and Biklen 1992: 42). It should also be
acknowledged that biases can only be limited but not eliminated. "All researchers
are affected by observers' bias", "qualitative researchers try to acknowledge and
take into account their own biases as a method of dealing with them" (Bodgan and
Biklen 1992: 43).
Truthfulness of the Responses
As the researcher is the Associate Director of Human Resources (and formerly the
Executive Assistant to the President), "how far the responses from the
interviewees are genuine?" presents a fair question. However, one can only trust
the integrity of the respondents and not let speculation hinder the research. Indeed,
in qualitative research, the mutual trust between the researchers and the
respondents is crucial to the success of the research. In most cases, the
researchers are "known and trusted" by the respondents (Bogdan and Biklen 1992:
2). As things turned out in the present study, there is evidence to suggest that the
views expressed by the respondents are credible: many responses collaborate with
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what were expressed during the discussion group meetings, as well as those
collected through similar research conducted elsewhere.
Summary
The thesis aimed at investigating the different perspectives of various categories
of academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong about the effect of an
appraisal scheme on their motivation to perform, through the mediation of
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. Given that the main purpose was to explore WHY
a phenomenon may happen, that is, WHY performance appraisal may motivate
staff, a qualitative approach was considered the most appropriate for the conduct
of the research.
In-depth interviewing was chosen as the main data collection method to facilitate
a deeper investigation of the issues. 21 interviews were conducted with senior
management people, as well as heads of academic departments, appraisers (who
are also appraisees of other appraisers) and appraisees from five (six including the
pilot interview) departments. A purposive sampling approach was used to select
the departments to ensure a good mix of people from different disciplines and
with different experience in going through the various stages of the appraisal
scheme. In addition, views expressed by participants, spanning various academic
ranks, at nine discussion group meetings were collated as a means to triangulate
the data collected during the in-depth interviews.
The data were analyzed in Chapters Six and Seven using the theoretical
framework constructed in Chapter Two. As the data centred on staff's perception
about the performance appraisal scheme of the City University of Hong Kong, a
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review of the introduction of the scheme has been made in the following chapter,




Performance Appraisal in the City University of Hong Kong
The introduction of the Performance Planning, Appraisal and Development
Scheme in the City University of Hong Kong is described, together with a brief
account of the appraisal schemes in other local institutions. The chapter begins
with an account of increasing adoption of managerial practices in Hong Kong's
public sector.
New Managerialism in Hong Kong
The public sector in Hong Kong is subject to rising pressure for improvement.
There is rising aspiration from the better-educated public. They are becoming
more conscious of their rights as citizens. As a result, there is increasing pressure
on the government to become more open, accountable and responsive to public
demands, and more efficient in its overall operations. The Public Sector Reform
in Hong Kong was launched in 1989, based on the concept of new public
management (NPM) or new managerialism that emerged in the 1 980s and early
1990s. Given the financial prosperity of Hong King in those years, the main
motive of Hong Kong's Reform was not to roll back the government, although the
government also faces some financial pressure because of expenditure needed for
major infrastructure programmes, such as the new airport. The main focus was to
achieve value-for-money, long term productivity gains and better public
accountability, to ensure that the public get the best possible service for what they
pay.
The Efficiency Unit was set up in 1992 in response to the concern expressed by
the Legislative Council on the efficient use of public money and the quality of
services delivered by public organizations. Government departments were asked
to formulate policy to achieve better control in the use of resources. Standards of
100
service, complaint and suggestion procedures have to be published by each
department. Consequently many departments established performance pledges
which set out performance standards, as an indication of their determination to be
accountable to the public for the quality of services. The public are regarded as
clients and public services are to be open and accountable to the clients. The
hierarchical structure was replaced by a flatter structure with more power
devolved to the local units, and with their performance monitored by users'
committees.
Higher Education in Hong Kong
During the past 20 years as the society became more affluent, Hong Kong saw
rapid expansion in education, especially in the higher education sector. The age
participation rate for undergraduates (proportion of the 17-20 year old age group
for whom first year first degree places are available) has grown from 2% in the
1970s to 18% in 1994, almost tenfold within 20 years. Government expenditure
on higher education as a percentage of GDP rose from 0.5% in the 1970s to 1% in
1994. In 1995-96, education accounted for some 21% of total recurrent public
expenditure, and cost the Hong Kong taxpayers about HK$30,000 million, about
35% of this can be attributed to higher education (University Grants Council
Report on Higher Education, October 1996). The number of first year first
degree places is now capped at 18% of the relevant age group, i.e., 14,500 places.
Concomitant with rising public expenditure is greater demand of public
accountability. The taxpayers are more concerned with whether they are getting
value for money. Are the tertiary education institutions producing graduates who
can meet the manpower needs of the society? Or are they producing more
101
graduates than the society wants, thus constituting a threat to social order? Some
means of control seem to be pertinent.
The University Grants Council (UGC) is a public body appointed by the Hong
Kong Government to advise on the development and funding of the higher
education institutions. The UGC is an advisory body with membership from
overseas and local academics, local professional and business people. To meet
the increasing demand for provision of degree places, the number of institutions
funded by the UGC has increased from 2 to 8 in the last two decades. In addition
to the two long established universities, namely the University of Hong Kong
(1912) and the Chinese University of Hong Kong (1963), a new Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology (1988) was built, two former polytechnics
(Hong Kong Polytechnic established in 1972; the City Polytechnic established in
1984) and the Hong Kong Baptist College (established in 1956) were upgraded to
become the City University of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Polytechnic
University and the Hong Kong Baptist University in 1994; the former Lingnan
College was upgraded to Lingnan University in 1999; and the Hong Kong
Institute of Education is seeking to attain university status.
The UGC is the major funder of the institutions. Its funding formula separately
identifies funding for teaching and research. For the teaching portion, budgets are
allocated mainly based on its discipline weighting, level weighting (i.e., whether
the course is at degree, sub-degree or postgraduate degree level), study mode and
planned student enrollment as allocated by the UGC. No additional funding will
be given for student enrollment beyond the UGC target. For the research portion,
the budgets are allocated mainly based on the number of active researchers as
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determined at the latest Research Assessment Exercise conducted by the Research
Grants Council (RGC). In addition, there is an element of funding on a fixed per
capita basis calculated on the number of academic staff in each institution, to take
account of the time they may spend in professional activities.
To monitor and enhance the quality of higher education, the UGC adopted a
variety of efficiency monitoring measures, in the form of regular reviews of the
institutions, including sectoral reviews, Research Assessment Exercises, Teaching
and Learning Quality Process Reviews, and Management Reviews. The UGC
also requires from institutions triennial academic development proposals and
other regular reports and statistical returns covering various aspects of their
ftmnctions.
While funding is provided by the Government upon advice from the UGC, each of
the UGC-funded institutions is an autonomous body with freedom to manage its
internal affairs under the directives from its governing Council. The UGC's
mission statement stresses the institutions' academic freedom and institutional
autonomy, but it also incorporates a concern for promoting efficiency and cost-
effectiveness in the activities of the institutions (UGC of Hong Kong Facts and
Figures 1995, April 1996):
"Recognizing the merits of and the need to preserve, academic freedom
and institutional autonomy subject to appropriate financial and public
accountability as well as the different and complementary roles of the
UGC-funded higher education institutions, University Grants Committee
will:
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promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the activities of the
institutions; and
avoid undue intervention in the affairs of the institutions, subject to
this being commensurate with the need for the Committee and the
institutions to be publicly accountable."
The rising level of expenditure allocated to the universities has raised public
concern on the cost-effectiveness of the higher education system. Education
Panel members of the Legislative Council had been critical. Miss Emily Lau
remarked, "although Hong Kong universities pay first-class salaries, they don't
seem to be able to attract many first-class scholars" (Frank-Keyes 1996). Some
other members of the Legislative Council had openly criticized the university
academic staff for making too little contribution, despite their high pay. The
Government admitted that the unit cost per student of the UGC-funded institutions
is high, both in relation to the other local education sectors and to the higher
education sector overseas. The UGC thus became concerned about the cost-
effectiveness of the local universities. Its concern is aggravated by its recognition
of decline in quality of university students, in terms of their language proficiency
and communication skills. In 1996, the UGC stressed that higher education as a
whole was entering a period of consolidation and the focus should now be shifted
from "quantity" to "quality" and "efficiency" (UGC Annual Report 1996). In
April 1996, the Government announced a target of real funding cut of 10% for the
1998-2001 trieimium (with 5% ploughed back to support research or other new
initiatives). At the time of writing of the thesis, the Government has sounded out
the possibility of a further cut of 7% for the 2001-2004 triennium.
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In response to increasing external scrutiny from both the Government and the
public, local universities have adopted new strategies, such as quality assurance,
re-engineering and re-structuring, setting up of self-financing units, and above all,
performance management measures.
The City University of Hong Kong
The City University of Hong Kong (CityU) was chosen as a case study for the
thesis partly because the researcher, being a staff member of the University, has
access to an insider view of the issues, but more importantly because the
University is seen as a pioneer among local universities in the introduction of
performance appraisal for academic staff. CityU's vision is to aspire "to be
internationally recognized as a leading university in the Asia-Pacific region". Its
mission, formulated in 1997, is:
(a) to provide its students with quality higher education;
(b) to contribute to the advancement of knowledge;
(c) to interact with other institutions of higher education and professional
bodies;
(d) to cooperate with industry, commerce and community;
(e) to offer access to the University 's human, physical and technological
resources for the benefit of the society.
Anticipating and responding to local and regional needs and the effects of rapid
social and technical change, City University of Hong Kong emphasizes
professional education and practice, and applied research.
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The student population for 2000-200 1 is approximately 16,000 full-time
equivalents (11,000 full-time and 5,000 part-time). There are seventeen academic
departments grouped under three Faculties - Faculty of Business, Faculty of
Humanities and Social Sciences, and Faculty of Science and Engineering - each
being responsible for a full range of research degree, postgraduate and
undergraduate degree programmes. Two Schools, namely School of Law and
School of Creative Media, are also offering a portfolio of programmes at various
levels. Associate degrees are offered in the College of 1-ligher Vocational Studies.
There are also a School of Graduate Studies and a School of Continuing and
Professional Education. The University has some 800 full-time academic staff
members and 1,800 full-time non-academic staff.
The President is the chief executive officer. The principal sections of the
University are Education, Research, Planning and Information Services,
Institutional Advancement, and Business and Finance. Each section is headed by
a Vice-President who has functional responsibility for particular areas of
activities. The University's management structure has three major elements: the
external governance committees that report to the Council, the academic
committees that report to the Senate, and the administrative committees that report
to the Management Board.
Staff of the City University of Hong Kong are appointed either on contract terms
or substantiable superannuable terms. Re-appointment for those staff on contract
terms is not automatic or guaranteed, and naturally is subject to satisfactory
performance. Staff appointed on superannuable terms are subject to evaluation
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for substantiation within a specified period of time (normally spanning three to six
years for academic staff). Substantiation is a concept different from tenure.
There is, however, no official or legal definition for the term. It is the general
perception as well as expectation of staff that a substantiated staff can reasonably
expect continuation of employment unless he/she is found to have breached the
disciplinary guidelines, or judged to have failed to perform up to the required
standard. There are so far no systematic check-points to assess the substantiated
staff for the purpose of continuous employment.
Staff members, irrespective of the terms of employment, are appointed to a
relevant salary scale according to their rank. Each scale spans a range of
incremental salary points, starting from the minimum entry point to the maximum
salary point beyond which no further increment will be awarded. A fundamental
drawback of the existing system is the almost automatic progression along the
salary scale, particularly for substantiated members of staff. Although provisions
exist in the employment contract enabling the President to withhold the otherwise
automatic annual salary increment, this has rarely been exercised even in extreme
cases. This is perhaps why there seems to be a widely held view among staff
members that the increment is an "entitlement" under the existing organizational
culture. To take it away may be regarded as an infringement.
The City University of Hong Kong adopts academic titles generally used by
North-American universities. The titles reflect the status and standing of the
academic staff and are determined according to the individual's experience and
academic achievement:
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Academic Titles	 Comparable ranks in
adopted by
	
most Commonwealth 	 Remarks
CityUniversity	 Universities	 ________________________________
Lecturer	 Assistant Lecturer	 This is a career grade. The
appointee is expected to have
advancement to a higher position
______________________ ______________________ upon completion of a contract.
Assistant Professor	 Lecturer	 -
Associate Professor	 Senior Lecturer	 -
Professor	 Reader	 -
Professor (Chair) of a
	
Professor	 A Professor (Chair) is at the top
subject/specialty	 ______________________ academic rank in the University
Table 2: Academic Titles Adopted by the City University of Hong Kong
Staff of the College of Higher Vocational Studies are appointed to a different set
of academic titles which, nonetheless, bear some equivalence to those used for
staff members in the Faculties or Schools. For simplicity sake, they will be
referred to by the equivalent academic titles in the study.
Strategic Plan of the City University of Hong Kong
The City University of Hong Kong has a Strategic Plan 199 7-2002 Towards an
Era of Excellence, which is consistent with the University's mission. It is the
University's first strategic plan, and the President played a key role in the
development of the plan since his appointment in 1996. The plan captures six
components of the University's goals as given in the acronym AURORA:
(a) Ambiance (for intellectual and personal growth)
(b) Undergraduate Education (as the University 's core competence)
(c) Research (excellence in selected areas)
(d) Outreach (to enhance the University's standing and to contribute to the
community)
(e) Reward (to realize the University's goals)
(f) Accountability (for effectiveness in the management of the University)
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The plan accords equal emphasis to teaching and research, as it stresses that "our
fundamental strategy must be to improve the quality of both our teaching and
research programmes". Therefore the plan is often referred to as the "Walking
with Two Legs" strategy. It states that:
"The mission of a full-fledged university is two-fold: teaching - the
transmission of knowledge; and research - the creation of new
knowledge. For the University to fulfill its Mission, our fundamental
strategy must be to improve the quality of both our teaching and
research programmes, strengthening teaching as our core competence
and research as our leading edge."
"A strategy of giving teaching and research equal emphasis has several
benefIts. First, achievement and recognition in either area improves the
image of the University. Second, the current funding methodology of the
UGC strongly suggests that superior performance in both teaching and
research will be rewarded. Third, the presence of both excellent teachers
and researchers on campus enhances the intellectual life of the
University."
"The policy of an equal emphasis on teaching and research is meant to
apply at the University level, not at the level of individual staff or at the
departmental level. Individual staff members of academic units cannot be
expected to be equally proficient in both transmitting and creating
knowledge. In many cases, to demand superior performance in both is
unrealistic and unproductive."
(bold face in original text, italics added)
As observed by the UGC Management Review Panel, "in developing the plan, the
senior management drew extensively upon both internal and external
contributions. Internally, the development of the plan was based on the work of
seven institution-wide Task Forces whose recommendations were considered at
an open forum with all senior staff and the President. The plan was also informed
by external consultations, for example, via the Departmental Advisory
Committees (made up of senior industry representatives), a survey of secondary
school teachers and discussions with community leaders, alumni and Council
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members". The UGC considered the approach successful in "generating a strong
sense of ownership of the plan across the institution" (UGC Management Review
Report, January 1999).
It seems quite clear from the Strategic Plan that the pursuit of educational values
is the primary goal of the University, with undergraduate education and research
supported by ambiance being put foremost as the leading components. As stated
in the Plan, teaching arid research represent the core of the University's
operations, the provision of an appropriate physical environment and ambiance is
to support these core functions in bringing successful learning and creative
research. An effective reward system and attention to accountability are thought to
be crucial to ensure effectiveness in the management of the University in
achieving its goals.
The Strategic Plan describes the reward system as one with the aim "to enhance
quality and superior performance of both academic and non-academic staff' and
as such "the University requires an effective evaluative system and the ability to
reward outstanding performance with accelerated salary advances. It must also be
possible to reflect consistent poor performance by barring further salary advances.
Such a system will need to be backed up by comprehensive human-resource
management, including aimual performance appraisals that are objective and
substantive." At the same time, the reward system is one in which staff "are
allowed to develop their careers in the light of their talents and interests". Public
accountability is also a key component of the AURORA strategy. The Plan states
that the University has to demonstrate a significant increase in cost-effectiveness
of management and accountability. Incentives should be set up to encourage units
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to use resources economically and to increase productivity.
Introduction of the Performance Planning, Appraisal and Development
Scheme
The introduction of performance appraisal in the City University of Hong Kong
pre-dated the drawing up of the Strategic Plan. It was introduced "in the context
of a strong policy of quality assurance" (Imrie 1996) which was prompted by the
UGC institutional visit in 1993. The unfavorable comment of a lack in
commitment and shared sense of ownership towards quality assurance triggered a
series of measures to address UGC's concern, including the set up of a Quality
Assurance Committee to install quality assurance mechanisms, establishment of a
system of internal teaching and learning quality audits, instigation of a
comprehensive system of teaching evaluation, re-engineering work processes, and
drawing up of performance pledges by various departments. A pilot Performance
Planning, Appraisal and Development Scheme (PPAD) for academic staff was
also introduced in 1995-96 as one of those initiatives. The scheme, incorporating
performance planning, appraisal and staff development into one process, aimed at
enabling staff performance to contribute to departmental development,
culminating in the achievement of institutional objectives. It also aimed at helping
to satisfy the University's accountability to the taxpayers. The scheme was fully
launched in 1996-97.
The stated aims of PPAD for academic staff are:
(a) establishing a culture in which individuals and departments take
responsibility for continuous improvement of their own performance and
contributions;
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(b) assisting staff to optimize their professional capabilities which in turn
enhance the capabilities and organizational effectiveness of the University;
(c) clarj5'ing and reinforcing the mission, values, goals and objectives of the
University in general and the departments in particular through
communication and shared understanding between the appraiser and the
appraisee.
The appraisal cycle starts in September each year with the performance planning
stage for goal setting and outcome planning. The appraiser and the appraisee sign
the agreed plan, which is a part of a standard PPAD Report proforma (Appendix
2). The plan then becomes the reference point for performance. During the year
the appraiser is expected to discuss progress and development with the appraisee.
An appraisal meeting will be carried out from June to August after which the
appraiser and the appraisee will sign the PPAD Report. The Heads of academic
departments (henceforth referred to as Heads) may assign senior staff as
appraisers to assist in the process but the ultimate responsibility remains with the
Heads. The appraisers will normally have at least 3 years of service with the
University. A staff member can, with good reason, make a request for an
alternative appraiser subject to agreement by the Head.
The ultimate purpose of the PPAD is to enable staff to contribute to the
achievement of the University's mission "to provide its students with quality
higher education; to contribute to the advancement of knowledge; to interact with
other institutions of higher education and professional bodies; to cooperate with
industry, commerce and the community". To support this mission, the main goal
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of the University is to excel in teaching and research by means of a "Walking with
Two Legs" strategy as specified in the University's Strategic Plan. On this basis,
four main areas of work are identified for appraisal purposes:
•	 teaching
•	 research or applied work
•	 service to the profession
•	 administration
Some criteria are suggested for each of these areas. However, to cater for
departmental differences, the standards may vary across departments and thus
staff members are not expected to compare standards across departments. On a
fair and equitable basis, the appraisers are asked to duly communicate the criteria
and standards to staff. Although the scheme was a developmental one, the
appraiser had to assign a grade to each of the four areas of work, as well as an
overall grade (see Appendix 2). The grades were to be arrived at by comparing
the staff member's performance against the targets the staff set for himself/herself
and agreed with the appraiser through mutual agreement. There was no
requirement on what the "expectation" should be, whether it should be norm-
referencing to that of other staff members in an equivalent position, or whether it
should be drawn up with reference to some acceptable absolute standard.
A Committee on Staff Performance and Development was set up by the
Management Board (which is the University's supreme body on managerial
matters chaired by the President and comprising Vice-Presidents, Deans/Directors
and Heads of major administrative departments), to administer and monitor the
scheme. The Committee comprises:
•	 a Vice-President (Chairman) 	 [academic]




•	 a head of an academic department
•	 a head of an administrative department
•	 an academic staff
•	 an administrative staff
•	 the Director of Human Resources
As success in the scheme depends to a large extent on how well the staff
understand the aims, objectives and process, briefing sessions for all academic
staff were conducted prior to its introduction. A series of training workshops for
appraisers were also conducted although attendance was not compulsory. Two
Guidebooks, one for Heads and one for staff, were prepared for consultation
purposes.
In October 1997 when the PPAD had completed one cycle, the Committee on
Staff Performance and Development conducted a review of the scheme. It
showed that of the 27 departments which participated in the scheme in 1996-97,
the number of cases where performance planning had or had not yet been
completed by the end of October 1997 are as follows:



















figures not available due to re-organization
There appeared to have been a mixed reaction to the PPAD. Some departments
had successfully implemented it, others had only done a proportion, and some had
not even started at all. It was a common feeling that there was reluctance in some
departments to practise the scheme. Quite a number of staff, including Heads,
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advocated that the PPAD should be made optional. The situation highlighted some
problems with the scheme.
When the City University of Hong Kong first introduced the PPAD, it decided to
adopt a non-judgmental approach as it was considered more readily acceptable by
staff. However, the developmental nature of the scheme appeared to be the most
confusing feature. The Guidelines state that "PPAD is a process which is
primarily developmental for the benefit of staff and departments" and that "the
criteria for appraisal in this process are based on the staff member's individual
performance and developmental needs, which may be different from those criteria
for personnel decisions". The PPAD was indeed intended for developmental
purpose as a staff member was appraised against "expectation previously agreed
between the staff and the appraiser, not norms". The scheme was expected to be a
formative means for staff developmental purpose instead of a summative means to
assist personnel decision. It emphasized a two-way communication spanning the
entire process, instead of the Head evaluating the staff at a particular point in time.
However, it was the belief of many staff that evaluations for personnel decisions
were made under the guise of staff development. On the other hand, staff would
consider the effort spent on a non-judgmental appraisal superfluous as they were
already subject to a variety of other appraisals and evaluations, for example, upon
expiry of contract, substantiation of appointment on superannuable terms,
crossing of efficiency bar, promotion, etc. Even some Heads thought that it was
difficult to use PPAD primarily for developmental purposes, as it was not
practicable to disassociate the results from assessment for personnel decisions.
The Heads would have formed an impression on performance while appraising
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staff. Furthermore, Heads were not keen to go through the time-consuming
exercise, as they could not see any tangible outcome: there is no tooth in the
scheme since they could not get rid of non-performers or reward good performers.
On the basis of the some staff feedback, the Management Board saw that there
was support for adapting the PPAD for judgmental purpose. In February 1998,
the Management Board asked a Task Group, comprising two Vice-Presidents, a
Dean and two academic members from the Committee on Staff Performance and
Development, to examine the matter and make recommendations to the
Management Board. The recommendation from the Task Group made in April
1998 was, however, that the PPAD should retain its primary objective of being a
developmental review. The Task Group considered that if the PPAD was adapted
as a self-contained judgmental exercise, the scheme had to be modified to
incorporate more detailed evidence and documentation on performance, which
might make the system more elaborate and create duplication of efforts with other
formal performance assessment at major personnel decision junctures.
While the Management Board was considering the Task Group's
recommendation, the UGC conducted a management review of the University in
August 1998. In its report, the UGC Management Review Panel commended the
University's management practices. In particular, it applauded the existence of
the PPAD to appraise the performance of staff It stated, however, that "the Panel
has some serious concerns about the absence of an on-going appraisal system for
academic staff which is both judgmental and developmental... .while performance
is appraised at the end of the probationary period and on application for a
promotion, there is no mechanism for identifying and managing poor performance
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at other times". It urged the University to work towards introducing an on-going
and "judgmental" appraisal scheme as a matter of priority. In its response to
UGC, the University agreed to modify the current PPAD to add a judgmental
component. Since many staff members have criticized the "toothless" feature of
the PPAD, the University considered it a good opportunity to devise an appraisal
scheme which would have consequences on personnel decisions.
Proposal of a Merit-based Reward Scheme
The University has also proposed a Merit-based Reward Scheme (MBRS),
predicated on an appraisal scheme, with the purpose of motivating and
encouraging staff to optimize their professional capacities and talents at the
individual level, thereby culminating in the achievement of the departmental and
instrumental goals. Henceforth, the appraisal scheme will serve both judgmental
(i.e., the evaluation results will inform personnel decision making) and
developmental purposes. Salary increment will no longer be "automatic", but
must be earned on performance. All staff members will be subject to a major
review every three years. Staff members assessed not to have attained the
required standard will be barred from progressing along the salary scale. For staff
members who are on the top point of their salary scale (i.e., no more salary
increment unless they are promoted to a higher salary scale), they will also be
required to pass the triennial review, although the result of the review will have no
effect on their salary. Assistance will be given to enable those staff who fail the
review to achieve the standard while their ensuing performance will be assessed
again in the following year. Salary increment will be awarded only when their
performance has attained a satisfactory standard. Under-performers who fail to
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achieve the requisite standards over a reasonable period of assistance and
guidance will receive appropriate warnings or punishment.
In tandem, two levels of merit awards - departmental and University - will be set
up to reward outstanding performance. Staff members with outstanding
performance will be nominated by the department for consideration to receive
awards. Staff members are eligible to receive both categories of awards in any
year. The departmental and the University awards will be equivalent to the value
of six times and 12 times respectively the difference between the current salary
point and the immediately preceding salary point of the staff member selected.
Each year, funding will be allocated to support a small fraction of total staff
members for the departmental awards. The University awards are seen as an
exceptional honour, with the number limited to about six each year. However,
should the number of deserving staff be higher than expected, additional funding
will be considered. Criteria for assessment will be drawn up at the departmental
level and will be linked to the departmental and University goals as driven by the
University's Strategic Plan. The criteria for crossing salary bars will correlate
with those used for other crucial personnel decisions and merit awards.
A consultation paper inviting comments and suggestions on a preliminary MBRS
proposal was sent to staff members in April 1999. The Human Resources Office
staff (including the researcher) visited nine academic departments selected
randomly, to listen to views and ideas and to answer queries. Some departments
as well as the Staff Association and individual staff members have also written to
the Human Resources Office. A second draft of the consultation paper, which
was revised taking into account the views expressed by staff in response to the
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first draft, was produced in August 1999. Three consultation forums were held in
September 1999. Views and suggestions were also collected from the two Staff
Consultative Committees. All views and suggestions made were collated and
presented to the Management Board in October 1999. The proposal was
subsequently approved by the University Council in November 1999 for
implementation with effect from January 2000, upon recommendation from the
Management Board.
At the time of writing of this thesis, the University has (in October 2000) decided
to modify the MBRS, as a result of concerns expressed by staff. "Feedback from
staff at all levels suggests that the workload involved in the implementation of the
scheme may not be proportionate to the possible benefits. There has also been a
growing feeling that the scheme, in its present form, may not be effective in
promoting a spirit of collegiality amongst staff and may, in fact, have a negative
impact." (The President's letter to all staff 10 October 2000). A major change
was not to apply the triennial review to those substantiated staff who are on the
top point of their salary scale, accepting the fact that it would simply not be
fruitful to apply the review to those who are not subject to salary increment. At
the same time, the monetary merit awards (both the departmental and University
levels) component of the scheme was removed as the process of selecting the
awards recipients was seen as divisive to many staff members.
The annual appraisal will be maintained for all staff, substantiated and otherwise.
The process will, however, be refined to make appraisal more effective in
maintaining and setting standards of performance. At the same time, a
comprehensive and strengthened staff development scheme is being studied, with
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the aim of creating an environment in which staff can perform to their fullest
potential. Consideration will also be given to enhance or install various forms of
recognition.
Problems of Appraisal Arising from Confusion and Contention in Purpose
The PPAD was introduced in the University under a climate of increasing
managerial control as necessitated by rising external scrutiny.	 The original
intention was to measure and control staff performance more systematically, to
enhance efficiency, and to direct all efforts towards the achievement of
organizational goals. It was only because some signals of resentment from staff
members were detected that the scheme was eventually experimented as a non-
judgmental one. A number of problems arose in such kind of appraisal scheme, a
brief account of which is given below.
Fundamental Problem with Purpose
The main problem with the PPAD was the lack of clarity in purpose. This
ambiguity reflected the ambivalence felt by the University at the time when the
scheme was first introduced in 1995. The University was somewhat" indecisive"
in choosing between a developmental and a judgment appraisal scheme. The
requirement of grading highlighted the contention between the judgmental and
developmental functions of appraisal, which was the root of the debate on the
more fundamental issue of managerial control by means of externally mediated
rewards based on appraisal results. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, most
staff suspected that the evaluation would in one way or another constitute an input
affecting personnel decisions.
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Controversy Over the Criteria
Concerns were expressed by staff members about the criteria against which the
performance was evaluated under PPAD. As the scheme was designed for a non-
judgmental purpose aiming at improving performance over a staff member's past
achievement, the issue of inter-personal comparison has not been taken into
account. Staff members were evaluated against the targets they set for
themselves, and so conceivably it would be possible for some staff members to set
the minimum acceptable standard, so that they could be rated as having "achieved
or even exceeded the expectation". However, problems arose when some staff
members perceived that the evaluation results had affected critical personnel
decisions, such as promotion, which involved comparison at an inter-departmental
level. The debate on whether the criteria should be discipline-based or whether
there should be an absolute university standard began. Were the assessment
intended to form a judgment on a comparative basis, this "competing with
oneself' design represented a fundamental flaw.
Insignificant Impact on Staff Performance
It was reported that some staff members did not make use of the PPAD process to
map out plans to improve upon their performance. While many staff members
suspected that the appraisal would serve some judgmental purposes, paradoxically
they did not want to pay serious attention to it, as they were not convinced that the
results would definitely be linked to personnel decisions. At the same time, many
appraisers were not under any "pressure" to give an assessment which would
discriminate between achievers and non-performers. They would not consider it
necessary to discriminate staff performance, as a non-judgmental appraisal would
not have teeth anyway.
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Disappointment as a Result of Wrong Expectation
It was the feeling among most staff members that the PPAD could not serve
developmental purpose. "Development" may mean different things to different
people. In the minds of many Heads, "development" meant the self-development
of staff towards the attainment of a higher standard of performance in areas
identified of importance by the department. They saw the PPAD as a guide to
assist staff members towards upgrading the standard by adjusting their original
performance targets, which in turn would help staff members in their career
progression eventually. On the other hand, some staff members expected that
some form of tangible assistance would be provided by the Heads to help them
"develop" in the weak areas identified. For example, where they were advised to
brush up their research performance, they would expect the Heads to give them a
reduced teaching workload. However, most Heads thought that there was little
scope for them to adjust the workload, especially as staff strength was stretched
under stringent budgetary situation. As staff members did not see "follow-up"
action as a consequence of the PPAD, they no longer took it seriously.
Appraisal Schemes of Academic Staff in Local Institutions
All the eight UGC-funded institutions, except the "oldest" University of Hong
Kong, have installed an appraisal scheme of one kind or another for their
academic staff. Only the City University of Hong Kong has declared its scheme
as a judgmental (as well as a developmental) one which will inform persoimel
decisions. As for the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Polytechnic
University and the Lingnan University, their schemes are described as a
developmental one, aiming to help staff improve performance. However, these
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institutions will not refrain from referring to the appraisal results to assist
personnel decisions when the institutions consider it appropriate; in most cases,
the appraisal results will be used to the staff member's advantage. The appraisal
schemes used in the Hong Kong Baptist University and the Hong Kong Institute
of Education are said to be purely for developmental purposes.
The evaluation criteria used are broadly similar across all institutions, covering
mainly teaching, research, administrative duties, service to the profession and the
community. Other than the City University of Hong Kong which requires a grade
to be given to the appraisee, both the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and the
Hong Kong Baptist University also require a specific descriptor, chosen among a
few possibilities be given, for example, "Unacceptable", "Threshold", "Good" or
"Excellent". In most cases, the regular appraisal cycle spans a year, while some
major reviews affecting personnel decisions will be conducted at some intervals,
normally once every three years.
Summary
The problems identified in the process of implementing a non-judgmental
appraisal scheme in the City University of Hong Kong for its academic staff, and
the development of appraisal schemes in other local universities prompted the
researcher's interest in conducting some in-depth inquiry into the issue of
performance appraisal as a means to motivate academic staff. Given that the
judgmental purpose (or the lack of it) of the appraisal scheme was the major
contention, the inquiry has centered around the impact on staff motivation brought
about by an appraisal which has an aim of managing staff performance through
the use of extrinsic rewards. Possible effects on intrinsic motivation were also
123
part of the study. Its aim was to find out whether performance appraisal should be
conducted in order to motivate staff; and if so, under what circumstances would




Rewards Valued by Academic Staff of the City University of Hong Kong
This chapter and the following chapter present data collectedfrom academic staff of the
City University of Hong Kong in the study about the University's Performance
Planning, Appraisal and Development Scheme. This part focuses on rewards valued by
the respondents.
Framework of Analysis
The Expectancy Theory of Motivation seems to suggest that performance appraisal
which aims at distributing extrinsic rewards in order to motivate staff will be effective,
based on the assumptions that:
(a) the management knows what rewards are valued by the staff members; the
management should be aware of the effect of administering one type of rewards in
relation to other types;
(b) staff can see clear links between the rewards and their performance; and there are
explicit, precise, quantifiable and measurable criteria to assess performance;
(c) the organization can set clear objectives so that staff members know exactly what
their roles are.
Using the study of the Performance Planning, Appraisal and Development Scheme
(PPAD) of the City University of Hong Kong, this chapter is devoted to exploring the
following questions:
Question One
To what extent do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong value intrinsic
rewards, such as satisfaction from teaching and research; as compared with the extent
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to which they value extrinsic rewards, such as job security, pay, promotion, etc. used by
the management? Do they wish to avoid punishment and negative feedback?
Question Two
What kind of a performance appraisal scheme do academic staff of the City University
of Hong Kong prefer or resist?
Question Three
Under what conditions will extrinsic rewards reduce intrinsic motivation in relation to
academic work?
Collection of Data
Data about staff's views towards intrinsic and extrinsic rewards were collected mainly
through in-depth interviews. As described in Chapter Four (on Research Methodology),
the head of department (henceforth referred to as Head), an appraiser and an appraisee
from each of the five academic departments selected by a purposive sampling approach
were interviewed, in addition to one pilot interview conducted with an appraisee of
another department. Data were also collected from five senior management people.
All six appraisees are junior staff members at the rank of Assistant Professor (or
equivalent). While three of them have been substantiated, the other three are on
contract terms. All the five appraisers (who are also appraisees of other appraisers) are
substantiated staff at the rank of Associate Professor (Scale A) (or equivalent) or
Professor (Chair/Scale A). The five Heads represent the middle management. All of
them are substantiated; four are Professor (Chair/Scale A) (or equivalent) while one is
an Associate Professor (Scale A). The five senior management people are all Professors
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(Chair/Scale A). Three of them are substantiated while two are on contract terms. In
reporting the respondents' views, the appraisees will be referred to as junior staff, the
appraisers and Heads as senior staff.
In addition, views expressed by staff members during the nine discussion group
meetings in relating to the proposed Merit-Based Reward Scheme (which have some
features similar to a contingent pay scheme, for details see Chapter Five) were also
included in the analysis, to provide some form of triangulation. There were about 15 to
30 participants for each session, spanning the various academic ranks.
Summary of Responses to the Research Questions
The following table gives a summary of the responses in relation to the research
questions:
Aspects	 Unsubstantiated Substantiated 	 Head of	 Discussion
_______________________	 Appraisee	 Appraisee	 Appraiser	 Department Management	 Group
Teaching	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Research	 Yes	 Yes
Autonomy and Choice
between Teaching and	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes/No	 No	 Yes/No
Research
Innovation/Creativity	 Yes
Variety of Work	 No	 Yes
Staff Development and Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 YesGrowth
Contract Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 YesRenewal/Substantiation
Promotion	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes/No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Pay	 Yes/No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes/No	 Yes/No
Recognition	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Coflegiality	 Yes	 Yes
Communication, Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 YesMutualTrust	 _____________
Punishment and Yes/No	 Yes/No	 Yes/No	 Yes	 Yes	 NoNegativeFeedback	 _______________ ______________ ___________ _____________ _____________ ___________
Judgmental	 Yes/No	 Yes/No	 Yes/No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes/NoPerformance Appraisal ________________ ______________ ___________ _____________ _____________ ____________
"Yes" means at least one respondent/participant indicated support to the item.
"No" means at least one respondent/participant expressed reservation about the item.
Table 3: Summary of Responses in Respect of Valued Rewards
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Question One: Intrinsic Rewards as Compared with Extrinsic Rewards
During the interviews, respondents were asked specifically what they considered most
important to them, and what has had the greatest impact on them. There was no limit
on the number of items raised, and most respondents gave one to three items. In
addition, some matters of importance to them were also discerned during the discussion
of the performance appraisal scheme of the City University of Hong Kong. Both
categories of items raised were analyzed below.
Intrinsic Rewards
Job Satisfaction
Job satisfactory was cited as one of the most valuable things by one Dean, two Heads
and one substantiated appraisee. One Head disclosed that he/she treasured work
achievement, a kind of recognition different from monetary reward or promotion. One
appraiser was concerned with having a job which could utilize his/her talents to give job
satisfaction; he/she wanted to find going to work as a pleasure.
Teaching
The ability to teach in a university was one of things considered most valuable to six
respondents, including senior and junior staff members. They regarded the quality of
education provided to students of crucial importance. One of them was concerned
about how students performed after graduation, another found it very encouraging to
see a change in students' learning attitude from passive to proactive. One Head
revealed that he/she enjoyed teaching because that was one way of doing something for
the next generation and for the society. A reduction in teaching load to make time
available to do research, enhance teaching skills, or brush up administrative capability
etc. was one of the possible outcomes of the PPAD expected by three junior staff
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Research
The opportunity to engage in research was cited as the most valuable thing by two
senior staff because the pursuit of scholarship would bring them self-actualization.
Autonomy and Academic Freedom
One Dean contended that the freedom to engage in academic work of one's interest was
the "real recognition" which the academic staff looked for, in addition to substantiation
of employment and promotion. This view was echoed in a discussion group meeting,
where one participant revealed that academic staff desired satisfaction from intrinsic
things such as opportunity to work in a free academic environment.
One unsubstantiated appraisee considered academic freedom to be important,
acknowledging at the same time that academic staff should be accountable to the public
for their results. He/She saw performance appraisal as a kind of managerial control to
dictate how academics should do teaching or research. However control would be
ineffective since the inspiration for academic work, especially research ideas, could not
be demanded at a particular time.
Innovation, Creativity and Variety of Work
One appraiser considered innovation and creativity important, as he/she expressed
disappointment with the PPAD which had not encouraged the development of these
attributes. One unsubstantiated appraisee asked for freedom to choose to focus on
teaching or research because he/she considered it difficult to be "part-timers" in both
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major endeavours. Two Vice-Presidents held a contrary view, and one of them
maintained:
"Academics are part-timers by the nature of their work, it is the variety of work
which makes academic work so stimulating"
Staff Development and Growth
Staff were keen to have opportunities to develop their potential and to seek continuous
improvement. Intellectual development was considered valuable. Seven respondents,
including senior and junior staff, thought that the PPAD should serve developmental
needs. One of them pointed out that academic staff in a university must keep
themselves at the frontier of knowledge.
Other Values
This thesis focuses on rewards at work and not outside. It, however, is worthwhile to
note that a few respondents found the most valued rewards outside work. These include
a happy family, wisdom, a happy life, health, contribution to the society and being
responsible for oneself.
Extrinsic Rewards
Contract Renewal/Substantiation of Employment
Job security with a stable work environment appeared to be a very strong work
motivator. All respondents, including managerial and junior staff, shared the same
observation that the appraisers and the appraisees would take the PPAD seriously only
in those cases where the appraisees were subject to consideration for contract renewal,
substantiation of employment or promotion. One Dean contended that substantiation of
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employment and promotion were the "real recognition" which the academic staff
looked for, other than the freedom to engage in academic work of one's interest. All the
three appraisees who were under contract terms of employment revealed that they
would put up their best effort to satisfy the requirement for continuous employment.
The substantiated appraisee felt some effect of the PPAD as he/she was actively seeking
promotion. The other two substantiated appraisees did not see any significant impact of
the PPAD on themselves. The five appraisers who have been substantiated did not
think the PPAD would affect them as appraisees.
Such apathy towards performance appraisal among the substantiated staff could be
explained since the results from the non-judgmental PPAD would not affect their job
security or their stable income. Indeed their employment was essentially protected
unless they committed any disciplinary offences. A different position towards the
PPAD could be expected if their continuous employment was made contingent upon
performance. Such a position was evident from the strong opposition expressed by staff
during the consultation process relating to the Merit-based Reward Scheme (see
Chapter Five) that the PPAD could in some way lead to termination of service. This
strong sentiment was expressed clearly by a statement made by the Staff Association in
its petition to the University Council's Staffing and Conditions of Service Committee:
"Although we have been told that the MBRS is not intended to provide a new
mechanism for the termination of "poor performer ", management continues to




Promotion seemed to have a significant place among the list of valued rewards of the
academics. "Promotion" was mentioned without prompt, at least once during the
conversation by nine respondents spanning senior and junior staff. Promotion was
specifically quoted as an objective of top priority being actively pursued by one junior
staff. Two Heads regarded promotion as a kind of recognition. One of them, however,
said that while he/she would welcome promotion as a kind of recognition, he/she would
not place too much emphasis on it. Another one said specifically that he/she would not
actively pursue promotion: "If it comes, it comes". He/She would rather be happy with
his/her job, enjoying a stable working environment with a stable income. One appraisee
believed that for those substantiated staff, only those who were seeking promotion
would be concerned about the PPAD. Managerial staff believed that promotion was a
powerful tool for work motivation. Two senior management people and all five Heads
expressed strong support to using the PPAD results to inform major personnel
decisions, including promotion.
During the discussion group meetings, promotion was raised as an important issue in
four of the nine meetings. One participant suggested that promotion was the most
powerful motivator. Another one thought that NOT getting promotion was a kind of
negative incentive. Two participants voiced that the appraisal results should be taken
into account in major personnel decisions, such as promotion.
Pay was cited as an example of rewards by four respondents, including senior and
junior staff. A stable working environment with stable income was the most important
132
thing treasured by three other respondents. Although it appeared to be secondary in
importance relative to other tangible rewards such as substantiation (or termination) of
employment and promotion, the three of them agreed that the appraisal results should be
reflected in the pay such that increment along the salary scale should not be automatic.
Even a Head who received a high salary felt strongly that his/her salary should be
adjusted according to the performance. One appraisee originally thought that the
appraisal should not be linked to any material rewards, he/she later came to recognize
that if the appraisal was pay related, it would give positive incentive to staff. The
linking of pay to performance was also supported by three participants in two of the
focus group meetings.
One the other hand, there was objection to using contingent pay as an incentive. One
Dean insisted that academics did not need any extra material reward, other than
substantiation and promotion, given that they already received a handsome pay. One
appraisee found it demoralizing and demotivating when he/she was given a rating lower
than the expected one. Five participants from four discussion groups held the
philosophical viewpoint that pay, as an extrinsic monetary reward, would not satisfy
their needs for intrinsic rewards, that is, satisfaction from the job which they have
valued more. Another participant found it distasteful if other people thought that a few
more dollars could make him/her do the job well. They maintained that they work
because they are intrinsically motivated. As professionals, they did not need and should
not be told what they should do. They pointed out that outstanding performance would
be rewarded anyway through other means, for example, publications recognized in
international journals. Objection to the concept of linking performance to pay was
particularly strong from discussion groups involving academics from the humanities
and social work disciplines.
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The proposed introduction of the Merit-Based Reward Scheme (see Chapter Five) in the
University indicated that the senior management staff believed that pay was a reward
valued by staff members. However, the study revealed that the junior staff did not
necessarily value pay as a motivator, as indicated in this remark made by one
participant in a discussion group meeting:
"The assumption that giving cash is the best way to motivate staff is WRONG."
Recognition
Recognition of achievement and contribution by other people, including peers and the
management, was cited as the most important thing by one appraiser. Three respondents
pointed out that recognition was important, however, it needed not be in the form of
material rewards: a record of number of papers published, high Research Assessment
Exercise scores or teaching evaluation scores on the curriculum vitae, etc. are already a
form of recognition. Respect earned from students and a good relationship with them
were regarded the most valuable things by three senior staff. Another Head suggested
that the management should also provide other visible forms of recognition, including a
facilitating working environment with the freedom to do work, grants to hire helpers in
research pursuits, and support for conference attendance. The discussion groups also
suggested alternative forms of recognition. Examples included more facilities to do
work, conference attendance, money to hire helpers and additional funding to the
department. One participant suggested that a variety of rewards should be available as
some might prefer cash, some might prefer other forms.
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Collegiality and Social Harmony
A harmonious working environment and good working relationship with colleagues
were considered the most important matters to three respondents. They found
colleagues' help, encouragement and collaboration having a great impact on them.
Effective communication, mutual trust and understanding were also considered
beneficial.
Punishment and Negative Feedback
No appraisees expressed support for the use of sanctions, although one of them
appreciated the reason why the management would wish to use sanctions as a tool to get
rid of non-performers. The punishment of non-performers as a means to help staff
improve was supported in four discussion group meetings. One participant contended
that academic staff should be accountable for their performance; another one expected
that the negative rewards in the form of demotion would give the "space" for the staff
member to pick up and get integrated again to the normal track. There was some
support from four senior staff to the use of punishment and negative feedback to
motivate staff. They thought that non-performers should not be tolerated. Three of
them suggested termination of employment as the kind of sanctions, while salary
deduction was suggested by the remaining one. Negative feedback was also considered
useful by two Heads as it would give peer group pressure to motivate staff.
While these staff members indicated a desire to use sanctions as an incentive, they did
not intend to take light decisions. They thought that appropriate sanctions should be
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given after sufficient warning. The President insisted upon well-informed decisions
based on evidence:
"The appraisal scheme will enable something to be done with under-
performers. It will assist the University to make decision based on well-
documented records, even though the choice may be unpleasant and painful.
Such a function is needed especially in face of expected cut in UGC funding."
On the other hand, four junior staff had reservation in using punishment or negative
feedback, maintaining that it would be an unpleasant feeling to be told that one was not
up to standard. Reservation about the use of sanctions was raised by four discussion
groups, for the reason that the punitive element was de-moralizing. The participants
speculated that the proposed contingent pay scheme would fail if the punitive aspect
were more salient than the reward aspect. One participant was adamant that the
University should not punish a staff member unless he/she still could not perform after
assistance had been given to help himlher. Moreover, if a staff member did not
perform, it might be due to institutional reasons, or due to factors beyond his/her
control, for example, the results of Research Assessment Exercise are unpredictable.
Conclusions about Question One
Intrinsic Rewards as Compared with Extrinsic Rewards
To what extent do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong value intrinsic
rewards, such as satisfaction from teaching and research; as compared with the extent
to which they value extrinsic rewards, such as job security, pay, promotion, etc. used by
the management? Do they wish to avoid punishment and negative feedback?
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The study indicated a desire for intrinsic rewards among the academic staff. Many of
the respondents wanted to seek satisfaction from their job, whether in teaching, research
or intellectual development to enhance their overall capability. While most respondents
found pleasure in doing either teaching or research or both, they might have different
priorities for either component at a different point of time, depending on factors such as
their stage of career development, preparedness for one type of work or another, etc.
Some staff members considered that they had not been able to enjoy the intrinsic
rewards from teaching, as they were not given the flexibility to choose between
teaching or research. It is implicit from their responses that only when such a choice,
free from managerial control, is allowed can one speak truly of the satisfaction of the
higher order intrinsic needs to engage in meaningful work.
The academic staff have also valued extrinsic rewards to a greater or lesser extent.
They have placed particular importance on job security (substantiation). In the study,
pay was found to be important, but secondary to substantiation and promotion.
Although pay was thought to satisfy basically physiological needs, while substantiation
and promotion the need for job security, no conclusion could however be drawn to infer
that safety needs should be satisfied before physiological needs. The phenomena has
more to do with the University's pay structure which is based on a fixed salary scale
with fixed incremental points, and its pay scale which is considered modest or
handsome by many. Indeed, pay can satisfy both physiological and safety needs. As
for promotion, while most managerial staff thought that linking appraisal results to
promotion would be an effective motivator, promotion might not be regarded as so
important by some staff members. Staff re-iterated that they work because they are
intrinsically motivated, and that extrinsic monetary rewards would not satisfy those
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intrinsic needs. Furthermore, other forms of intrinsic values, such as collegiality and
social harmony, are also valued by the academic staff.
The responses suggested that it was the perception of some staff members that the
management might not know exactly what staff members need or prefer. The desire to
seek promotion and pay raise were two examples. The management allegedly neglected
the need of the staff members to reduce teaching load to find more time to do research,
enhance teaching skills, etc. The numerous suggestions made by staff on others forms
of tangible recognition also reflected a possible low usage of those rewards by the
management.
As to whether a punitive appraisal and reward system should be used, there were
divided views. There was some support from senior staff for the use of sanctions
against non-performers. On the other hand, almost all staff members did not want to
see an appraisal and reward scheme which would facilitate reduction in salary, let alone
the termination of their employment. Thus punishment and negative feedback were
valued by the academic staff too, but only in a negative sense; i.e, something the
academic staff would wish to avoid.
The needs expressed by the respondents can be categorized into the five kinds of needs
postulated by Maslow (1943, 1954, 1970), namely physiological needs (in the form of
salary award), safety needs (in the form of secured employment with decent pay), social
needs (in having a collegial working environment), esteem needs (promotion, sense of
achievement, independence, freedom, recognition and prestige) and self-actualization
(needs for self development).	 However, the responses did not reveal any order in
which one would pursue these needs (see Chapter Three for discussion on hierarchical
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order of needs). On the other hand there appeared to be some support for a "Two-step
Hierarchy": lower level needs for material and security rewards, and higher level needs
for achievement, challenge and self-esteem. Staff appeared to first follow the
physiological and security pattern (a stable income, substantiation and promotion)
before targeting on any of the remaining three types of needs. While all categories of
staff, whether substantiated or unsubstantiated, junior or senior, expressed a need to
seek intrinsic rewards by engaging in work that they would find meaningful, all of them
were concerned with the goal of getting substantiation and promotion in the first place.
As reported in Chapter Three, junior staff may be more concerned with the lower level
needs; higher level staff may be more concerned with the higher level needs (Pinder
1984; Marsden and Richardson 1992). The study of the City University of Hong Kong
showed that the relative importance placed on the two levels of needs hinged very much
on the employment status of the person. Unsubstantiated staff members were more
concerned with substantiation arid promotion. As they are mostly likely newcomers
who join the University at a junior grade, the pattern is in congruence with what Pinder
(1984) and Marsden and Richardson (1992) suggest.
To the Head who received a handsome salary and who asked for adjustment in his/her
salary according to his/her performance, the main satisfaction from the attainment of
pay raise was not to meet physiological or safety needs, but to "help satisfying one's
ego" as he put it. Two other Heads also considered promotion a kind of recognition.
This suggested that extrinsic rewards such as pay and promotion might satisfy multiple
needs: the lower level of physiological and safety needs, as well as the higher level of
esteem and self-actualization needs (Lawler 1994; Lopez 1968).
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Question Two: Performance Appraisal
There appeared to be overwhelming support from both the management and staff to link
the performance appraisal results to persoimel decisions so as to distribute rewards
according to performance, if the appraisal scheme was to have any concrete effect at all.
It was a general perception that the non-judgmental appraisal scheme which served
developmental purpose alone had not been useful to motivate performance. 15
respondents including senior and junior staff accorded the lack of "teeth" as the cause to
the slow progress of the PPAD. Two appraisees, while they did not consider any
appraisal scheme necessary for academic staff, saw the potential benefits of a
judgmental scheme. They observed that the non-judgmental PPAD failed because both
management and staff were not determined to work towards the purpose of attaining a
certain standard of performance.
An appraiser observed that almost all staff have preferred the Head to be the appraiser, a
phenomena which reflected that the effect of the appraisal on personnel decisions was
the prime consideration of most staff One Head asserted that most staff members
would look for tangible rewards as a consequence of the appraisal process, although the
rewards needed not be monetary. Another Head summarized the situation, as he saw it,
succinctly:
"People plan their work according to what is appraised and rewarded."
Five senior staff concurred that an appraisal scheme, which distributed rewards for
performance in accord with University goals, would steer the University in the direction
it wanted to go. However, the PPAD could help consolidate every staff's effort towards
that direction, only if the University stated the direction clearly and explicitly. One
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appraiser noted that, since the appraisal of performance focused mainly on research, the
University attained improvement in research, but not in teaching. One of them insisted
that high achievers ought to be rewarded, if the University is to benchmark itself with
international standards.
There was, at the same time, discomfort among staff arising from the adoption of the
PPAD. Three senior staff and four junior staff considered that the appraisal process
gave a negative feeling and exerted unnecessary pressure on staff. One appraiser and
two unsubstantiated appraisees voiced objection to external control which would
infringe upon their freedom:
"I am disinclined to externally imposed process or standard to evaluate
performance."
"Academics prefer freedom and will be disinclined to a judgmental scheme."
"Academics may not buy the idea of deciding one 's future based on a
mechanistic assessment. Subjecting academics to too much control may be
counter-productive."
Similar objection to the concept of linking performance to pay was raised at the
discussion group meetings. The participants worried about the control that could be
exercised by the management under a contingent pay scheme. They did not accept the
need to prove to the administration outside their profession that they were good. They
considered it a backward step to rely on managerial control. The following assertions
were typical:
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"It looks like a very business-oriented scheme. It is de-moralizing. It is too
much of a cultural shock."
"The concept of monetary reward is NOT readily acceptable to academia."
One participant suspected that the true purpose of the contingent pay scheme was to
answer managerial accountability rather than rewarding staff. Another participant
asked the management to commit itself to involving staff members in the drawing up of
the criteria, otherwise the scheme might become a means for the management to control
staff. One participant thought that using pay-cuts to help staff overcome their
deficiencies should only be used when all other efforts failed. To help improve
performance, other means were more effective. Instead of having the contingent pay
scheme, one participant asked if there could be different awards schemes, such as
Teaching Excellence Award, Research Excellence Award, Service Award, etc. so that
staff members could choose to participate on a voluntary basis. Contrary to the feelings
of control associated with a contingent pay scheme, one participant accepted the need to
prove their eligibility to the institution in the process of consideration for promotion,
and did not regard such requirement a kind of control.
It should also be pointed out that staff began to realize that they could no longer enjoy
the extent of "freedom" that university academics had so far enjoyed:
"We know there is no more 'iron rice bowl'.
["iron rice bowl" means that the University will hire a person for life, for the
"iron" rice bowl can never be broken.]
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"Triggered by Asia 's economic turmoil, the civil service has been considering
major reforms including reducing its benefits package. We began to realize that
we are not free to do whatever we want. After all we are using public money.
The trend ofaskingfor value for money will extend to universities."
"If we don 't get ourselves prepared, then someone else from outside will come
and tell us what to do."
Conclusions about Question Two
Performance Appraisal
What kind of a performance appraisal scheme do academic staff of the City University
of Hong Kong prefer or resist?
There was both support and objection from staff for the adoption of a judgmental
appraisal scheme which distributed extrinsic rewards according to evaluation results.
Support came from both the management and staff, while objection was raised
essentially by staff, particularly those at the more junior level. The main reason given
for the objection was the academics' dislike of managerial control.
The study revealed the ambivalence felt by academic staff about the desirability of a
judgmental performance appraisal scheme. Although many respondents did not see the
need of an appraisal scheme, they indicated preference for some visible results arising
from the appraisal scheme, should the University adopt one at all. On the other hand, a
few of those respondents who advocated a judgmental appraisal under these
circumstances expressed concern about the possible implications on managerial control,
something that the academics would not embrace out of their own volition.
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Question Three: Effect of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation
While the academic staff have treasured intrinsic rewards, including job satisfaction,
appreciation and recognition of their efforts, there was no specific mention that the offer
of extrinsic rewards diminished their intrinsic motivation. On the contrary, there was a
suggestion from an appraisee that extrinsic rewards might stimulate intrinsic
motivation:
"When the PPAD was first introduced, I thought very ideally that the appraisal
should not be linked to any material rewards, as I assumed that everyone is
interested in developing oneself even without any extrinsic motivation. But the
experience changed my mind. I realized that f the appraisal is not related to
any tangible consequence, there is no incentive to urge the staff to achieve the
developmental targets set. To appraise purely for developmental purpose is too
idealistic, particularly in cases where the results can only be seen over a much
longer timeframe. Some tangible results within a shorter time limit will be
motivating. So I no longer object to relating the appraisal to pay. It will give
positive incentive. It is a form of recognition."
This appraisee's view was supported by the fact that almost all respondents, both from
staff and the management, considered it appropriate to relate the appraisal results to
major personnel decisions, in order to distribute externally mediated rewards. The
extrinsic rewards need not be monetary. Visible recognition or consequence, in one
form or another, was considered most important. Two appraisees admitted that they felt
the pressure to work hard as they knew they would be watched, and be asked to account
for what they had done at the end of the year. The attention paid by their Head to their
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progress would constitute some kind of visible consequence, and they considered that to
have motivating effect. One of them speculated that the motivating effect would be
greater should the performance results be linked to some material rewards:
"The PPAD did not achieve the effect to the extent it should because we were a
bit lenient about achieving the standard. The scheme was said to be non-
judgmental, so we didn 't work hard to make people achieve that standard (as
there was no incentive to do so)."
One Head and one appraiser maintained that measuring and recognizing performance of
staff and giving staff constructive feedback would provide motive for staff to continue
develop. In a sense, the staff would internalize the extrinsic rewards and would become
engaged in the pursuit of intrinsic rewards of self-development.
As reported earlier (see the discussion on pay in this chapter) strong objection was
raised by discussion groups to a proposed scheme to award salary increment based on a
systematic evaluation of performance. The main reason given was the academics'
dislike of being told what to do. As intrinsic motivation was mentioned as the primary
work motivation for academics when the issue of managerial control through the use of
externally mediated rewards was discussed, it may be inferred that extrinsic rewards,
given its association with managerial control, are likely to decrease intrinsic motivation.
Conclusions about Question Three
Effect of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation
Under what conditions will extrinsic rewards reduce intrinsic motivation in relation to
academic work?
145
There was some weak indication which suggested that the academic staff envisaged that
extrinsic rewards might reduce intrinsic motivation, given their association with
managerial control. Such a perceptive was more apparent among staff members from
the humanities and social work disciplines. However, there was also the suggestion that
extrinsic rewards might stimulate intrinsic motivation, as the tangible results would be
interpreted as a kind of recognition. It is worthwhile to note (in the discussion on
performance appraisal in this chapter) that the subject of promotion as an extrinsic
reward presented another picture: there was no opposition to the need to be assessed in
promotion cases. The difference lies probably in the perception that the controlling
aspect is more salient in assessment for contingent pay, while the feedback aspect is
more salient in assessment for promotion.
Overall Conclusions
The academic staff have a desire for intrinsic rewards, including teaching, research,
autonomy and academic freedom, intellectual development, etc. They also value
extrinsic rewards, to a greater or lesser extent. They place particular importance on job
security (substantiation). Pay raise is of secondary importance. Collegiality and social
harmony are also valued by the academic staff. While most managerial staff think that
linking appraisal results to promotion will be an effective motivator, promotion may not
be regarded as so important by staff members. The academic staff assign a negative
value to punishment and negative feedback. As regards to the question of whether the
appraisal and reward scheme should include a punitive component, views are divided.
While a few managerial staff have expressed support to the use of appropriate sanctions
against non-performers, most staff members do not wish to see a punitive appraisal and
reward scheme.
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A "Two-step Hierarchy" of lower level needs versus high level needs appeared to have
emerged. The data have offered some weak indication that academic staff of the City
University of Hong Kong value pay and promotion because they may satisfy both lower
order needs and higher order needs. While intrinsic rewards satisfy higher order needs,
extrinsic rewards may satisfy both lower and higher order needs.
The academic staff generally considered that they did not need an appraisal scheme.
Their main objection arose from their rejection of managerial control which is usually
associated with performance appraisal. However, should the University decide to
practise performance appraisal, they would prefer to have a scheme which distributes
extrinsic rewards according to evaluation results.
The academic staff envisaged that extrinsic rewards might reduce intrinsic motivation if
the controlling aspect of the rewards is salient. On the other hand, extrinsic rewards
may not reduce intrinsic motivation if the feedback aspect is salient; the former may
even stimulate the latter under these circumstances. There is no opposition to the need
to be assessed (controlled) in promotion cases. It is likely that the controlling aspect is
perceived to be more salient in assessment for contingent pay, while the positive
feedback aspect is more salient in assessment for promotion.
Next Step
As discussed in Chapter Two and recapitulated at the beginning of this chapter, in order
to have an effective appraisal and reward scheme, staff must be able to see clear links
between the rewards they value and their performance. The visibility of such links
depends on whether there are explicit, precise, quantifiable and measurable criteria to
assess performance. Having gained an idea of what the academic staff value through
147
the inquiry reported in this chapter, the next chapter will search for possible answers to
the research questions about assessment of academic work and the University's role in




Assessing Academic Work and the Institution's Role in It
Chapter Six presents data collected from academic staff of the City University of
Hong Kong in a study about the University 's Performance Planning, Appraisal
and Development Scheme. This chapter presents data from the same study on
issues about assessment of academic work and the University's role in it.
Framework of Analysis
It has been shown in Chapter Two that in order for any performance appraisal
scheme to serve a motivational purpose by offering rewards, it must fulfill certain
conditions including the following:
(a) The scheme must be clear enough for staff to see clear links between the
rewards and their performance. The appraisal results must lead to some
rewards. To link rewards to performance, there must be effective
measurement, to compare the actual performance against pre-determined
objectives to discriminate among individual staff members in terms of
performance. The management has to define standards of performance,
which need to be explicit, precise, quantifiable and measurable.
(b) Clarity in roles is crucial if the reward system is to contribute to the overall
strategic management of the organization. The system should enable
individuals to integrate their goals with those of the organization.
To investigate whether these conditions are met in an appraisal scheme that
distributes extrinsic rewards, using the example of the Performance Planning,
Appraisal and Development Scheme (PPAD) introduced in the City University of
Hong Kong, the following research questions have been explored:
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Question Four
How far do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong believe that their
performance will be rewarded? How much do they consider that academic
performance is quantflable, measurable or predictable, and that it can be
assessed objectively?
Question Five
In what ways do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong consider that
their ability to perform will be affected by a clear understanding of the goals of
the University and of their role in helping to attain these goals?
Summary of Responses to the Research Questions
The following table summarizes the findings:
Aspects	 Unsubstantiated Substantiated 	 Head of	 Discussion
______________________	 Appraisec	 Appraisee	 Appraiser	 Department Management	 Group
Research given more Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
recognition_________________ _______________ _____________ ______________ ______________ ____________
Everyone must do both Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yesteaching and research
Diverse views about Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
scholarship_________________ _______________ _____________ ______________ ______________ ____________
Academic work




predictable_________________ _______________ _____________ ______________ ______________ ____________
Subjectivity is accepted	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Common elements in
good teaching or	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes/No
research
Clarity of University Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yesgoal needed
Performance appraisal
helps consolidate staff's Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
effort towards
Universitygoals	 ________________ ______________ ____________ _____________ ______________ ___________
"Yes" means at least one respondentiparticipant indicated support to the item.
"No" means at least one respondentlparticipant expressed reservation about the item.
Table 4: Summary of Responses in Respect of Assessment of Academic Work
and the University's Role in It.
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Question Four: Measuring Academic Work
What Counts?
When the PPAD was introduced, the University paid particular effort to
emphasizing that the scheme was non-judgmental, such that the appraisal results
would not be linked to any personnel decisions. The intention was to minimize
the resentment from staff. The fact that there was an overwhelming support to
make the appraisal scheme judgmental (should the University determine to have
any appraisal scheme at all), as shown in Chapter Six, confirmed that the link
between expected valued rewards and the performance appraisal is essential in
order to motivate staff As staff did not see the link, the appraisal effort expended
in the PPAD scheme lost motivational effect.
While staff attributed the lack of impact of the PPAD to the absence of the
consequences arising from appraisal, they paradoxically did not believe that the
appraisal results would not influence personnel decisions. Such a view was not
ol1ly common among staff members, but was shared among the managerial staff
too. Indeed three Heads of Departments (henceforth referred as Heads) admitted
that the appraisal process would definitely affect their impression about the staff's
performance, which would be taken into account when they were to make
personnel decisions. Thus arguably the link did exist, it was only not clearly
demonstrated to staff.
Staff members would be able to see the link only if they knew what was counted
in performance assessment. They were not only concerned about how teaching
and research would affect rewards separately, but also the relative weights to be
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attached to each. Six senior and junior staff observed that even though the
University has declared in its Strategic Plan (see Chapter Five) that teaching was
one of the two core functions of the University, in reality research was regarded as
more important as evident in the reward system which has placed more emphasis
on research than teaching. One Head maintained that the reward system should be
modified to reflect the University's call for "Walking with Two Legs" strategy.
Two appraisers considered research to be the primary factor affecting continuous
employment and promotion:
"Teaching is important, but not for promotion purposes."
"Research is regarded as the motivating factor, while teaching the
survival factor. If your teaching is bad, you won 't be promoted, but it
won 't affect your continuous employment. However, one may lose the job
due to unsatisfactory research."
An unsubstantiated appraisee was even more pessimistic:
"If you are good in research, but teaching is poor, you can survive. It
does not work the other way round, good teachers will lose the job f they
cannot keep up research."
However, one Vice-President rejected this claim, contending that:
"There is a wrong perception among staff that we only focus on research.
This is a fallacy. If that is the case, we will only end up with mediocre
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teaching. We do not wish the University to become a publication
machine. Academics should engage in a variety of work, including
teaching and research."
Staff members were particularly concerned about the requirement for
substantiation and promotion. They asked the University to clarify whether one
would be rewarded on the basis of good research or teaching alone, or was one
required to be an all-rounder? Three senior staff were adamant that every
academic staff must exert their best to do research while fulfilling the teaching
duties as well. The academic staff's freedom was never unfettered, as they had to
be accountable to the society. On the other hand, two junior staff thought that
while all academic staff should "walk with two legs", they should be allowed to
have "one long leg and one short leg". The University should set an institutional
norm regarding requirement to do research and at the same time allow individual
staff members to have a choice on how to satisfy or exceed the norm. The request
for autonomy in deciding one's work priority was strong among junior staff but
the voice was not confined to them. There was support to it from the senior
management staff too. They, however, insisted that all academic staff should
engage in research.
One participant each from two discussion groups maintained that so far the
assessment in personnel decisions had focused on research, and suitable criteria
for teaching were badly needed. One participant of another group was of the view
that both research and teaching, being the University's core functions, must be
performed by every staff member.
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Measuring Academic Work
As personnel decisions are made of measured performance, rather than
performance itself, staff are naturally concerned about the criteria to be used to
measure performance. While there was no argument about the need for criteria to
be clarified and agreed in advance, there were divided views among respondents
as to how accurately, objectively and comprehensively could academic work be
assessed.
Senior and junior staff alike concurred that there were diverse views about
scholarship. Eight respondents were of the view that different disciplines would
have unique characteristics and requirement depending on their nature, and it was
difficult to assess academic work even if one was in the same field. It was
considered not appropriate to assess the performance simply by checking against
pre-determined criteria, given that academic performance was "unpredictable"
and would depend on factors beyond the academics' control. For instance,
teaching had to be adjusted on the basis of student quality; research accepted for
publication might not be in direct relation with the research quality. Should
quantity be stressed at the expense of quality, the process might be vulnerable to
manipulation by staff, for example, one could claim that he/she already taught so
many hours a week, without making reference to the quality of teaching and of
learning.
The use of qualitative criteria was not beyond controversy. Two junior staff
raised the question about comparison of ratings between staff members if the
appraisal was to serve judgmental purpose. Should qualitative criteria be the
primary yardstick to measure performance, a practical problem of comparability
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would then arise. A solution was suggested by two senior staff: the appraiser
should be explicit on what evidence one was to supply to demonstrate the
achievement.
Almost without exception, the issue of assessment criteria was brought up in all
the discussion group meetings. Questions were raised on objectivity, fairness and
comparability across disciplines and individuals. But the major concern was
related to the difficulty in drawing up assessment criteria for academic work
which covers a range of aspects, some of which are more quantifiable and
measurable than others. The use of peer reviews was suggested by a participant
of one discussion group. A participant in another group, however, preferred
quantifiable criteria: staff are clear about them and will strive to work towards the
department's goals. Another participant from yet another group was ambivalent
about the choice between quantity and quality as he/she found:
"A motivating scheme would be rendered demotivating fyou quantfy too
much. But on the other hand, [you make the criteria too general, they
will be subject to interpretation, resulting in misgivings and controversy."
The issue of fairness among staff members was raised by four participants in three
discussion group meetings, who felt that there should be some ways to enable
inter-disciplinary comparison. Five participants concurred that it was possible to
compare performance across similar disciplines as there are "core competencies".
Five participants (all from the science and engineering disciplines) found it not
difficult to arrive at the suitable criteria, as it was only acceptable to benchmark
with the international, or at least regional, standard. They felt sure that there
155
should be an absolute standard against which everyone's performance would be
measured; otherwise it would not be fair to those staff in disciplines which have
very stringent standards. Not everyone from the same discipline was united in the
views about standards of measuring academic work. Two other participants (from
non-science and engineering disciplines) doubted the desirability and
practicability in having an absolute standard irrespective of disciplines.
All the five senior management staff and four senior staff admitted the
impracticability in quantifying academic work which is often intangible. How
could one describe, let alone assess, quality of research, research paper, teaching
quality, devotion to students, and relationship with students, etc. No matter how
precisely one tried to quantify, the measurements would remain debatable to
some. A holistic approach using some broad criteria was considered good
enough. The senior management seemed to have a shared view that it was not
only impracticable, but also undesirable to restrict to measurements that are so
quantitative, precise or predictable, since it would mean that performance would
be mediocre, and not creative enough. As the President put it:
"Rigid measurement will make life easier, but it betrays the lack of quality
or judgment."
It appeared that one had to accept subjective judgment in assessing academic
work, as asserted by eight senior staff, for they saw no better way to assess
academic work. One Vice-President summarized:
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"Quality is clear to people who know what quality is. It is just like beauty,
which cannot be precisely defined or measured. But the fact that it cannot
be quant/led does not mean that it cannot be evaluated. It requires
subjective judgment, but people will agree whether a person is beautiful.
Subjectivity does not imply unfairness."
Assessing Teaching and Research
On the issue of how teaching should be assessed, the divergence in views seemed
to be great. One appraiser was disappointed with the lack of generally accepted
measuring instruments for teaching, and so different disciplines were using a
variety of tools. He/She felt strongly that the University should develop better
ways to assess quantity and quality of teaching to facilitate the recognition of
teaching. Such a view was shared by one participant from a discussion group.
Three senior staff and two junior staff agreed that people in the field could tell
what good quality teaching is. The two junior staff even went further to assert
that there are common elements across disciplines as to what constitute good
teaching. Two senior staff suggested that a portfolio approach should be used to
assist a more holistic assessment, encompassing peer review, submission of
teaching materials, teaching evaluation scores and student feedback, classroom
observation, statements explaining the teaching philosophy and ways to interact
with students, and innovation to teaching, etc.
There appeared to be less controversy in the assessment of research. Perhaps it is
because there are well-established procedures to evaluate research modeling after
the methods used for the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). The criteria are
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largely quantitative, and the process involves independent peer review. Although
the methods are not perfect, they are widely accepted among academics. Criteria
found acceptable by five respondents included: RAE results, the amount of
research grants obtained, quantity and quality of papers published and recognized
internationally, quantity and quality of research projects, citation index, impact
factor, and number of research students.
Conclusions about Question Four
Measuring Academic Work
How far do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong believe that their
performance will be rewarded? How much do they consider that academic
performance is quantfiable, measurable or predictable, and that it can be
assessed objectively?
While there are acceptable ways to evaluate academic work, including teaching
and research, the limit to which the outputs can be quantified was acknowledged
by both the management and staff. Academic work is intangible; scholarship is
not something that is easily quantifiable. No matter how precisely one quantifies,
the measurements will remain debatable to some. The academic staff found it
particularly difficult to describe explicitly how the qualitative aspects of teaching
and research can be adequately measured. There was reservation on assessing the
performance simply by noting whether the pre-set goals were achieved, given that
academic outputs are unpredictable. They worried that there is no way to
guarantee results, for example, not all research can find its way to publications,
student quality varies, research accepted for publication may not be in direct
relation with research quality.
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There was some divergence of views as to whether there should be an absolute
standard to be attained irrespective of the disciplines, or whether the
departmental/faculty norms should serve as the reference point. A few staff
members, mostly from the science and engineering disciplines, considered that
there should be an absolute (mainly quantitative) standard across all disciplines.
For those non-science or engineering disciplines with outputs less amenable to
quantifiable measurements, their staff members might see themselves
disadvantaged if they have to attain an absolute standard. They would argue that
if the criteria were to be quantitative, the "performance contract" would become
too rigid, discouraging new initiatives. Whether quantitative or qualitative, many
staff members requested more precise definitions of assessment criteria, believing
that the criteria, if couched in excessively broad terms, would be subject to
interpretation, possibly giving rise to controversies.
There was a consensus among the senior management staff that subjective
judgment is not only "not a bad thing", but also indeed something essential, given
that it is not possible to describe or measure quality precisely, comprehensively
and objectively. While ranking among staff members is neither necessary nor
desirable, it is possible to use subjective judgment to discriminate between good
and bad performance. Rigid measurement may make life easier, but "it betrays
the need of quality or judgment", as the President insisted. While quality cannot
be quantified, it can be evaluated. Quality is clear to people who know what
quality is.
Staff members felt surer that research would count, especially in decisions to
recommend promotion. However, they were less certain about recognition for
159
teaching. While it was clear to everyone that the University management has said
that the University recognizes both teaching and research, staff members did not
seem to have been convinced that the University management has demonstrated
its commitment to excellence in both teaching and research. It appeared to many
staff members that the University's goal was mainly to improve its research
performance, as they perceived undue weights being given to recognize research
performance in personnel decisions.
There seemed to be some confusion about the University's strategy of "Walking
with Two Legs" which is stipulated in the University's Strategy Plan. This
strategy is subject to the interpretation of members of the University. It is unclear
to many staff members whether the strategy means that the University as a whole
has to excel in both teaching and research, or whether it means that everyone
should do both teaching and research with equal emphasis although not
necessarily with equal proficiency. The wordings used in the Strategic Plan are
partly attributable to the cause of the confusion, for it may be interpreted that
since "equal emphasis" is not required of each individual staff, a staff member is
not required to contribute (equally) to both teaching and research:
"The policy of an equal emphasis on teaching and research is meant to
apply at the University level, not at the level of individual staff or at the
departmental leveL Individual staff members of academic units cannot be
expected to be equally proficient in both transmitting and creating
knowledge. In many cases, to demand superior performance in both is
unrealistic and unproductive."
(bold face in original text, italics added)
160
On the other hand, the senior management maintained that achievements in both
aspects would be taken into account in a holistic way. In any case, it seemed
clear, from the responses of the senior management members, that an academic
staff in the University is expected to do both teaching and research. Also, they
were referring to the quality of the work, and not mere quantity. Although some
allowance could indeed be made to accommodate the special circumstances, it
should be the exception rather than the rule. The requirement was confirmed by
the President:
"The designation ofpeople as teachers and researchers did work in some
institutions. But this is not my original idea. I require everyone to walk
with two legs. In the two core functions of teaching and research, one has
to achieve a level acceptable in one and good in another."
From the President's perspective, it will be possible for an academic staff to be
promoted as a result of excellence in teaching, while achieving an acceptable level
in research. It is crucial that this stance represents a shared vision of the
University, and if so, it should be made explicitly known to all staff members. It
is even more important that this vision is reflected in what counts in the
University's appraisal and reward scheme, as advocated by many staff members.
Question Five: Clarity in Organizational Goals and Roles of Staff
As shown in the earlier part of this chapter (see discussion on What Counts?),
many staff members seem to have received mixed messages about the
University's goals regarding teaching and research. Some extent of role
ambiguity has arisen from the different interpretation of the "Walking with Two
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Legs" strategy. Some staff members have had difficulty in seeing clearly their
roles in contributing towards the University's goals of pursuing excellence in
teaching and research. Naturally, these staff members will have difficulty in
identifying their goals with those of the University. If as perceived by some staff
members, the University indeed cares about research only, then those staff
members who prefer to specialize in teaching will have particular problem in their
sense of identification and probably motivation to work too.
Eight senior and junior staff felt the need for the University to clarify its goals
regarding teaching and research and the criteria it would use to assess staff in
these aspects, so that staff could plan their work to match the University's goals.
Such clarity was considered especially important if the appraisal scheme was to be
made a judgmental one. Seven senior staff concurred that an appraisal scheme,
which distributed rewards for performance in accord with the University's goals,
would steer the University in the direction it wanted to go. One discussion group
participant agreed that a reward system would help steering staffs efforts towards
the University's mission. Once clear (quantifiable) criteria had been worked out,
staff members would gear their efforts towards meeting the criteria. Another
participant expected an absolute University threshold on standard of academic
work on top of which the departmental threshold should be drawn up. However,
one Vice-President considered it difficult to determine a University-wide
minimum threshold for teaching, research or other aspects as the determination of
the threshold itself would already be subjective and rigid.
The responses from some staff members revealed that they also felt a conflict in
their role to teach and to engage actively in research. Three junior staff expressed
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that there was a need to reduce the teaching load of some staff given that the two
functions of teaching and research competed for their time and resources. Two of
them did not seem to be convinced of the value of themselves conducting research
if it was merely for the purpose of enhancing teaching.
Conclusions about Question Five
Clarity in Organizational Goals and Roles of Staff
In what ways do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong consider that
their ability to perform will be affected by a clear understanding of the goals of
the University and of their role in helping to attain these goals?
The University's goals, as directed by its management, are reflected in what the
University recognizes in its reward system. To the extent that the appraisal is to
serve judgmental purpose, most respondents from staff and the middle
management felt that the University has the obligation to spell out its criteria
clearly to staff, although the criteria can be in the form of some broad guidelines
given the complexity and diverse nature of academic work. Departments and
individual staff members can then plan how they can fit in the University's overall
plan. Only when the University states that direction clearly and explicitly can the
appraisal process help consolidate every staff's effort towards the direction the
University desires.
Overall Conclusions
Academic work is not quantifiable, measurable or predictable particularly given
its complex and diverse nature across disciplines. That is perhaps why many staff
members were unclear about the standards to be used in assessing academic work.
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However, there are ways to differentiate between good and bad quality, but one
has to accept subjective judgment, which is considered both necessary and
desirable by many academics in order to encourage innovation and creativity.
Staff felt surer that research would be rewarded, but less certain about teaching.
Many of them expected to be rewarded (in substantiation or promotion) on the
strength of good teaching alone, given the University's "Walking with Two Legs"
strategy which states that "equal emphasis" in teaching and research is NOT to
apply at the level of individual staff. However, the expected rewards for teaching
did not materialize. On the other hand, the managerial staff interpreted the
strategy to mean that everyone should do both teaching and research, but not
everyone is expected to be equally proficient in both. The confusion caused by
the lack of clarity in the University's goals as enunciated in the strategy is partly
attributable to staff's perception that inadequate rewards were given to teaching.
The academic staff's ability to perform in contributing towards the University's
goals depends upon their having a clear understanding of the goals and their roles
the University expects of them. While it is impossible nor practicable to list out
the criteria for measuring academic work quantitatively and comprehensively,
many staff will find it beneficial for the University to spell out its direction and
some broad guidelines, so that staff can direct their efforts towards achievement
of the University's goals.
Towards the Final Step
Based on the data collected in the case study of the Performance Planning,
Appraisal and Development Scheme of the City University of Hong Kong, as
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presented in this chapter and Chapter Six, an attempt has been made in the next
chapter to investigate the possible effect of a judgmental appraisal scheme on staff
motivation. The investigation has also shed some light on the validity of the
assumptions held by new managerialism.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Putting the Parts Together to Examine the Impact of New Managerialism on
Higher Education.
This final chapter of the thesis puts the findings together with an attempt to answer the
question of whether a judgmental appraisal scheme, which distributes extrinsic rewards
according to appraisal results, will serve as a means to motivate academic staff
towards continuous improvement and development. Some general implications on the
validity of the assumptions held by new man gerialism are also included
Introduction
Performance appraisal serves a variety of purposes. The main objective commonly
targeted by organizations is to motivate staff towards continuous improvement and
development. With this requirement in mind, an attempt has been made to find out
what kind of appraisal schemes will serve motivational purposes in respect of academic
staff. The following research questions were explored:
Research Questions
(i) To what extent do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong value
intrinsic rewards, such as satisfaction from teaching and research; as compared
with the extent to which they value extrinsic rewards, such as job security, pay,
promotion, etc. used by the management? Do they wish to avoid punishment
and negative feedback?
(ii) What kind of a performance appraisal scheme do academic staff of the City
University of Hong Kong prefer or resist?
(iii) Under what conditions will extrinsic rewards reduce intrinsic motivation in
relation to academic work?
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(iv) How far do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong believe that
their performance will be rewarded? How much do they consider that academic
performance is quantifiable, measurable or predictable, and that it can be
assessed objectively?
(v) In what ways do academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong consider
that their ability to perform will be affected by a clear understanding of the
goals of the University and their role in helping to attain these goals?
To begin, it will be useful to recapitulate the main findings of the study:
(a) Academic staff enter and stay in the profession mainly because of their
motivation to obtain intrinsic rewards from academic pursuits. Academic staff
of the City University of Hong Kong enjoy teaching, research, autonomy and
academic freedom, intellectual development, etc. They also seek extrinsic
rewards, placing particular importance on job security (substantiation). Pay
raise and promotion are of secondary importance, while collegiality and social
harmony are also on the list. Punishment and negative feedback are valued too,
but only in a negative sense; i.e., something the academic staff wish to avoid.
(b) It was the perception of some academic staff that the management may not
know exactly what their staff members need. They had not been able to enjoy
the intrinsic rewards from teaching and/or research, as they were not given the
freedom to decide how to conduct their own work. Another example is the
management's reluctance to reduce the teaching load of those staff members
who experienced a need to find more time to do research, enhance teaching
skills, etc. Promotion constitutes yet another example; while most managerial
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staff thought that promotion would be an effective motivator, many staff
members did not put it on the top of their mind. The numerous suggestions
made by staff concerning other forms of tangible but non-monetary recognition
also reflected the existence of rewards valued by staff but neglected by the
management.
(c) The greatest departure in the perception of needs between the management and
the staff lies in the importance to be attached to teaching as compared to
research. While the management's stance of requiring staff to do both teaching
and research seems clear, quite a few staff members expected to be rewarded (in
substantiation or promotion) on the strength of good teaching alone, relying on
the University's "Walking with Two Legs" strategy which states that "equal
emphasis" in teaching and research is NOT to apply at the level of individual
staff. What they saw was, however, "undue weight" attached to research when
substantiation and promotion decisions were made. Many staff wished to see
more recognition of teaching. They also wished the University to allow them to
choose to devote substantial efforts towards either teaching or research.
(d) There is the possibility of a "Two-step Hierarchy" in which many academic staff
sought to satisfy the lower order extrinsic needs of physiological and security in
the first place, before they concentrated on the higher order intrinsic needs of
self-esteem and self-actualization. 	 Under some circumstances, extrinsic
rewards, such as pay raise and promotion were thought to be able to satisfy not
only the academics' lower order physiological and security needs but also their
higher order needs of self-esteem and self-actualization, as these extrinsic
rewards would also signal success in work.
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(e)	 The academic staff envisaged that extrinsic rewards might reduce intrinsic
motivation, if the aim was to exercise managerial control. Such a perception
was more apparent among staff members from the humanities and social work
disciplines who maintained that they work mainly because of intrinsic rewards.
However, there was also the possibility that extrinsic rewards might affirm or
stimulate intrinsic motivation, as the tangible results indicated by the extrinsic
rewards might be interpreted as a kind of recognition. Therefore, extrinsic
rewards might not reduce intrinsic motivation; it might even stimulate the latter
under these circumstances.
(f) Many staff members failed to see the link between performance and rewards
because they were unclear about the standards used or to be used in assessing
academic work which is not readily quantifiable, measurable or predictable.
Academic work is particularly difficult to measure given its complex and
diverse nature across disciplines. While there is general acceptance of
subjective judgment in assessing academic work, the subjectivity adds to the
"blur" in the link. The confusion caused by ambiguity in the University's goals
as enunciated in the "Walking with Two Legs" strategy also attributed to staff's
perception of lack of linkage between teaching performance and rewards.
(g) Some staff members have had difficulty in seeing clearly their roles in
contributing towards the University's goals of pursuing excellence in teaching
and research, given the lack of clarity in the University's goals. Naturally, these
staff members might have difficulty in identifying their goals with those of the
University.
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(h)	 The academic staff generally considered that they did not need an appraisal
scheme. Their main objection arose from their rejection of managerial control
which is usually associated with performance appraisal. However, should the
University decide to practise performance appraisal, they would prefer to have a
scheme which distributes extrinsic rewards according to evaluation results.
Discussions
Powerful Intrinsic Rewards
As shown in Chapter Two, the most effective motivation in the work place is believed
to be intrinsic motivation to satisfy a person's need for feelings of competence and self-
determination in dealing with the environment. As opposed to extrinsically motivated
behavior, intrinsic motivation will not be reduced even after the goal has been attained,
but will even become more attractive the more a person feels satisfied. Intrinsic
satisfaction will last longer since the control within oneself is more stable. There is also
a more direct link between effort and intrinsic rewards as the person directly rewards
himself/herself
Conventional theory has advised management to rely on rewards, promises, incentives,
threats and other coercive devices. It is true that management has the power to satisfy
staff members' physiological and security needs by awarding employment, pay,
benefits and working conditions. The staff members can be controlled so long as they
are struggling for survival. But a satisfied need is no longer a motivator of behavior.
Once a person has reached a satisfactory subsistence level, he/she will be motivated
primarily by higher order needs. The person will then feel deprived if there are no
opportunities at work to satisfy these higher level needs, and as a result undesirable
behavior will occur. If management continues to confine its attention to the lower order
needs, its motivational efforts will be in vain. "Management cannot provide a person
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with self-respect, or with the respect of his/her fellow, or with the satisfaction of needs
for self-fulfillment" (McGregor 1957: 314), but it can create conditions to motivate the
staff to seek such satisfaction for themselves.
Academic staff are people with high order needs to achieve. They are willing to work
hard despite the absence of extrinsic rewards, so long as they can obtain intrinsic
satisfaction. The overall performance of a university depends on the "inner motivation
of teachers - their sense of pride, their intellectual involvement with their subjects, their
professional commitment to the role of teacher, their love of students or of learning -
the forces that lead teachers to bring their full resources to the teaching relationships"
(Trow 1997: 391) and other aspects of academic work. It is therefore crucial for
management to create conditions to make these intrinsic rewards available to the
academic staff who possess higher order needs.
Extrinsic Rewards to Demonstrate Recognition of Contributions to University's
Goals
However, management should not neglect the extrinsic rewards, as there is no way to
guarantee that higher order needs do emerge. Extrinsic rewards "can still have very
strong influences on motivation although many people choosing to work for a public
organization do not emphasize making a lot of money as a goal in life." (Rainey 1991:
131). In societies in which the status of occupations and the achievements within them
are hierarchically organized, it is difficult for individuals to be content with intrinsic
satisfactions alone (Bess 1997: 432). While the worker par excellence is stimulated by
the intrinsic challenge the job poses for them, by the opportunities it affords them for
personal growth and development (Lopez 1968), there is also ample evidence to show
that this worker par excellence is an "uncommon man" (p. 22).
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The example of the City University of Hong Kong seems to suggest that it is not
practicable to rely ONLY on the higher order needs of intrinsic rewards to motivate
work performance. While intrinsic motivation is important and may be effective, its
impact cannot last long unless the efforts expended by the staff members are recognized
somehow in some form of extrinsic rewards or tangible results. In another words,
intrinsic rewards will not be effective on their own. The feeling of intrinsic rewards
may not sustain long if the staff members fail to receive visible signal from external
sources to confirm internally with themselves that they are making contributions, and
that the feeling of intrinsic motivation is real. The award of extrinsic rewards will give
something tangible to confirm the intrinsic motivation, and in some cases, will
accentuate the value of the intrinsic motivation. It will also help the staff members to
visualize more clearly the link between performance and rewards. The confirmation
needs not only be in the form of externally mediated rewards, but also it has to be
visible or tangible. Verbal reinforcement, or even a pat on the shoulder, or attention
paid to staff will suffice in many cases.
Motivation is "highest when people get feedback and are affirmed by others" that they
are competent (Walker and Symons 1997: 17). This is particularly important for
academic staff, as people with high order needs for achievement seek "concrete
information on how well they perform" (Rainey 1991: 135). The recognition of and the
appreciation for a person's efforts, as "expressed by his/her associates and supervisors",
will provide the driving force (Lopez 1968: 21). Extrinsic rewards, despite their
potentially negative effect on intrinsic motivation, are useful. Furthermore, when
rewards are used as a means of conveying positive feedback as competence cues,
intrinsic motivation may not be decreased, and could even be increased. Extrinsic
rewards are important also because of the ability of some of this kind of rewards to
satisfy multiple levels of needs. For example, pay, substantiation and promotion can
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satisfy the lower order physiological and security needs, as well as the higher order
needs of self-esteem and self-actualization.
One may derive intrinsic satisfaction from working on a piece of work to which the
organization may not accord importance. But the highest stage of self-fulfillment is the
feeling of personal worth and importance towards the achievement of the organization's
goals (Likert 1961). The reward system of an organization communicates its values and
priorities. If the achievement is not recognized by some form of extrinsic rewards, staff
may infer that it does not fit into the University's goals. As a result, the intrinsic
satisfaction of working in the University will NOT last long. The giving of extrinsic
rewards by the management will help sustain intrinsic motivation. For example, it is
not enough to simply say that teaching is important, the value of teaching must be
reinforced in tangible and visible ways. If the culture of the University supports good
teaching by rewarding teaching performance, faculty members are more likely to place
a higher value on teaching and derive more intrinsic satisfaction from it.
There may be concern about possible adverse effect on other forms of intrinsic
satisfaction, such as collegiality and solidarity, as the award of extrinsic rewards may be
potentially divisive. However, it should be remembered that academic staff emphasize
self-control and self-regulation rather than organizational control. They view excellent
performance as a goal in itself rather than as a means to compete for external rewards.
Given their understanding that the external rewards will come naturally as a
consequence of good performance, the negative impact on collegiality and solidarity
can be minimized or eliminated.
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Integrated Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation
However, extrinsic rewards tend to be less immediately satisfying than intrinsic job
rewards, which bring personal satisfaction. Given the possibility of extrinsic rewards
reducing intrinsic satisfaction, the University must create and preserve conditions which
will help staff seek intrinsic satisfaction, while at the same time, offer extrinsic rewards
that are directly related to performance. However only extrinsic rewards that will not
diminish intrinsic motivation should be used.
If the University wants to live up to its promise, as outlined in the Strategic Plan, of
achieving excellence in both core functions of teaching and research, it must set up
conditions to help staff to seek intrinsic rewards in teaching and research, and at the
same time give them the extrinsic rewards in cases of excellent performance in these
areas. In order not to allow the extrinsic rewards to diminish intrinsic motivation, the
extrinsic rewards must NOT be administered in a way such that the controlling aspect is
made salient. Instead, the positive feedback aspect should be emphasized, so that staff
can eventually internalize the intrinsic motivation. Behaviors that are extrinsically
motivated can become autonomous through a process of internalization and integration
(Schafer 1968). A regulatory process that is initiated externally may be taken in, and
gradually the staff will begin to value the activity and self-initiate the process without
the external prompt. Eventually, the regulation may become an autonomous extrinsic
motivation. Allowing autonomy and minimizing pressures will facilitate internalization.
For the academic staff, the motivational bases for work are intrinsic motivation and
extrinsic motivation in an integrated way. They are intrinsically motivated when they
are interested in teaching and research and finding the work spontaneously rewarding.
They are autonomously extrinsically motivated when they involve themselves fully in
the activity, "having internalized and integrated the importance of the activity" (Deci,
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Kasser, and Ryan 1997: 68). The way to enable such a state of integrated intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation is for the University to establish clear goals, to truly reward
contributions towards the goals, and let staff have the freedom to decide how to direct
their own efforts to attain the rewards by contributing towards the goals. This will
enable staff to find for themselves the joy in the work.
Task Autonomy and Clarity of Roles
Intrinsic rewards are powerful work motivators, but only when people have sufficient
autonomy to do the job. The tasks should be ones the staff feel delighted in doing, so
that they can accrue satisfaction from the accomplishment, from the expression of
abilities, and exercise of their own decisions. As perceived by many staff, the
reluctance of the University to accept other criteria (other than research) for promotion
made staff felt that they were "coerced" to conduct research despite their relative
strengths on teaching. Such a driving force for research work is one of extrinsic
motivation for rewards. Striving for intrinsic motivation from teaching, some staff
asked that they should be given the freedom to choose whether to focus on teaching or
research. It is only when such a freedom is allowed can one speak truly of the
satisfaction of the higher order needs.
While recognizing the benefits in enhancing intrinsic motivation by giving staff the
freedom to choose between teaching and research, it must be noted that personal
freedom of staff is limited to the extent to which it meets the broader needs and interests
of the whole organization. It is impossible for public servants, including university
academic staff, to have absolute freedom in deciding what or what not to do in the jobs.
The University has a legitimate necessity to decide its requirement upon its staff
members, ideally with staff's participation. However, it should state its requirement
explicitly, for specific goals, whether imposed or self-set, are preferable to vague goals
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(Ivanecevich 1976). A decision relating to whether faculty should be allowed to choose
between teaching and research has major implications as the way faculty members are
evaluated for pay raise, substantiation and promotion has a significant motivational
impact upon faculty's performance. Needless to say, detailed specifications are neither
desirable nor feasible. It is, however, desirable and practicable to give a broad direction
and the major requirement un-ambiguously, even though that may put pressure on or
even upset some staff members who prefer to specialize in one particular aspect of the
academic work. Within the confines of this broad direction, the management should
allow staff the autonomy to decide how to satisfy the requirement, for example, by
developing their relative strengths in teaching or research, while attaining an acceptable
level in both. Such autonomy will serve in some way to enable the staff to seek
intrinsic satisfaction from the jobs.
While the Strategic Plan of the City University of Hong Kong promises that equal
emphasis is to be placed in teaching and research, such promise is empty if the appraisal
and reward system reflects that teaching excellence has not been adequately and equally
recognized. Many staff members at the University perceived an undue weight being
given to the importance of research, in relation to teaching, as reflected in the extent of
recognition given to these two aspects in major personnel decisions. This phenomenon
is not unique to the City University of Hong Kong. Many academic staff elsewhere
believe that "while promotion ostensibly can be achieved through high performance in
research, teaching, administration and academic development, it is only the first of
these factors that counts with most promotion committees" (Bright and Williamson
1995: 82). But if the University wishes to achieve its stated goals, the criteria it uses for
reward must be consistent with the University's goals as reflected in its Strategic Plan.
As the "Walking on Two Legs" strategy is an important component of the plan, its
precise meaning should be clarified. What is more crucial for the achievement of the
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University's goals is that the appraisal and reward system must reflect the correct
interpretation of this strategy. If teaching is regarded as an important University goal,
the scheme must recognize the teaching contributions of staff.
Assessment Criteria
Assessment criteria constitute a major area of contention in nearly all appraisal and
reward systems. The managerialist approach to management requires the definition of
objective and measurable standards to be used in the allocation of rewards, and
surveillance to ensure that those standards are met. This approach is inconsistent with
academic work which is not readily amenable to strictly objective or quantitative
measurement. The case study of the City University of Hong Kong reveals that
assessment of teaching and research performance is necessarily qualitative and
subjective.
Subjective judgment is particularly important if teaching is regarded as an art (House
and Lapan 1989). The techniques used in the process of teaching are personalized
rather than standardized because the teaching situation is unpredictable, frequently
requiring departure from set rules and techniques. As these departures are expressions
of the personality and personal insight of the individual teacher, the assessment should
be based on holistic judgments of the overall pattern of events rather than discrete
behaviors. In all scholarly activities, "it is quality that counts, not quantity" (Lynton
1992: 73). Quality is difficult to measure as it includes the degree of expertise required,
originality and degree of innovation, difficulty, scope and importance. Quality is
indicated by the "qualities of mind" displayed, "not only in the products but also in the
way it is executed. Quality cannot be judged from afar on the basis of numerical data"
(Elliot 1987: 176).
177
Full Range of Rewards
Given the academics' dislike of managerial control, the management could help staff
sustain their intrinsic motivation by making better use of non-tangible external rewards,
for example, verbal reinforcement, and social approval. Since these extrinsic rewards
are less likely to be perceived as a controlling device, the staff will continue to be
intrinsically motivated; and the behavior will persist even after such non-tangible
rewards have been removed.
While it may be possible to separate the various desires into intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation, it is not necessary to adopt such a polarity. For example, "the reasons for
doing research are often complex, intertwined, paradoxical and changeable" (Webb
1994: 80). Academic staff may conduct research for both extrinsic and intrinsic
rewards. Those who are under the pressure to publish for the purpose of seeking pay
raise, substantiation and promotion are motivated by extrinsic reasons; others may be
motivated by intrinsic needs to satisfy "a blend of curiosity, creativity, ambition, pride,
the need for recognition and for self-esteem, which together make the challenges and
opportunities associated with research so important" (Webb 1994: 81). Motivation
towards substantiation may be similarly mixed, satisfying both extrinsic and the
intrinsic aspects. Many academics are "at least as interested in academic rank,
reputation and status within the profession or the university, as are in money" (Webb
1994: 81).
Theory X and Y approaches to management are not mutually exclusive. In real life
organizations rarely identify totally to either polarity of Theory X and Y. Research
findings indicated that the highest-producing organizations did not rely solely on the
economic motive to organize and coordinate the organizations (Likert 1961). Instead
all motives were used fully, including self-fulfillment, status, recognition, approval,
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acceptance and power, the desire to undertake significant and important tasks, curiosity,
creativity, security motives and economic motives. By tapping all the motives which
yield favorable and cooperative attitudes, maximum motivation towards realizing the
organization's goals as well as the individuals' goals will be achieved.
Thus it is advisable to make use of a range of rewards, both intrinsic and extrinsic.
Indeed the responses from the academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong
suggest that they would be receptive to a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.
Academic staff have higher order needs as they found it intrinsically motivating in the
job of teaching and research, provided that they have a reasonable extent of freedom in
determining how they are to do the job. At the same time, they value extrinsic rewards
both to satisfy their lower order needs, as well as to serve as a form of visualizing the
intrinsic rewards. The society consists of people who are "complex man" (Schein
1965) with a variety of needs, ranging from the lower order physiological needs to the
high order social and self-actualization needs. Furthermore, individuals differ in the
extent to which they value the rewards. So in addition to financial and material rewards,
the management should consider other substantive forms of recognition embracing
promotion, increased job autonomy, opportunities for learning and development, praise,
peer support, responsibility, empowerment and professional recognition which are
largely under-utilized by organizations today.
Punishment and Negative Feedback
What about punishment and negative feedback? As discussed in Chapter Two, there
are both supporters and opponents to the use of these means. Such a divisive view is
also evident in the City University of Hong Kong. As expected while most staff
members did not wish to see a punitive appraisal and reward scheme, most managerial
staff expressed support for the use of appropriate sanctions against non-performers.
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These managerial staff shared the same view as their peers elsewhere who felt that the
universities have not been firm enough in dealing with unacceptable levels of staff
performance (Haslam et al 1993). They suggested that while staff appraisal should be
used for staff development purposes, the appraisal should be backed up by sanctions
against the poor performers and rewards for the good performers.
Punishment and negative feedback are also valued rewards, but in a negative sense. As
long as the employees see punishment and negative feedback as consequence to certain
behavior, the punishment and negative feedback will serve as "extrinsic rewards" to
motivate desired behavior. Therefore it is useful as a motivating tool. Under-
performers may be satisfied with their job and will continue to stay. In addition to
making efforts to help them seek higher order satisfaction, it may also be useful to
disturb their "equilibrium" by introducing uncertainty of employment, pay raise, etc.
It will be de-motivating to staff members who perform if they see no action taken
against non-performers. They will, however, see an intensified link between
performance and rewards, if the appraisal results will bring both positive and negative
incentives. Thus the tough measures against under-performers will serve as a motivator
to those who perform, and will make the values of positive valued rewards more salient.
However, there is the danger that given the overt controlling aspect of punishment and
negative feedback, the intrinsic satisfaction associated with the work will diminish.
Taking all factors into consideration, it appears that if performance appraisal is
concerned with performance improvement, it ought to have a punitive component. To
motivate subordinates, managers must have authority to 'hire' and 'fire. However, staff
must be clear that the punitive measure is a result of the poor performance. Given that
academic work may not be objectively and un-ambiguously judged, as it is not readily
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quantifiable, measurable or predictable, the use of punishment and negative feedback to
motivate academic staff should be proceeded with carefully.
Conclusions
The Need for a Judgmental Appraisal Scheme?
In order for rewards to serve as effective motivators, staff members need to see that
high level of performance does lead to high level of rewards. The experience of the City
University of Hong Kong shows that it is not possible to detach the judgmental element
(i.e., rewards) from performance appraisal, contrary to the assumption the University
made several years ago when the scheme was introduced. The responses collected in
the study indicate that staff would take the matter seriously only if there is an apparent
link between the appraisal results and rewards. This finding correlates with staffs
request to exempt those who are substantiated on the top point of the salary scale from
the Merit-based Reward Scheme (see Chapter Five) for the reason that the triennial
review will not affect the salary of this group of staff. The exemption from the triennial
review was interpreted by many staff as corollary to exemption from performance
appraisal.
While the academics highly value intrinsic satisfaction from work, they would wish to
see some forms of tangible rewards as a visible recognition of their efforts. It is
difficult to convince them that appraisal will be beneficial if there is no prospect of
realistic substantive outcomes. In the final analysis, "What You Test Is What You Get"
(Broadfoot 1998). If the University does not use the appraisal results to reward and
promote faculty, it is unlikely that the tremendous amount of time and energy expended
in assessment can be sustained. Therefore, the appraisal scheme should be given some
"teeth" by its ability to distribute rewards according to efforts and performance. An
appraisal scheme must be supplemented by a reward scheme. However, rewards need
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not be confined to monetary ones. Furthermore, rewards made to those who contributed
to the organizational goals will encourage more of those actions (Braskamp and Ory
1994; Suffolk Education Department 1995), since there will be sufficient incentives to
promote positive risk-taking (Baker and Mezei 1988).
Indeed, the academic staff of the City University of Hong Kong know very well that
their efforts should ultimately be geared towards the achievement of the University
goals. They were not necessarily hostile to the idea of linking appraisal results to
rewards, possibly as a sign of increasing realism (Hughes 1998). On the contrary, they
considered that the use of appraisal results to inform personnel decisions covertly may
lead to mistrust, thus undermining the usefulness of the whole scheme, let alone the
developmental purpose. It is thus advisable to make the rewards explicit. However, the
use of rewards must be carefully administered, so that the academic staff will not regard
it as a means of control imposed by the management. The resistance to the
management-led merit awards component of the Merit-based Reward Scheme (see
Chapter Five) highlighted the need to minimize the controlling aspect of any appraisal
and reward scheme. The desire to obtain the rewards as a form of recognition of
performance must come from within the academic staff themselves.
It has been argued in this thesis that relying on control is not the most effective way to
motivate staff. Even if it does motivate staff, the staff will lack initiative and
adaptability. Moreover, control will not work in the academia, for people in education
cannot be managed in exactly the same way as technical workers. Quantitative and
calculative approaches do not fit the educational cultures. An attempt to control
academics through external means ignores the importance of the meanings of work for
most people working in education. Thus appraisal of academic staff should focus on the
developmental element to enhance staff's perceptions of competence, which will in turn
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increase their intrinsic motivation and make the activity itself more enjoyable.
Appraisal without development tends to be summative in nature, focusing on
shortcomings and necessarily threatening. The developmental focus will be attractive
to academic staff, as they prefer a development model of appraisal (see Chapter Two)
which respects them as competent professionals. The purpose of appraisal should be to
develop them to enhance their ability to educate students and to engage in scholarly
activities.
The developmental component should draw reference from the "more enlightened and
participatory paradigm of teacher evaluation" (Smyth 1996: 187). "A bottom-up model
with self-evaluation and reflection will be more useful" (Clandinin et al 1996: 172).
This does not imply the entire abandonment of control over the work of the academic
staff, but a reliance on internal professional responsibilities as the ultimate guardian of
excellence. Ideological control is even more powerful than external forces. The
academic staff seek a high degree of self-control over setting their own goals and over
defining the paths to these goals. Only if this condition exists will they feel the
psychological 'success' resulting from good performance.
Professional development and growth of academic staff are critical to the success of
university education for the next generation. Growth does not refer so much to
promotion but means the academics' growth towards the realization of their full
potential. It is a synergic process in which the academics increase the capability to
make contributions to the organization's goals and consequentially obtain a deeper,
more enduring and ego-enhancing satisfaction from work. It has been argued that a
developmental focus towards growth is more conducive to generating commitment
among academic staff who work under a collegial environment characterized by
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mutuality of interests. Such appraisal scheme is believed to be effective in serving the
long-term benefits of both the University and the academic staff
"Once individuals have exhausted their own mental and emotional resources, they are
unlikely to be motivated to grow without the intervention of some external impetus"
(Duke and Stiggins 1990: 119). Performance appraisal can provide that impetus.
Evaluation feedback can provide the challenge which is vital to "stage growth" (i.e.,
advancing from one developmental level to another) (Thies-Sprinthall and Sprinthall
1987: 71). Staff should recognize that their self-development goals require them to be
willing to accept feedback and ideas for alternative approaches to the job. This
approach should be acceptable to the academia, for faculty are used to receiving
criticism and feedback from their peers, as "the research enterprise is built on criticism
and feedback" (Braskamp and Ory 1994: 25).
Individual improvement contributes to institutional improvement only when the
institutional goals are congruent with those of the individual staff. Performance
appraisal that distributes rewards according to appraisal results offers a process of
reconciling conflicts between the two goals and brings them into harmony. The rewards
will guide staff towards improvement that the institution recognizes as contributing to
its goals. Motivation occurs when the staff member sees a meaningful involvement in
the institution's achievement. Successful performance appraisal and attainment of
rewards will stimulate the academics' desire for further improvement and growth. The
University can gradually elevate its standard, thus moving up the pecking order. As the
President put it:
"If everyone marches forward, the University will march forward."
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About New Managerialism
As outlined in Chapter One, the new managerialism doctrines are based on a number of
assumptions:
(a) Better management can solve all problems; managerial skills are generic,
applicable equally to both the public and private sectors.
(b) Economic efficiency is the main concern; the focus is on results and output
control rather than on input or process.
(c) All public sector activities are products capable of being measured and
controlled; the product is definable precisely without ambiguity. There are
explicit standards and measures of performance which are quantifiable and
measurable.
(d) Organizational and personal objectives can be set clearly to enable systematic
measurement; the objectives are mutually compatible.
(e) Market mechanism is regarded as superior and more efficient in resource
allocation; competition is encouraged as it promotes efficiency and consumers'
sovereignty which in turn provide better results and greater public
accountability.
(f) Managers have great discretionary power of control over the workforce; they
assume personal responsibility for results with a critical role in planning,
implementing and measuring the required improvement in efficiency.
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(g)	 Individuals will not perform to their fullest unless an appropriate system of
incentives is in place. Organization effectiveness can be heightened through the
more selective application of rewards. As organizations control future
outcomes that individuals value, people derive value from knowing how well
they fulfill organizational expectations.
A major debate about whether new managerialism is good for the public sector centers
on the question of whether the public sector management is the same as private sector
management. The managerialists argue that they are the same, since both sectors
produce goods and services for clients (Keating 1989). Thus managerialism is
considered a plausible solution to the problems confronting the governments by
applying the private sector managerial practices in carrying out the management
functions in the public sector. However, the critics cast doubt on the usefulness of such
approach since there are fundamental differences in the two sectors (Allison 1982;
Considine 1988; Pusey 1991; Yeatman 1987).
The managerialists are correct in that the task of managing in the public sector is
substantially similar to that in the private sector. Both should be concerned with results
which can be achieved by using private sector management techniques. They both
utilize resources to produce value for the clients. However, the critics are equally
correct in highlighting that the two sectors differ in context. The public sector has
unique political, social, constitutional and ethical dimensions which make it different
from the private sector. Based on this perspective, many of the assumptions on which
private sector management is based may not be equally applicable to the public sector.
There should be no objection to the need for public organizations including the public-
funded universities to serve the economic needs of the society. Indeed, academic
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capitalism or the "Enterprise University" will offer good prospects for new ways to
enable the universities to meet their aspirations under growing globalisation. The
question is "the extent to which universities must mirror markets in order to serve the
markets, must become corporations in order to treat with firms" (Marginson and
Considine 2000: 5). Being useful to business does not necessarily means that
universities have to be like business. In becoming entrepreneurial, the universities must
NOT lose sight of their distinctive characteristics. The new spirit of "enterprise" should
not be driven by the bottom line alone, for academic autonomy and prestige remain
important. In this context, an attempt to examine the validity of the assumptions
underlining new managerialism has been made, focusing particularly on their
applicability to higher education.
Professional Values Incongruous with Managerial Control
Educational organizations are "loosely coupled systems" in which each person is able to
maintain his/her own identity and separateness although their activities may be
connected (Weick 1976). Unlike a private organization with a clear management
structure, no one in a university has over-riding power of action. The cellular nature of
the classrooms gives the traditional view of academia freedom, and the ideology of
shared governance by a collegial group has dominated the academia. The uneven
progress made in the completion of the first cycle of the Performance Planning,
Appraisal and Development Scheme across the departments of the City University of
Hong Kong illuminates this unique characteristic of a university. The discretionary
power held by heads of departments mediates a university's capability to ensure total
acceptance of policies the university seeks to impose, in contrast to the requirement of
strict compliance in a private organization.
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With the creation of managers possessing the right to control by prescribing what the
academics should do, academic members become simply a kind of resources to be
managed. The managers' concern for efficiency necessitates surveillance of the
academics by the managers, setting into motion of growing distrust between the two
parties. As professionals are "independent operators", monitoring, no matter how 'light
touch', may be regarded as an intrusion on a private domain to undermine independence
of thought and action. Also the system of competition conflicts with the academics'
culture of collegiality. A single-purpose judgmental performance staff appraisal will
not be effective in motivating staff as they will be resistant to such form of control.
There were even some doubts on whether a university has the right to dictate how the
academics should direct their efforts (Hughes 1998).
The universities do not have the means to award many of the rewards valued by the
academic staff. Academics have strong loyalty to their profession and discipline, but
weak bonds to their institution. They come to the possession of extensive and highly
specialized knowledge after lengthy periods of education in order to meet the criteria of
their profession. By custom and practice, their authority and loyalty are derived from
and owed to the profession, rather than the university. Thus they value more those
rewards that are derived from identification to external professional constituencies than
rewards from identification to internal constituencies. Students too are in the position
to distribute or withhold intrinsic work rewards. As many of these valued rewards are
norm-referenced, it is all the more impossible for the universities to exercise control
through manipulating these rewards.
Academics derive authority not from hierarchical positions but from the quality of
academic work which is assessed in accordance with standard of the profession
independent of the judgment of the universities. While academic staff are increasingly
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aware of their need to demonstrate their worth to the society, they know that merit (the
quality of work by professional standard) remains the ultimate criterion for judging
them. The driving force for them is therefore their professional status which cannot be
detached from professional judgment, and the right to self-regulation. This poses further
problems of control over the academic workforce, as control is mediated by claims for
professional autonomy.
Public Service is Not a Product to be Controlled
The results of many kinds of work are difficult to quantify arid measure. The study of
the City University of Hong Kong has shown that it is particularly difficult to measure
academic work against pre-determined objectives, given its complex and diverse nature
across disciplines. While some quantitative measures may be used to assist judgment of
the quality, the overall performance is not readily quantifiable, measurable or
predictable. When the focus is put on quantitative aspects, the less easily measured
activities will be accorded lower priority or even cut back. The efforts gearing to
satisfy the quantitative criteria will divert resources away from achieving what is really
desired, resulting in a dysfunctional impact on higher education. The universities may
then reward the wrong behaviors and discourage desirable ones.
What distinguishes a public organization from a profit-making one is that while it
should be concerned with economy, efficiency, arid effectiveness, it should be more
concerned with the outcomes and quality of the services. However, the pressure to
demonstrate quick results will force public managers to put undue emphasis on
quantitative measurement. Given that the choice of performance indicators is more
often determined by how readily the data are available rather than their appropriateness
(Borden and Banta 1994), the consequence is short-sightedness, tunnel vision,
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suboptimization and gaming, and negative impact on the quality of the process (Ritzer
1993).
In universities, performance of academic staff can be more easily assessed by means of
hours taught, grades that students obtain, teaching evaluation scores, Research
Assessment Exercise scores, number of publications, etc. than by a holistic assessment
of their contribution to students' learning and the academic staff's achievement in
scholarship. Quantification reduces the worth and quality of education as a process to
some crude performance indicators or a product to be sold. For instance, reducing
teaching performance to a set of competence restricts the outcome of learning to a
defined range of behavior; as a result, the knowledge and qualities that underpin that
learning may be ignored. Furthermore, too much reliance on quantification,
standardization, calculability and predictability will not stimulate creativity required of
scholarship, instead it will disempower those who are willing to innovate, since the
greater the challenge the greater the risk of failure. Competent staff may become de-
motivated, for people who are motivated towards the goal of quality, personal
satisfaction and productivity may be negatively related.
The private sector managerial practices are based on a simple bottom line of
productivity and profitability. But universities are providers of services rather than
producers of standardized products. Services are intangible, and their outcomes are
intangible too. The process of education is important, not only the products.
Universities cannot be profitably standardized and coordinated to a rigorous time
schedule. The achievement of the main educational objectives, i.e., the development
and transmission of knowledge, cannot be subordinated to control based purely on
financial consideration. As education and scholarship cannot be monetized, it is
difficult to measure the performance according to standardized quantitative criteria.
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Performance appraisal which assumes that teachers are "calculable, describable and
comparable" (Ball 1991: 159) has ignored the unique individual contribution of
teachers which has a direct bearing on students' learning, the ultimate purpose of
education. Unless the appraisal and reward scheme can recognize the importance of the
process in making teaching and other academic work effective, the scheme is not likely
to motivate the desired behaviors.
Controls Reduce Intrinsic Motivation and Deprofessionalize Academics
Professionalism (autonomy, creativity, commitment to learning, novelty and discovery)
refers to the dominant job context factors that attract academics to the profession.
However, private sector managerial practices, with their undue emphasis on extrinsic
motivation, shift the academic staff from internal motivation associated with
professional work to external control. The requirement to produce a more or less
standard "product" will limit the intellectual and emotional scope of the academics'
work as they can no longer exercise discretion or create their own roles. Autonomy, at
best, is restricted to means rather than ends.
The emphasis on control does not only infringe upon the professionals' rights of self-
determination, but also necessitates the replacement of human technology with non-
human technology (Ritzer 1993). In order to hierarchically monitor and control,
performance appraisal will focus on "low-inference, observable performance skills" and
academic work will be transformed from 'art' to 'labour" (Elliot 1987: 177). The
ultimate result may be deprofessionalisation of academics who are reduced to a mere
de-skilled workforce whose judgement is no longer critical. The deprofessionalization
will turn devoted people away from the academic profession, leading to a shortage of
academics whose interest lies mainly in the ultimate goals of education.
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Multiple and Conflicting Goals
The success of managerialist practices depends on the setting of clear and mutually
compatible objectives. However, "clear and limited objectives, stable and explicit
priorities are very seldom the experienced reality of public-service organizations"
(Pollitt 1990: 121). Nearly all public organizations have multiple and conflicting goals.
Public interests are more diverse, and there are pressures to set objectives that are vague
and ambiguous, so that it is unclear as to which groups are likely to be satisfied.
Broadly stated objectives will help to attain the maximum degree of agreement among
the groups.
Universities have even more problems in building a common goal. Academics are
pluralistic by nature and the work of the professorate is one of extreme differentiation.
Universities have multiple, diffuse, vague, ambiguous, and frequently abstract goals
(Peterson and Martin 1990) with a diversity of stakeholders. At best universities can
identify a mission statement based on a few shared goals, but the strong tradition of
professionalism actually encourages goal diversity. Given that universities are
'organized anarchies' (Cohen and March 1974), clarity of organizational goals is
elusive.
The faculties are loosely connected, with conflicting interests segmented by department,
school, rank, or discipline. The goals of the groups are frequently contradicting and
sometimes competing. The case study of the City University of Hong Kong reflects
such conflicts. For example, members from the science and engineering disciplines
strongly support an absolute standard (more of a quantitative nature) against which
everyone's performance should be measured; otherwise they would consider it not fair
to those staff (themselves) from disciplines which have very stringent standards. On the
other hand, members from the non-science or engineering disciplines doubt the
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desirability and practicability in having an absolute standard irrespective of disciplines.
They may fear that they will be disadvantaged, given that their work is less amenable to
quantitative measures. The study also reveals that academic staff from the humanities
and social science disciplines are more philosophically resistant to the idea of
subjecting academics to managerial control through extrinsically mediated rewards.
Market Failure
Private sector management focuses on market values based mainly on efficiency,
sometimes at the expense of other important non-market values, such as fairness,
justice, representation, impartiality, probity, equity and participation (see Chapter One).
The public sector managers, on the other hand, have to cater for both market and non-
market values. They have to take measures to remedy market failure in the interest of
non-market values. The duty of the public sector managers is not merely to find out
objectively what people demand and to use the most efficient means to satisfy those
demands. They should provide the public with alternative perspectives of what is
desirable and feasible.
The "provider/consumer transactions in the public services tend to be notably more
complex" than those faced by the consumers in a normal market, and public service
consumers "are never merely consumers, they are always citizens too" (Pollitt 1990:
125). There are occasions where the public service may have to be coerced upon the
recipients against their will. On other occasions, a member of the public is not
permitted to use a particular service even though he/she wants to. Very often the
provision of public service is not to satisfy the consumers' current demands, but to
encourage their preferences to change and develop. Education is a case in point. The
maxim that "the customer is always right" is debatable for many public services. The
consumers may not be able to evaluate the relative merits of the options for they may
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not have the information or expertise to do so. In education, students, parents, and
employers may be ill-equipped to make well-informed decisions. Education is not only
concerned with producing employable graduates to meet employers' immediate
demands. If courses are all driven by their immediate practical utility, the fundamental
aim of education in giving meaningful educational experience to students will be
neglected. As a result, education will fail to achieve its goal of human capital
development. Furthermore, the universities have the responsibility to lead the
advancement of knowledge by anticipating future needs which may not be recognized
by the "customers" at present.
Public organizations are concerned with solving not only economic problems, but also
social, cultural and political ones which are complex and intertwined. Reducing all
social issues to managerial ones will lead to social inequalities, undermining social
harmony and neglecting human well-being. The public sector has a fundamentally
different nature from that of the private sector, and thus its services should be based on
a different set of values. The primary purpose of public organizations, including the
universities, is to serve all members of the public equally irrespective of their ability to
pay. "The most productive governments, the most efficient governments, and the most
economizing governments can still be perpetuating poverty, inequality of opportunity
and injustice" (Frederickson 1976: 39). Public accountability embraces financial
accountability but does not stop there (Law 1995). While public servants should be
rational and be concerned about efficiency, they should not forget their wider moral and
ethical responsibilities in preserving social equity and harmony, which override
financial considerations.
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Limitations of the Study and Further Research
In this thesis, the impact of new managerialism on the motivation of academic staff has
been explored, by using a case study of the performance appraisal scheme adopted by
the City University of Hong Kong for its academic staff However, given the defined
scope of the study, this thesis has not devoted sufficient efforts to cover some relevant
issues. It is desirable to extend the study in future, to address some of the limitations of
the study as given below.
Motivation as a Perception
The study was not an attempt to measure the motivation of the respondents. Indeed,
researchers have great difficulty measuring motivation and there are no conclusive
measures of motivation (Rainey 1991: 123). Instead, the study aimed at finding how
the respondents perceived the effect of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, as influenced by
an appraisal scheme, on their motivation to perform. The study of perception was
considered relevant as "the crux of distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation stems from the feeling or perception of causation" (deCharms 1968, as
interpreted by Calder and Staw 1975b: 599). Likewise, the study did not attempt to
measure the perceived effect of rewards on the actual performance or productivity.
Other Organizational Factors
The analysis has focused on the individual staff members' perception. No particular
attention was paid to examine how the respondents' perception was influenced by the
group factor. The study also did not give sufficient attention to other organizational
factors, such as the ways the organization can influence the individual staff members to
perform. While performance will depend on the ability of the individuals, even the
most capable ones will achieve only if they are properly supported by the organization.
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The study also took the overall value orientation of University as given, without
examining the impact of organization culture on staff motivation.
External Factors
Motivation is not only an internal organizational matter. There are external influences,
particularly on public organizations, that can affect motivation. The Hong Kong
Government, for instance, would welcome the University to adopt a judgmental
appraisal scheme for academic staff as a means to monitor and control the quality of
staff performance in the University. Such a tendency was clearly transpired from
UGC's urging the University to develop a judgmental PPAD in its Management Review
Report (see Chapter Four). Indeed a judgmental appraisal could serve as a way to help
the Government to shift universities in government-determined direction: through its
funding methodology, the government could influence the setting of the University's
goals, which in turn will determine how academic staff are to be appraised.
The public will likely think that effective organizations pay for performance; ineffective
organizations do not relate pay to performance. The adoption of a judgmental appraisal
in the University is also a way to communicate to the public that it is responsive to
external constituencies and is concerned about how its staff perform. But this
"political" factor has not been taken into account in the data analysis of this study.
Measurement of Performance
The study has shown that the issue of measurement of performance is important, as it
will affect the extent to which staff perceive a link between performance and rewards.
The necessity of subjectivity in assessing academic work and its acceptance by staff
members were acknowledged, but no substantial efforts have been devoted to examine
how such subjective judgment could be arrived at without its being rejected by staff as
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unfair or invalid. It follows that the study did not attempt to examine the way the
University has in practice rewarded performance in teaching, research or other aspects
of academic work.
Generalizability
The limitation in the generalizability of a qualitative research such as this one has been
acknowledged in Chapter Four. As the study is based on data collected from one
university, the limitation in generalizability across institutions, let alone the whole
public sector, must be noted.
Cultural values and attitudes differ from one society to another and "faculty members at
different types of institutions have different motivations" (Braskamp and Ory 1994).
For example, reluctance to openly criticize someone is often quoted as a feature of
Asian or Chinese culture. It will be of value to conduct further research in this direction,
using a comparative approach involving some other institutions, public organizations as
well as private organizations in Hong Kong and elsewhere.
Practical Issues
The thesis has argued for the desirability of an appraisal scheme for academic staff
which has a developmental focus, supplemented by the reward of autonomous efforts
that staff made towards professional growth. It contends that academics are willing and
can afford to spend time and efforts to seek criticism and feedback as part of the
appraisal process. However, there may be practical difficulties in carrying it out. The
need recognized by the City University of Hong Kong to modify the Merit-based
Reward Scheme (see Chapter Five) illuminates possible practical difficulties in
implementing appraisal and reward schemes. Many academic staff of the University
lamented that the need to expend sheer efforts in participating in the scheme is already
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de-motivating, as the work generated necessarily distracts the academics' time and
energy from the core functions of teaching and research. It is worthwhile to conduct
action research to explore the feasibility of a developmental appraisal for academic
staff.
The Final Words
Despite the limitations of the study, it has been shown clearly that the private sector
managerial practices must NOT be implanted to the public sector without regard to the
characteristics of the public organizations. There are merits in many of the new
managerialist practices, which can be adopted in the public sector, given the objective
of ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in the public service. However, while the
adoption of a managerial approach is necessary, the kind of management must be
spec?/Ic to the conditions of the public sector. The management system must be one that
fits the specific organization, to eliminate any unintended consequences. The appraisal
process should take account of the differing context in which the academics work.
In a profit-making organization, the management typically assumes that it alone has the
prerogative to set the objectives and goals, provides the motivational rewards, and
drives every staff towards the goals. Such a managerialist approach also has a tendency
to underplay intrinsic motivation, as it is much easier for the management to give out
extrinsic rewards than to help staff attain intrinsic rewards. Paradoxically the attempt to
motivate staff through external means ONLY is often perceived by staff as a means of
control. The consequence is the staff's resistance to the appraisal and reward scheme
and a deterioration in their intrinsic motivation.
The most effective motivation in the work place is intrinsic motivation. This is
particularly true for academics who have higher order needs of achievement, and who
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are willing to put up with relatively low pay for hard work in order to pursue the
intrinsic satisfaction from academic work. Universities thus do not have all the means to
award academic staff with what they value. Moreover, academic work is not readily
quantifiable, measurable or predictable, and its assessment requires subjective judgment
of quality. Appraisal focusing on control through external technical means will only
work to deprofessionalize the academic workforce, turning devoted people away from
the profession. On the other hand, it was found equally not practicable to rely ONLY
on intrinsic rewards to motivate work performance. Intrinsic motivation cannot last long
unless staffs efforts are recognized in some form of tangible results, so that the staff can
confirm within themselves that they are contributing to the organization's success.
There may be a tension between treating a university as a community of scholars and as
an entrepreneurial organization. A suitably designed appraisal and reward scheme can
be a constructive avenue to discuss the tension openly in order to strike a healthy
balance. The society has the right to demand academics to be accountable for the
efficient use of public funds. However, managerial control based on distrust is not in
tune with the values treasured by academics. Relying solely upon organizational
control at best can guarantee minimum efforts of staff So far as the academic staff are
judged by the extent to which they attain pre-defined targets, rather than by the capacity
to deal with the environment, the "learning capacities" of the universities will be limited
and new knowledge cannot be generated.
It is true that universities should be accountable for the quality of education and
advancement of scholarship. However, the ability to achieve this end depends heavily
on the professional competency of the academic staff, whose personal development is
crucial not only to their own success but also the success of students' learning.
Universities need academics with high motivation, but whose jobs cannot be
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standardized and coordinated in a rigid way. In their attempt to use performance
appraisal to motivate academic staff by linking appraisal results to extrinsic rewards,
universities must take into account the academics' desire for intrinsic rewards,
particularly in terms of autonomy and professional development, and their dislike of
managerial control.
An appraisal scheme with a developmental focus, supplemented by a system of visible
rewards to give recognition to autonomous efforts made by staff to enhance
performance that contributes towards the organization's goals, can serve both
professional development and public accountability purposes. The desire to obtain the
rewards to prove their merit and worth comes from within the academic staff. The
controlling aspect is minimized, as control is based on professional values and
motivation; the feedback aspect is intensified as individuals attain personal satisfaction
by developing themselves, and making their best contribution to the organization's
success. The motivational bases are intrinsic motivation and autonomous extrinsic




Purpose of the Interview
I am currently enrolled on the Doctor of Education degree offered by the
University of Bristol, United Kingdom. As partial fulfillment of the
requirement, I have to conduct a piece of research with a view to
submitting a dissertation.
I am interested in finding out staff perspectives on staff appraisal as an
effective means to motivate and develop academic staff in City University
of Hong Kong. I would like to interview you to learn of your understanding
and expectation of the Performance Planning, Appraisal and Development
(PPAD) scheme introduced at the University for academic staff, your
perspectives on staff appraisal, motivation and development. Your
suggestions on how the scheme could be improved would be useful. The
consolidated results of the interviews, in the form of the dissertation, will
be presented to the School of Education, University of Bristol, and to City
University which is sponsoring my study for the EdD.
The interview will be conducted at a time and place convenient to you. It
is expected to last for about one hour. Confidentiality of your identity will
be strictly enforced. The project aims at finding ways to improve the
PPAD through consolidating views and suggestions. No data subject will
be identified individually. The raw data collected will not be released to
anyone for any other purpose than those stated above.
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People the Respondent Supervises:
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Interview Schedule
A.	 Experience in PPAD and Other Staff Appraisal Exercises
Al. General







• Comparability among staff
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A2. What are the functions achieved by the PPAD scheme?
• Measuring performance
• Imp roving staff performance and productivity
• Enhancing staff professional capabilities
• Motivating staff
• Helping staff formulate development plans
• Facilitating staff training and development
• Enriching staff personal values
• Enhancing University's effectiveness
• Providing information and facilitating communication
• Clarifying/reinforcing mission/value/goals/objectives of the
University
• Helping staff appreciate objectives/expectations of Department
• Helping Department to appreciate staffs expectations and views
• Promoting/destroying collegiality
• Answering University's accountability
• Controlling staffs behaviour
• Discriminating among employees' performance
• Linking to personnel decision, such as salary increment,
promotion
• Getting rid of incompetent staff
• Recording for future reference
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Are these the functions you expected of the PPAD scheme?
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A3. About the Process





• Frequency of cycle
• Appraisal Form
• Self-assessment
• Staff development plan
• Appraisal Meeting
• Duration of the meeting
• Content
• Ways to allay anxiety
• Fair?
• Efficient?
• How long did the whole process take?
• How long did it take to fUl in the appraisal form?
• How long did the Appraisal Meeting take?
• Was the time spent justified?
• What was revealed in the process that would not be revealed
through other means
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A4. About the Criteria/Standard









• Difficult to set
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A5. People lnvolved
Who do you think should be involved in drawing up the criteria?
• Management
• Employee
Who do you think is the most appropriate person to appraise you?
• Head of Department
• Immediate supervisor
• Mentor
How do you consider the appraiser's competency?
• As an educational leader
• As an evaluator






• Objective and balanced
• Concentrated on relevant aspects
• Advice on areas of improvement











What do you think of the Guidebooks?
• Made reference
• Usefulness
How would the data collected by used, in your view?
• Appraisee given a copy
• A copy kept in the departmental office
• Confidentiality
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B.	 Perception of the Impact/Value of the PPAD Scheme
Please explain the impact of the PPAD scheme on you.









How would the PPAD scheme affect the University in achieving its
goals? How would these factors affect your future?
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C.	 Reasons for the Perception about the Impact of the PPAD
Why did the PPAD have such an impact on you?






• Working relationship with supervisors, colleagues
What has had the greatest impact on you?
• PPAD
• Other forms of appraisal
• Other forms of feedback/advice
• Others
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D.	 Improvements to be Made




• Understanding of the scheme
• Mutual trust
• Culture of the University
Do you think that the scheme should continue?
What are the improvements needed?
• Resources
• Workload
• Publicity about the scheme






E.	 Experience in Other Staff Appraisal Scheme
How would you describe your experience in other staff appraisal
exercises?
What made the difference between the PPAD scheme at CityU and
the other appraisal scheme?
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CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
(FOR FACULTY USE)
PERFORMANCE PLANNING, APPRAISAL AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT
for the year
Particulars of Staff Member




Date of First Appointment
Particulars of Appraiser





Part I Performance Plan
(To be completed by staff member and I-lead of Department stipulating
agreed objectives to be used for attainment of results, where applicable)
A. Contribution to Teaching	 _______ % of workload
B. Contribution to Research
	 ______ % of workload
C. Administration	 ______ % of workload
D. Service to the Profession	 _______ % of workload





A.	 Appraisal on Performance Plan
(To be completed by staff member and appraiser)
Contribution to Teaching
Staff s Appraisal 	 Appraiser's Appraisal
Contribution to Research
Staffs Appraisal 	 Appraiser's Appraisal
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B.	 Staff Member's Comments
(You may mention issues such as difficult parts of your job, obstacles for achieving the
performance plan along with areas for improvement and any other comments that will





(To be completed by appraiser)



















collegiality, commitment to the 	 A B C Dinstitution, work attitude etc.
*Note: Please indicate the standard of performance achieved by:
A - very much above expectation
B - above expectation
C - at expectation
D - below expectation
Comments :-
Staff Member's Signature & Date 	 Appraiser's Signature & Date
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Part Ill Staff Development Plan Recommended
(To be completed by appraiser)
Appraiser's Signature & Date
Part IV Meeting between Staff and Head of Department
(To be completed if Head of Department is not the appraiser)
The outcome of the appraisal and the staff development plan were discussed.
Comments from staff member:-
Comments from Head of Department:-
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